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Making International Refugee Law
Relevant Again:
A Proposal for Collectivized and
Solution-Oriented Protection

James C. Hathaway*
R. Alexander Neve**

International refugee law is in crisis. Even as armed conflict and
human rights abuse continue to force individuals and groups to flee
their home countries, many governments are withdrawing from the
legal duty to provide refugees with the protection they require. While
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University; presently Visiting Fromm
Professor of International and Comparative Law, Hastings College of the Law, University of
California at San Francisco. The research funding provided by the Ford Foundation and the John
D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
** Legal Programmes Coordinator, Centre for Refugees Studies of York University.
Since the initial thesis for this project was published as Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human Rights

Protection, 4(2) J. REFUGEE STUD. 113 (1991), it has been debated, elaborated, and refined. In
the spring of 1993, a group of 12 top international refugee law scholars met in Toronto under
the sponsorship of the Centre for Refugee Studies to define the conceptual framework for a
reconceived system of international refugee protection. North-South teams of expert social scientists were then established to generate critical empirical research on the mechanisms identified
to advance the project: collectivized administration, operational burden sharing, temporary protection pending return in safety and dignity, responsibility sharing, and repatriation and development assistance. This research was summarized in five comprehensive "Studies-in-Action,"
which served as the basis for a meeting in May 1995 of 40 academics, government officials, and
representatives of nongovernmental organizations and intergovernmental agencies from around
the world. Based on the deliberations of the May 1995 meeting, a draft synthesis of the proposal
for reform was widely disseminated among persons and organizations committed to refugee
protection, and was debated for several months by an international Internet discussion group
involving 80 people. Finally, consultations with leaders in the international human rights and
global governance communities were convened in London and Washington in October 1996 to
broaden the base of support for reform of the refugee protection system, and to secure strategic
guidance on how best to advance the project on the global agenda.
Most of the participants in the project's various stages acknowledged the urgent need for
refugee law reform to counter increasing resort by states to measures designed to block access to
asylum and otherwise to withdraw from their refugee protection responsibilities. There was a
strong consensus that global reform should be preceded by a sustained effort to build confidence
its the viability of collectivized and solution-oriented temporary protection, which could be
undertaken without calling into question the authority of the present Refugee Convention. This
Article seeks to respond to that advice by positing a relatively detailed proposal for reform of the
mechanisms of refugee protection at the sub-global level, conceived in a way that will lay the
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governments proclaim a willingness to assist refugees as a matter of
political discretion or humanitarian goodwill, they appear committed
to a pattern of defensive strategies designed to avoid international legal
responsibility toward involuntary migrants. Some see this shift away
from a legal paradigm of refugee protection as a source for enhanced
operational flexibility in the face of changed political circumstances.'
For refugees themselves, however, the increasingly marginal relevance
of international refugee law has in practice signalled a shift to inferior
or illusory protection. It has also imposed intolerable costs on many of
the poorest countries, and has involved developed states in practices
antithetical to their basic political values.
The argument that operational effectiveness will be enhanced by
shifting away from reliance on legal principles reflects a serious misunderstanding of the function of international refugee law. The goal of
refugee law, like that of public international law in general, is not
enforceability in a strict sense. 2 It is instead a mechanism by which
governments agree to compromise their sovereign right to independent
action in order to manage complexity, contain conflict, promote decency, or avoid catastrophe. 3 International refugee law was established
precisely because it was seen to afford states a politically and socially
acceptable way to maximize border control in the face of inevitable
involuntary migration. Refugee law has fallen out of favor because its
mechanisms no longer achieve its fundamental purpose of balancing
the rights of involuntary migrants and those of the states to which
refugees flee.
Specifically, it is our view that the withdrawal of states from their
legal responsibility to protect refugees stems primarily from two fac-

groundwork for eventual universal reform. The more broad-ranging thinking of project participants on fundamental reform of refugee law at the global level is collected in RECONCEIVING
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAw (James C. Hathaway ed., forthcoming, 1997).
1.
The last five years have witnessed some significant changes in the scale, score and
complexity of the global refugee question .... In their efforts to respond to these

contradictory developments, UNHCR and its partners have been obliged to reassess
the continued relevance of established approaches to the problem of involuntary migration. New strategies are emerging from this process, which, in contrast to earlier
approaches, are designed to address the causes as well as the consequences of forced
displacement. As a result, international attention is moving away from the difficulties
confronting refugees in their countries of asylum and towards the circumstances which
have obliged them to leave their homeland.
UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES: IN SEARCH OF SOLUTIONS 19 (1995)
[hereinafter UNHCR, WORLD'S REFUGEES].
2. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (1991). Yet as Professor Henkin observes, "lilt
is probably the case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of internationallaw and almost
all of their obligations almost all of the time." Louis HENNiN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND
FOREIGN POuCY 47 (1979) (emphasis in original).
3. RICHARD FALK, REVITALIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW 91-93 (1989).
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tors. First, governments increasingly believe that a concerted commitment to refugee protection is tantamount to an abdication of their
migration control responsibilities. They see refugee protection as little
more than an uncontrolled "back door" route to permanent immigration, in conflict with official efforts to tailor admissions on the basis of
economic or other criteria. Second, neither the actual duty to admit
refugees nor the real costs associated with their arrival are fairly apportioned among governments. There is a keen awareness that the states
in which refugees arrive presently bear sole legal responsibility for what
often amounts to indefinite protection.
In principle, refugee protection is not about immigration. It is
intended to be a situation-specific human rights remedy: when the
violence or other human rights abuse that induced refugee flight comes
to an end, so does refugee status. Nor is this duty of limited duration
logically assigned on the basis of accidents of geography or the relative
ability of states to control their borders. Governments have regularly
endorsed the importance of international solidarity and burden sharing,
but collectivized efforts to date have been ad hoc and usually insufficient.
The challenge is to re-assert both the essence of refugee protection
as a human rights remedy, and the logic of a shared commitment by
governments to provide and fund that remedy. We can no longer insist
on either the routine, permanent integration of all refugees, 4 nor expect
all governments, whatever their circumstances, simply to receive and
provide quality protection to all refugees who arrive at their territory.
The critical right of at-risk people to seek asylum will survive only if
4. This Article does not address the question of a formal expansion of the conceptual scope of
refugee status beyond that mandated by Article I of the United Nations Convention relating to
the Status of Refugees, openedfor signatureJuly 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered intoforce April
22, 1954) [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. We proceed instead on the basis of a holistic and
contextualized understanding of a Convention refugee as "a person who is outside her country
because she reasonably believes that her civil or political status puts her at risk of serious harm
in that country, and that her own government cannot or will not protect her." JAsS C.
HATHAWAY, THe LAW OF RaFuGE STATUS v (1991). There is, however, reason to believe that
a shift of the kind advocated in this Article, in which refugee status leads to temporary protection
rather than to permanent residence, may induce states to conceive refugee status more expansively.
The most inclusive legal definitions of entitlement to refugee status are incorporated in the
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Sept. 10, 1969, art.
1, para. 1, 1001 U.N.T.S. 46 [hereinafter OAU Refugee Convention], and the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, at 190-93, OAS/Ser.LJVILI.66, doc. 10, rev. 1 (Nov. 19-22, 1984), endorsed
by the Organization of American States [hereinafter OAS Cartagena Declaration]. Each was
developed by states accustomed to granting protection on a temporary basis. A comparable
relaxation in the definition can be seen in the temporary protection programs implemented by
Northern states. Access to these programs usually has not been conditioned on strict compliance
with the Convention refugee definition. For instance, persons in flight from ongoing armed
conflict, environmental disaster, or other extraordinary and temporary condition may be granted
.temporary protected status" (TPS) under United States law. Immigration Act of 1990 § 302, 8
U.S.C. § 1254(b)(1) (1994).
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the mechanisms of international refugee protection can be reconceived
to minimize conflict with the legitimate migration control objectives
of states, and dependably and equitably to share responsibilities and
burdens. In the analysis that follows, we argue for a shift to a solutionoriented temporary protection of refugees, conceived within a framework
of common but differentiated responsibility among states.
In Part I, we define the current crisis in refugee protection, and
elaborate our view that reform should address both the absence of a
meaningful solution orientation in present mechanisms of protection,
and the problem of individuated state responsibility. We argue that
there is an ethical imperative to engage with these legitimate preoccupations of governments, but to do so without compromising the
critical right to seek asylum. In Part II, we posit the two cornerstones
of a renewed system of refugee law: solution-oriented temporary protection, and shared responsibility among states to both protect refugees
and finance the costs of protection. We also show how such a conceptual shift can be achieved without formally revising the framework of
the Refugee Convention.
Part III of the Article offers a detailed blueprint of how such a
system might function in practice. We define the elements of solutionoriented temporary protection, including respect for the refugees' social
structures, development of skills and resources during temporary protection, the promotion of linkages with the internally displaced and
stayee communities, and confidence-building in anticipation of repatriation. We grapple with the definition of principled limits to temporary protection, and with the means to ensure that repatriation in
safety and dignity is a viable option for most refugees. The institutional structure for the implementation of collectivized protection is
then outlined, focusing on the establishment of interest-convergence
groups at the sub-global level that agree in advance to allocate the
responsibilities and burdens of a refugee flow among themselves on the
basis of pre-established criteria.
Finally, we turn to the substantive criteria that we believe ought to
define the relative obligations of the state members of an interest-convergence group. Basing our proposal on the notion of common but
differentiated responsibility, we suggest standards that take full account of the very real differences in the relative abilities and circumstances of states, and seek to maximize the overall commitment to
protection by drawing on the strengths of each participating government.

1997 / InternationalRefugee Law
I. THE NEED FOR REFORM
Modern refugees increasingly encounter significant barriers erected
to prevent them from reaching potential asylum states. Because particular states have legal obligations only toward refugees who are
within the sphere of their formal or de facto jurisdiction, 5 efforts to
exclude refugees altogether are an effective means to avoid the duty to
provide protection. Where the denial of entry is politically or logistically problematic, refugees who arrive in asylum states are often dealt
with harshly and in violation of their human rights. Many states hope
that refugees physically present will feel compelled to leave, or at least
that would-be refugees will be diverted elsewhere. For those refugees
able to enter and remain in an asylum state, the reality of protection
is increasingly bleak. While fewer governments are prepared to link
refugee status to a right of permanent residence, little thought is given
to how to dovetail the modalities of temporary asylum with a serious
commitment to solutions. The "warehousing" of refugees, long practiced by many states of the South, is therefore becoming a common
feature of asylum in the North as well.
A. Refoulement
Even though international law presently requires no more than the
provision of rights-regarding temporary protection, Northern states, in
law or in practice, have historically afforded refugees permanent status. 6
As the interest-convergence 7 between refugees and developed countries
has disappeared, Northern states have sought to avoid the arrival of
5. The Refugee Convention, supra note 4, and the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees,
Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, are treaties to which particular states agfee to be bound. While
an individual isa Convention refugee as soon as he or she meets the Convention definition (see
infra text accompanying notes 173-178), the rights that accrue by virtue of that status remain
inchoate until the refugee comes under the formal or effective control of a state party to the
Refugee Convention or Protocol.
6. The notion of interest-convergence theory is elaborated in Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of
Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARv.L. REV. 518 (1980).
7.
Because refugees seeking protection in the years following the Second World War were
of European stock, their cultural assimilation was perceived as relatively straightforward. Refugees also helped to meet acute post-War labor shortages. The reception of
refugees opposed to communist regimes moreover reinforced the ideological and strategic objectives of the capitalist world .... The reasons that induced this traditional
generosity toward refugees have, however, largely withered away. Most refugees who
seek to enter developed states today are from the poorer countries of the South: their
"different" racial and social profile is seen as a challenge to the cultural cohesion of
many developed states. The economies of industrialized states no longer require substantial and indiscriminate infusions of labor. Nor is there ideological or strategic value
in the admission of most refugees. To the contrary, governments more often view
refugee protection as an irritant to political and economic relations with the state of
origin.
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refugees by adopting policies of external deterrence. Because developed
states have the logistical capacity to prevent the arrival of many, and
sometimes most, refugees, they have been able to implement non-entr6s
practices that prevent refugees from even reaching their frontiers. Since
legal duties arise only once refugees successfully access a state's jurisdiction, non-entrie practices are a relatively invisible, and hence politically expedient, means to ensure that refugees are never in a position
to assert their legal right to protection.
Specifically, most Northern states impose a visa requirement on the
nationals of refugee-producing states, and penalize airlines and other
transportation companies for bringing unauthorized refugees into their
territories. By refusing to grant visas for the purpose of making a claim
to asylum, Northern countries have been able to insulate themselves
from many potential claimants of refugee status. 9 The United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has expressed concern
that visas are a serious obstacle to the admission to protection of
refugees, and may in some instances put refugees at serious risk of
refoulement,10 that is, of return to the country in which they assert they
will be at risk of grave harm."
Multilateral burden-shifting arrangements and bilateral readmission
treaties have also proved popular with Northern states. These arrangements deny entry to asylum-seekers who have not arrived by direct
transportation, and authorize their summary removal to so-called "safe
third countries" to pursue their claims.' 2 In Europe, refugees are thus

James C. Hathaway, Can InternationalRefugee Law Be Made Relevant Again?, in U.S. CoMmirrEu
FOR REFUGEES, WoRLD REFUGEE SURVEY 14, 15 (1996).
8. The concept ofnon-entre policies ("the refugee shall not access our community") is developed
in James C. Hathaway, The emerging politics of non-entre, 91 REFUGEES 40-41 (1992).
9. Asylum applications in the 15 developed states that belong to the Intergovernmental
Consultations dropped by 44% between 1992 and 1995. The projection is for a further 31%,
reduction in 1996. The rate of decline was radically greater in Europe, where non-entree practices
are most evolved, as compared with Australia, Canada, and the United States. The European 1995
asylum claim rate was 58% lower than the 1992 rate; the 1995 rate for Australia, Canada, and
the United States actually increased by about 20% relative to 1992. INTER-GOVERNMENTAL
CONSULTATIONS ON ASYLUM, REFUGEE AND MIGRATION POLICIES IN EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA, AND AUSTRALIA, EVOLUTION IN THE NUMBER OF ASYLUM APPLICATIONS AND GENEVA
CONVENTION STATUS DECISIONS (July 22, 1996). "Sanctions . . . have had an effect on the
number of airport asylum requests. A year after Britain's fines were introduced, airport asylum
applications dropped by fifty percent." Peter Kessler, Jet Set Refugees, 88 REFUGEES 35 (1992)
See generally Erika Feller, CarrierSanctions and InternationalLaw, 1 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 48 (1989),
10. UNHCR, WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 1, at 200-01.
11.
No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner

whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened
on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion.
Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 33(1).
12. Rosemary Byrne & Andrew Shacknove, The Safe Country Notion in European Asylum Law,
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removed from Northern and Western Europe to the transit states of
Southern, Central, and Eastern Europe. The governments of Canada
and the United States have similarly explored the possibility of an
arrangement with Mexico that would authorize the return to that
country of Central and South American asylum-seekers. 13 These procedures are premised neither on substantive nor procedural harmonization of refugee determination at a level that ensures meaningful protection. 14 Because the largely uncoordinated system of international
refugee protection is incapable of delivering consistent results from
state to state, burden-shifting arrangements can deprive persons who
are genuine refugees of internationally guaranteed rights, including the
right to protection against refoulement.
Even when refugees are able to navigate the course of visas, interdiction, and burden-shifting arrangements, they often remain at risk
of refoulement. Developed states that wish to avoid receiving refugees
adopt restrictive interpretations of the Convention refugee definition
as a means of influencing refugees' choice of a destination state. The
result is a downward spiral of protection toward the lowest common
denominator, and a failure to recognize the claims of persons who are
entitled to international protection. For example, the states of the
European Union have recently adopted a common policy in which they
refuse to recognize the refugee status of persons threatened by non-state
actors unless the risk "is individual in nature and is encouraged or
permitted by the authorities."' 5 Only Sweden has formally opposed this
reversal of the usual understanding that seriously at-risk persons are
the harm,
also refugees where the authorities are not complicitous in
16
but nonetheless prove unable to offer effective protection.

9 Hsv.Hum. Rrs. J. 185 (1996). A "domino effect" has been noted, in which refugees are
pushed farther and farther away from developed states. Stefan Teloken, The Domino Effect, 94
REFUGEES 38-40 (1993). See also Wladyslaw Czaplinski, Aliens and Refugee Law in Poland-Reent
Developments, 6 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 636, 641 (1994).
13. Arthur C. Helton, Toward Harmonized Asylum Procedures in North America: The Proposed
UnitedStates-CanadaMemorandum of Understandingfor Cooperationin the Examinationof Refugee Status
Claims from Nationals of Third Countries, 26 CORNuLL INT'L L.J. 737, 738 (1993). A proposed
agreement between the United States and Canada contemplates the possibility that asylum-seekers who arrive in the territory of either state may be removed to a third country. Preliminary
Draft Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States
of America for Cooperation in Examination of Refugee Status Claims from Nationals of Third
Countries, Oct. 24, 1995, art. 5.

14.

See FRANWOIS CR9PEAU, DROIT D'ASnLE: DE L'HoSPITAIT9 AUX CONTROLES MIGRA-

TOIRES 280-84 (1995); SARAH COLuNSON, BEYOND BORDERS: WEST EUROPEAN MIGRATION
POLICY TowARDs THE 21ST CENTURY 83-84 (1993).
15. Council of the European Union, Joint position defined by the Council on the basis of
Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union on the harmonized application of the definition of
the term "refugee" in Article 1 of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to the status
of refugees, 1996 O.J. (L 63).
16. Id at Annex II. Denmark initially entered the same reservation as Sweden, but withdrew
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More dramatically, Northern states are beginning to adopt summary
exclusion procedures and to interdict refugees at frontiers and in international waters. France, for example, detains asylum-seekers in artificially designated "international zones" of its airports, in which it
has claimed to be free from the constraints of either domestic or
international law.17 The interdiction at sea of Haitian refugees by the
United States is another example. The U.S. Coast Guard forced asylum-seekers onto its vessels, destroyed their boats, and returned them
to Haiti where many suffered further human rights abuse.18 The U.S.
Supreme Court condoned this policy.19 In addition, recent legislation
adopted in the United States allows for the quick turnaround of
refugees at border points. Refugees who rely on false documentation
to avoid visa controls will now be subject to a summary removal
process after no more than a rudimentary examination of their need
for protection. 20 European governments have similarly approved expedited exclusion procedures for a wide-ranging category of asylum-seekers, including those whose claims are deemed (without a hearing on
the merits) "inconsistent, contradictory or fundamentally improbable."'21 Because both the American and European procedures authorize
the removal of asylum-seekers whose claims to refugee status have not
22
been seriously considered, they raise the specter of refoulement.

its objections. In contrast to the European Union position, the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees affirms that "[w]here serious discriminatory or other offensive acts
are committed by the local populace, they can be considered as persecution if they are knowingly
tolerated by the authorities, or if the authorities refuse, or
prove unable, to offer effective protection." UNHCR, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE
STATUS
65 (1979) [hereinafter, UNHCR HANDBOOK] (emphasis added).
17. U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SuRvEY 140 (1995). The recent
judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Amuur v. France, 22 Eur.Ct. H.R. at 533
(1996) found that despite itsname, the "international zone" does not have extraterritorial status.
As a result, the denial by France of basic legal, humanitarian, and social assistance to asylumseekers within the "international zone" amounted to a violation of Art. 5(1Xf) of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
18. See generally Bill Frelick, HaitianBoat Interdiction and Return: FirstAsylum and FirstPrinciples
of Refugee Protection, 26 CORNELL INT'L .J.675 (1993); Arthur C. Helton, The United States
Government Program of Intercepting and Forcibly Returning Haitian Boat People to Haiti: Policy Impications and Prospects, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 325 (1993).
19. See Sale v.HaitianCenters Council, Inc.,
509 U.S. 155 (1993). See also Guy S. Goodwin-Gill,
The Haitian Refoulement Case: A Comment, 6 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 103 (1994).
20. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Star. 3009 (1996).
21. Ministers of the Member States of the European Communities Responsible for Immigration, Resolution on manifestly unfounded applications for asylum (Nov. 30-Dec. 1, 1992),
reprinted in EUROPEAN CONSULTATION ON REFUGEES AND EXILES, SAFE COUNTRIES, MYTHS
AND REAnTiEs, App. C (1995).
22.
[C]onsider the case of Fauziya Kassindja, the young woman who fled from Togo to
escape genital mutilation. She sought asylum here but was turned down on arrival and
again by an immigration judge. After a year in detention, a dedicated lawyer took her
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It is also refoulement to require refugees to repatriate while a risk of
persecution persists in their country of origin. In January 1996, Germany announced a two-stage plan for repatriation of Bosnian refugees,
to begin on June 30, 1996, but then appropriately suspended the plan
out of concern that conditions were still unsafe. Soon after the recent
Bosnian elections, however, German authorities announced that repatriation efforts would proceed. 23 This time, the government has minimized the significance of human rights concerns, turning a blind eye
to widespread evidence of election fraud.24 Indeed, the fact that officials
have said they will not send refugees back to "areas now governed by
hostile ethnic groups" 25 suggests that the situation in Bosnia is too
unstable to warrant sending refugees back at all. The NATO-led peace
force has reported dozens of homes destroyed by fires or explosions,
and observed that "[ulsing mines to blow up houses that refugees
might fix up and move into is clearly designed to keep fear alive and
26
intimidate refugees who might have wished to return to their homes."
There is even evidence of official hostility to the return of refugees,
formal commitments notwithstanding. 27 The forced return of refugees
to such circumstances amounts to refoulement.
Southern states have historically demonstrated relatively scrupulous
regard for the principle of non-refoulement, even under very difficult
circumstances. A case in point was the admission to India of
ten million refugees from Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) between
March and December 1971. Most of the refugees were Bengali Hindus,
many of whom had family or other connections in India. The massive
numbers notwithstanding, "there was no question of turning any refugee
case to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which granted her asylum. Under [the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, supranote 21],
Ms. Kassindja would have had at most one week to appeal to an immigration judgewithout a lawyer, and probably by telephone. She could not have taken her case to the
Board of Immigration Appeals. After the immigration judge turned her down, she
would have been sent back at once to Togo, and butchery.
Anthony Lewis, Covering Up Cruelty, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1996, at A15.
23. German authorities originally intended to begin repatriating Bosnians after March 31,
1996. At a January 26, 1996 meeting that date was delayed until June 30, 1996. U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, WORmD REFUGEE SURVEY 150 (1996). This deadline was again extended,
but the intention to begin repatriations was reaffirmed, following a meeting of 16 German state
interior ministers on September 19, 1996. A government spokesman indicated that "those who
resist voluntary repatriation will face deportation." Germany to Begin Returning Bosnians, REFUGEE
REPORTS, Sept. 30, 1996, at 13.
24. Alan Cowell, Germans Plan to Return Refugees to Bosnia, N.Y TIMES, Sept. 20, 1996, at
A14; Julian Borger, Massive vote-rigging taints Bosnia election, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WKLY.,
Sept. 29, 1996, at 1.
25. Cowell, supra note 24.
26. Dozens of Bosnian Homes Are Set Ablaze, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 26, 1996, at A7 (quoting Major
Simon Haselock, a spokesman for the NATO peace force in Bosnia).
27. Mike O'Connor, Defiantly, Bosnian Serbs Blow Up Muslims' Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7,

1996, at A6.
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back." 28 Increasingly, however, Southern states have taken decisive,
and often unlawful, action to avert responsibility toward refugees.
While usually lacking the resources and sophisticated border control
systems to implement non-entr&e policies, governments in the less
developed world have engaged in several more direct forms of refoulement.
Most notoriously, Southern governments have sometimes forced
refugees away from their territory by physical deterrence or the
closure of borders. Between 1975 and 1980, for example, one million Indochinese refugees fled Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Countries in the region were unwilling to admit them, even on a temporary basis. Concerned that there would be little effective international
assistance, governments were convinced that temporary admission
would lead to long-term responsibility for the refugees. These countries of first asylum only agreed to allow refugees to be admitted to
temporary protection once they had received formal commitments
from countries outside the region to accept the refugees for resettlement. When resettlement countries opted to stop receiving refugees, first asylum states were reluctant to continue to offer even
29
temporary protection.
Boatloads of Liberian refugees have also recently been shunted from
port to port throughout West Africa, and at times denied entry to any
country. They have been forced to remain on overcrowded ships, in
unhealthy conditions, without sufficient food and water for prolonged
periods of time, and always at risk of eventual return to Liberia.
Countries such as Sierra Leone, Cte d'IvoYre, Guinea, and Ghana have
welcomed hundreds of thousands of Liberians over the past seven years,
but now appear unwilling to allow more Liberian refugees into their
territory.30 In dosing its border, Cbte d'Ivo're (which has provided
asylum to over 300,000 Liberians) emphasized that it simply could not
cope with any more refugees. 31 Tanzania took similar action in 1995
28. B.S. Chimni, The Legal Condition of Refugees in India, 7 J. REFUGEE STUD. 378, 381 (199-1).
In emphasizing the temporary nature of the refuge India would provide, the government referred

to the refugees as "evacuees," and housed them in short-term "transit relief camps." The refugees
quickly returned home after the liberation of Bangladesh. The officially assisted repatriation
movement of the refugees began on January 1, 1972 and was completed an extraordinary two
and one-half months later. G.J.L Coles, Temporary Refuge and the Large Scale Influx of Refugees
5 (submitted to UNHCR Expert Meeting, July 17, 1981).
29. See generally JANINA W. DACYL, BETWEEN COMPASSION AND REALPOLMKIT
(1992); James
C. Hathaway, Labelling the "Boat People". The Failureof the Human Rights Mandate of the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees, 15 HUM. RTs. Q. 686 (1993); Sten A. Bronbe, The
History of the Comprehensive Plan of Action, 5 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 534 (1993).
30. Jana Mason, Liberian Refugee Crisis: Africa Reconsiders its Tradition of Hospitality, REFUGI3I
REP., July 30, 1996, at 1-10; Asylum? No, thanks, 37 AFR. CONFIDENTAL, May 24, 1996, at
8.
31. Mason, supra note 30, at 3.
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in response to an influx of as many as 50,000 Rwandans, who needed
to escape ethnic-based violence in Burundi, their country of first refuge.
Already accommodating about 750,000 Rwandan refugees and fearing
decreasing support from the international community, Tanzania tem32
porarily closed its borders.
Even where refugees are admitted to a Southern asylum state, they
occasionally face concerted efforts to drive them out. Zaire admitted
huge numbers of Rwandan refugees following the genocide and ensuing civil war that left perhaps one million Tutsi and thousands of
moderate Hutu dead in 1994. There was, however, considerable local
hostility and resentment directed at the refugee population, which was
blamed for environmental degradation and increased insecurity in the
area. In 1995, Zaire began forcibly expelling several thousand of the
estimated 1.8 million Rwandan refugees, and announced that the forced
repatriations would continue until there was a concrete plan to provide
33
for the return of the refugees to Rwanda.
The duty of non-refoulement was similarly violated by the mass expulsion of some 500,000 Rwandan refugees from Tanzania in December 1996, 34 pursuant to an edict enforced by armed troops. 35 UNHCR
apparently acquiesced in this move, 36 even though no serious effort had
been made to effect a reconciliation between the Hutu refugees and
the Tutsi and other survivors of the 1994 genocide.3 7 Nor was provision

32. Refuge seekers denied entry, [TORONTO] GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 1, 1995; Rwandans stopped at
border, [TORONTO] GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 3, 1995; Tanzania Closes Border to Over 50,000 Refugees,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, availablein LEXIS, News library, Curnws file. In 1996, Tanzania again
closed its border to refugees. UNHCR PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION, INFORMIATION BULLETIN:
BURUNDI AND RWANDA, June 1996.
33. Refugees Flee Zairian Troops, [TORONTO] GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 23, 1995. See also Zaire
Expels 3,500 Refugee From Rwanda Border Camp, N.Y. TIES, Aug. 22, 1995, at 2; TerrifiedRwanda.
Refugees Forced out of Camps, [TORONTO] GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 22, 1995; Zairian Troops Force out
Hutus, THE INDEPENDENT, Aug. 22, 1995; AMNESTy INTERNATIONAL, RWANDA AND BuRUNDI-THE RETURN HOMe: RUMOURS AND REALITIES, Feb. 20, 1996. Forced repatriation was
again threatened in 1996, long before the apparently voluntary mass repatriation of refugees in
the latter part of that year. Zaire Move to Seal Camp Part of Plan, [TORONTO] GLOBE & MAIL,
Feb. 13, 1996; Get out, Maybe, [TORONTO] GLOBE & MAIL, Feb. 20, 1996.
34. Tanzania and the U.N. Tell Rwandan Refugees to Go Home, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 6, 1996, at
A15.
35. James C. McKinley, Jr., Tide of Rwanda Refugees Flows Back to Tanzania Camps, N.Y. TiMES,
Dec. 14, 1996, at A4; James C. McKinley, Jr., Soldiers Force Refugees Into Rwanda From Tanzania,
N.Y TWmrs, Dec. 16, 1996, at A3.
36.
Now Tanzania, another country where [Rwandan Hutus] sought refuge, no longer
wants them either, and its policy is being enforced by troops with guns. On the
sidelines, someone representing the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
stands by and notes cheerfully, "They're moving in the right direction."
Barbara Crossette, The Shield for Exiles is Lowered, N.Y TWs, Dec. 22, 1996, at 4(1).
37. Suzanne Daley, Rwandans Confront a Time to Heal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1996, at A6.
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of any kind made to consider particularized objections to the asserted
safety of return.

B. Denials of Refugee Rights
While Southern states have traditionally been less likely than Northern
governments to block access to asylum altogether, refugee life in much
of the less developed world is marked by insecurity and the inability
to meet even basic needs. In part, this occurs because refugees are
being protected in states in which citizens themselves suffer from
a severe lack of economic resources. Of the twenty-six countries
where the refugee to host population ratio is 1:100 or greater, only
five have a per capita gross national product over U.S. $1,000.38
As Southern countries continue to face mass influxes of refugees
without assurance of dependable assistance from wealthier countries,
they have expressed an understandable reluctance to share scarce resources with refugees. 39 Southern states have increasingly resisted honoring international legal duties that require the expenditure of resources, such as the right of refugees to be assimilated to nationals in
terms of access to rationing systems, elementary education, and public
relief.4 o
Refugees also face severe difficulties as the result of human rights
abuse in many Southern asylum states. Malawi, for example, hosted a
population of 1.1 million Mozambican refugees between the early 1980s
and 1992. Large-scale repatriation occurred in 1993, when sixteen
years of brutal civil war in Mozambique ended. Malawi's willingness
to shelter such a large number of refugees, amounting to more than
ten percent of its own population, is without parallel in the North.
Refugees in Malawi, however, also endured a pattern of serious human
rights abuse, including expulsion, detention, sexual abuse, and theft of
food rations. At the time, human rights violations were commonplace
in dictatorial Malawi, and the ruling government strongly supported
RENAMO, the armed Mozambican opposition group from which many
of the refugees were fleeing.4 1
Perhaps the most common denial of refugee rights in the South is
the forced confinement of refugees. Mozambican refugees in South
Africa were granted temporary resident status only in two South
African homelands, and any Mozambican residing elsewhere in South
38.

U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, WoRD REFUGEE SURVEY

7 (1996).

39. Fernando del Mundo, The Future of Asylum in Africa, 96 REFUGEES 3-7 (1994).
40. Refugee Convention, supra note 4, arts. 20, 22, 23. See generally JAMES C. HATHAWAY &
JOHN A. DENT, REFUGEE RIGHTS: REPORT ON A COMPARATIVE SURVEY 32-33, 39-40 (1995).
41. See RCHARD CARVER, LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHIS, AFRicAN EXODUS:
REFUGEE Ciusis, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 1969 OAU CONVENTION 3, 80-83 (1995).
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Africa was considered an illegal alien subject to deportation. 42 The
majority of Vietnamese refugees in Thailand have been held in an
isolated and overcrowded detention center in the northeast of the
country, where there are concerns about inadequate water and sanitation, an arbitrary code of justice, and physical abuse. 43 Countries of
first asylum routinely restrict Indochinese asylum-seekers to closed
camps, which have been described as being "run in the same spirit and
according to many of the same rules as the prisons[,J . . .surrounded
44
by tall fences and patrolled by guards."
In some instances, there have been serious concerns about the vulnerability of refugees in the South to attack by agents of both their
home and asylum countries. In Kenya, for example, there have been
numerous reports of the rape of Somali refugee women by local police
and military. Somali refugees in Kenya have also been attacked by
armed Somali bandits who fled into northeast Kenya after U.N. forces
were deployed in Somalia. Because of longstanding discrimination in
Kenya directed at its own ethnic Somali population, Kenyan authori45
ties did little to stop the assaults.
Relocation efforts have also been the source of rights violations, even
when the efforts were undertaken to ensure greater safety for the
refugees. In the early 1970s, the Sudanese government, with the cooperation of UNHCR, forcibly relocated Eritrean refugees from border
camps to new, permanent settlements away from the frontier. The
refugees, who were not consulted, resisted the move, primarily because
they considered it incompatible with their desire to repatriate4 6 In
1984, Mexico transferred Guatemalan refugees from self-settled camps
near the border to interior locations in order to avoid attacks on the
refugees by the Guatemalan military. To achieve this goal, Mexican
authorities resorted to flagrant human rights violations, including burning
47
settlements, cutting off food supplies, and forcibly evicting refugees.

42. See id at 42-47.
43. U.S. COMMITrEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 85 (1993).
44. LAWYERS COMMITrEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, INHUMANE DETENTION: THE TREATMENT

OF VIETNAMESE BOAT PEOPLE IN HONG KONG 2 (1989). See also U.S. COMMITTEE FOR
REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 81 (1993); U.S. COMMITrEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD
REFUGEE SURVEY 84 (1995).
45. See AFRICA WATCH, KENYA: FORCIBLE RETURN OF SOMALI REFUGEES AND GOVERNMENT REPRESSION OF KENYAN SoMALs (1989); IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD DOCUMENTATION

CENTRE, CANADA,

KENYA:

RESTORATION OF MULTIPARTY GOVERNMENT AND

KENYANS OF SOMALI ORIGIN (1992); AFRICAN RIGHTS, THE NIGHTMARE CONTINUES: ABUSES
AGAINST SOMALI REFUGEES IN KENYA (1993). See also CARVER, supra note 41, at 64-71.
46. GA m KIBREAB, REFUGEES AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF ERITREA 80-83

(1987).
47. Joel Simon & Beatriz Manz, Representation, Organization, and Human Rights Among Guatemalan Refugees in Mexico--1980-1992, 5 HALv. HuM. RTS. J. 95, 109-10 (1992).
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In extreme cases, patterns of rights violation may be tantamount to
refoulement. Since 1983, India has provided asylum to over 200,000 Sri
Lankan refugees. Initially, the refugees were welcomed in southern
India. Tensions grew,, however, when India attempted unsuccessfully to
intervene, in the Sri Lankan conflict, and when Tamil separatists assassinated Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. Following a
1992 agreement between Sri Lanka and India to facilitate voluntary
repatriation of the refugees, India began taking a number of steps to
"promote" return. The Indian government suspended education for the
children of Sri Lankan refugees, delayed the delivery of food rations
and stipend money, and refused to make repairs in refugee camps. After
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were banned from the camps,
supplementary health, feeding, education, and recreation programs
ended. Freedom of movement was restricted, making it difficult for
refugees to work. There were also concerns that some refugees had not
understood the repatriation agreements (which were initially available
only in English), and that they were not provided with reliable information about conditions in Sri Lanka. By violating the rights of Sri
Lankan refugees in order to force them to return home before it was
safe, the Indian authorities committed "indirect refoulement,"' 8 consistently violating refugee rights to force them to return to an unsafe
home.
Patterns of human rights violations against refugees have also been
reported in Northern countries, particularly in states of the former Soviet
bloc.4 9 In most cases, though, Northern governments have respected the
human rights of refugees who manage to enter their territories, no doubt
prompted by legal cultures receptive to holding states formally accountable to their treaty obligations. But when a significant number of Bosnian
asylum-seekers successfully evaded European non-entre policies, special
legal regimes were devised coupling relaxed eligibility requirements
with rights sometimes set below international legal standards. Under
the guise of affording refugees from former Yugoslavia (legitimate)
temporary protection, these schemes often suspended the usual procedures for processing refugee claims and required members of the des48. AsIA WATCH, HALT REPATRIATION OF SM!LANKAN TAMIIs, Aug. 1993; U.S. Comumrrua
FOR REFUGEES, "PEOPLE WANT PEACE": REPATRIATION AND REINTEGRATION IN WAR-ToRN

SRI LANKA, Jan. 1994.

49.
"We have no right to work, no education, no right to rent housing, no right to medical
treatment," [arefugee in Russia] said. "We are still subject to the law on foreigners,
which means we are considered illegal." He produced tattered pieces of a UNHCR
registration card that he said had been torn up by a Russian policeman who said it
was worthless.

Ron Redmond, Old Problem in a New World, 94 REFUGEES 28-30 (1993). Sce also Sarah Koenig,
Refugees Straining Patiencein Russia, N.Y. Tndis, Dec. 26, 1996, at A6.
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ignated groups to accept the lesser status and lesser rights provided for
in the special legislation. 50
While European governments have the authority to enact supplementary protection regimes, they cannot rely on the existence of such
programs to deny Convention rights to those entitled to Convention
refugee status under international law.5 1 Yet, European countries have
sometimes placed restrictions on the freedom of movement of temporarily protected refugees. In Germany, persons with a temporary residence authorization may not leave the ldnder or part of the lnder that
issued the authorization. 52 In other countries, such as Norway, entitlement to social assistance and housing benefits may be expressly tied to
residence in a certain municipality or reception center. 53 More generally, temporary refugee protection is frequently coupled with policies
that make it difficult for refugees to support themselves and their
families. Most Northern states allow individuals in receipt of temporary protection to work. In the Netherlands, however, work permits
are issued only after three years of temporary protection. 54 In Denmark,
temporarily protected refugees can work only in refugee shelters, in
special programs run by the Danish Refugee Council, or in jobs that
cannot be filled by a Dane or the holder of a Danish work permit. 55
After the decision was made to suspend the processing of Bosnian
asylum claims, temporarily protected refugees in Germany were denied
access to the labor market.56 The Refugee Convention, in contrast,
requires states to grant refugees the same access to employment as that
of the nationals of the most favored countries, 57 arguably requiring
European Union (EU) states to grant refugees the same access to
58
employment as granted nationals of other EU states.

50. For instance, when temporary protection for Bosnian refugees was adopted in Denmark in

November 1992, the authorities suspended the processing of Bosnian claims for regular asylum

(resumed in December 1994). Similarly, although a grant of temporary protection is no legal bar to

an application fbr asylum in Germany, the processing of Bosnian asylum claims was de facto suspended
in that country as well. SECRETARIAT OF THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL CONSULTATIONS ON
ASYLUM, REFUGEE AND MIGRATION POLICIES IN EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA AND AUSTRALIA,
REPORT ON TEMPORARY PROTECTION IN STATES IN EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA AND AUSTRALIA

79, 118 (1995)

[hereinafter INTER-GOVERNMENTAL CONSULTATIONS, TEMPORARY PROTECTION].
51. Many Bosnians assigned to temporary protection had genuine claims to refugee status. By

way of comparison, Canada recognized 97% of refugee claims from Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995.
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD, CONVENTION REFUGEE DETERMINATION DsISION, STA-

TISTICAL SummARY, 1995.

52. INTER-GOVERNMENTAL
53. Id. at 168.
54. Id. at 153.

CONSULTATIONS,

TEMPORARY PROTECTION, supra note 50, at 122.

55. Id. at 82.
56. Id. at 121; Morten Kjerum, Temporary Protection in Europe in the 1990s, 6 INT'LJ. REFUGEE

L. 444, 453 (1994).
57. Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 17(1).
58. HATHAWAY & DENT, supra note 40, at 27. However, some European governments have
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In the face of restrictions on the right to work, access to public
assistance is clearly crucial.' 9 Some European states, including France
and Belgium, grant temporarily protected refugees access to the national social welfare system. 60 Other states withhold welfare assistance,
or limit the provision of welfare to "in kind" assistance, including some
period of required residence in reception centers, and longer-term
provision of food, clothing, and pocket money. For instance, in the
United States, beneficiaries of Temporary Protected Status (TPS)61 enjoy
only restricted eligibility for public assistance, and have been unable
62
to apply for a number of basic forms of welfare support.
Northern states have taken a particularly restrictive approach to the
reunification of refugee families. As discussed in Part 11,63 this right
to reunification does have standing in international law and is of vital
importance to the well-being of refugees. However, most Northern
states, including the United States, France, Germany, Switzerland, and
the United Kingdom, do not allow any family reunification for the
beneficiaries of temporary protection, 64 while the Netherlands allows
65
reunification only after three years of temporary protection.

C. Refugee Warehousing
The "temporary" protection systems of many states could more
accurately be called "indefinite" protection regimes. Refugee protection
frequently amounts to a system of prolonged "warehousing" in which
refugees are denied the right to integrate in the asylum state, yet are
entered explicit reservations to the Convention, refusing to extend to refugees the same right to
work as accrues to the nationals of countries with which they have preferred trade or customs
arrangements. For example, the Belgian government has stipulated that:
[i]n all cases where the Convention grants to refugees the most favourable treatment
accorded to nationals of a foreign country, this provision shall not be interpreted by
the Belgian Government as necessarily involving the regime accorded to nationals of
countries with which Belgium has concluded regional, customs, economic or political
agreements.
UNITED NATIONS CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 273

(1987). Similar reservations have been entered by, inter alia, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg,

Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.
59. The Convention provides refugees with specific welfare-related rights in the areas of
rationing, housing, public relief, the protection of labor laws, and social security. Refugee
Convention, supra note 4, arts. 20, 21, 23, 24.
60. INTER-GOVERNMENTAL CONSULTATIONS, TEMPORARY PROTECTION, Supra note 50, at 62,
109.
61. Immigration Act of 1990, supra note 4.
62. B. Frelick & B. Kohnen, Filling the Gap: Temporary ProtetedStatus, 8 J. REFUGEE STUD.
339, 352 (1995).
63. See infra text accompanying notes 211-215.

64.

INTER-GOVERNMENTAL CONSULTATIONS, TEMPORARY PROTECTION,

109, 122, 211, 221, 235.
65. Id. at 154.

supra note

50,

at
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unlikely to be restored to meaningful membership in their home
community.
The ability to end temporary protection is fundamentally dependent
on the promotion of meaningful and durable changes in the state of
origin. Repatriation is unlikely to succeed if the refugees are returned
before conditions are truly safe. 66 It has been recently observed, for
example, that the repatriation of Cambodian refugees was conducted
with insufficient regard for the need to build a "lasting foundation for
the safe reintegration of returning refugees." 67 Despite a U.S. $3 billion repatriation and reconstruction effort, large numbers of Cambodian returnees have again been displaced by fighting, have been unable
to turn their repatriation grants into lasting investments, and have
6
been injured by land mines more frequently than in previous years. 8
Massive financial assistance to returnees does not necessarily guarantee
successful repatriation if political conditions are not truly ripe for
return.
Even when conditions are objectively safe, repatriation can fail if the
groundwork for return and reintegration has not been properly laid. It
is particularly important to build cooperative relationships between
returnees and individuals who remained in the country of origin. For
instance, the return of Guatemalan refugees from Mexico has been
marked by misunderstandings and resentment between returnee and
resident communities. The Guatemalan military has consistently portrayed the returning refugees as associates of armed guerrillas, leading
local people to fear that returning refugees will foster heightened
military activity. Local residents also resent the fact that returning
refugees are exempt from the obligation to participate in civil patrols.
Other conflicts have developed around land ownership. Returnees are
eager to reclaim land that belonged to them before they fled but that
other peasants, often army sympathizers, have occupied during their
absence. Local residents have threatened returnees and, occasionally,
have even physically prevented them from entering villages. The Guatemalan government has done little to mediate these disputes and has
69
been slow to fulfill its promises to provide returnees with new land.
Repatriation and resettlement following civil war is particularly com-

66. See,
ag., supra text accompanying notes 23-27 and 24-36.
67. lain Guest, Returning to an uncertain future, MANCHESTER GUAtIAN WKLY.,Jan. 7, 1996,
at 15.
68. Id. See also U.S. COmmITrEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 80-81 (1996);
BETWEEN HOPE AND INSECURITY: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE CAMBODIAN PEACE
PROCESS (Peter Utting ed., 1994).
69. U.S. COaMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 145-46 (1993), 178-79

(1995), 189-91 (1996).
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plicated, given the lingering effects of brutal human rights violations
70
committed by fellow citizens.
When safe repatriation does not prove possible within a reasonable
period of time, refugees should be afforded the option of permanent
resettlement. Most Northern states having specific legislative schemes
of temporary protection guarantee residual access to permanent residence. In Norway, permanent residence is granted after three or four
years. 71 In Denmark, access to the normal determination procedure is
required after two years of temporary protection. If unsuccessful, and
if temporary protection is still required, permanent residence follows
after another two years. 72 In the Netherlands, a grant of permanent
residence will normally be made after three years of temporary protec73
tion.
In the United States, however, TPS does not automatically convert
into a more permanent status. 74 This is also the case for France and
Germany, which have implemented temporary protection through less
formal administrative channels rather than adopting specific legislation.75 There is no limitation as to how long "temporary" protection
can continue. The same is true in most of the less developed world
where temporary protection rarely converts to permanent status, regardless of the amount of time that passes. Some refugees in the South
are never even granted secure temporary status, as has been the situation of Mauritanian refugees in Senegal, six years after they fled
76
Mauritania.
Prolonged temporary protection fails to take account of refugees'
psychosocial needs. Entire generations of refugee children may grow
up in uncertainty and despair. 77 Refugees who are unable to return
home and yet are ineligible for permanent membership in their asylum
state are likely to be less self-sufficient and will find it more difficult
to integrate locally. Where there is no hope of integration in the state

70. All Mazrui, The African State as a PoliticalRefugee: Institutional Collapse and Human Diiplacement, 7 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. SPECIAL ISSUE 21 (1995).
71. INTER-GOVERNMENTAL CONSULTATIONS, TEMPoRARY PROTECrON, supra note 50, at
165.
72. Id. at 79.
73. Id. at 146.
74. Id. at 231; Frelick & Kohnen, supra note 62, at 351.
75. In France, "temporary permission to stay will be prolonged for as long as a troubled
situation in the region of origin of the beneficiaries continues to eist." INTER-GOVERNMENTAL
CONSULTATIONS, TEMPORARY PROTECTiON, supra note 50, at 104. Similarly, in Gernmny "[piersons from Bosnia-Herzegovina who do not have any other type of permission to stay in Germany,
are allowed to stay temporarily... until such time as their return is considered possible." Id. at
117.
76. See CARVER, supra note 41, at 55.
77. Neil Boothby, Displaced Children: Psychological Theory and Practice from the Field, 5 J.
REFUGEE STUD. 106, 119-20 (1992).
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of asylum or elsewhere, refugees may even take up arms and attempt
to force their way home. This can destabilize the host state and the
region in general. For example, many Tutsi Rwandan refugees fled to
neighboring countries in 1959. Rwandans in Tanzania obtained permanent status and, eventually, most became Tanzanian citizens. Rwandans in Uganda, on the other hand, were denied permanent status even
after thirty years. 78 The long-term presence in Uganda of unintegrated
Rwandan refugees, and the growth of armed opposition within the
refugee community, induced the Rwandan military to carry out armed
incursions into southern Uganda. 79 As Rwandan refugees began to take
up arms, they also became involved in Uganda's own domestic conflict
and lent considerable support to the National Resistance Army of now
President Museveni. 80
D. The Fallacy of the "Right to Remain"
As the right of refugees to access secure and dignified asylum fell
out of favor in both the North and South, states prevailed upon
intergovernmental institutions to devise a less intrusive alternative to
the duty to receive refugees. UNHCR responded by proclaiming the
'
"right to remain."81
Given the determination of the governments that
control and fund it to deemphasize the right to seek asylum, UNHCR
saved face and institutional stature by redefining its raison d'8tre, away
from the goal of ensuring access to quality asylum, in favor of an
avowed commitment to eradicate the need to flee in the first place:
Refugee movements are not inevitable, but can be averted if
action is taken to reduce or remove the threats which force
people to leave their own country and seek sanctuary else78. AFRICAN RIGHTS, RwANDA: DEATH, DESPAIR AND DEFIAucE 23 (1994). In Uganda,
Rwandan refugees experienced three decades of harsh ethnic victimization, convincing most that

"they could only find lasting security by returning to Rwanda." Idaat 24. See also Rachel van der
Meeren, Three Decades in Exile: Rwandan Refugees 1960-1990, 9 J. REFUGEE STUD. 252, 259
(1996).

79. Rwandan refugees in Uganda founded the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Eager to return
home and bring an end to the longstanding oppression of Rwanda's Tutsi minority, the RPF
attempted an armed invasion of Rwanda in 1990, and then took power in the country during
the civil war that followed the 1994 genocide. Van der Meeren, supra note 78, at 261-62.
80. Id. at 261.
81.
While responding to refugee situations in countries of asylum, the [UNHCR] also
started focusing activities in countries of origin, seeking to prevent and contain refugee
movements ....
Invoking the human right to remain in one's country of origin, the
[UNHCR] sought to ensure that people were not forced to flee from their homes in
the first place.
Report of the United Nations High Commissionerfor Refugees, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 12,
par. 3, U.N. Doc. A/48112 (1993).
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where. That is a fundamental principle of the emerging ap82
proach to the issue of human displacement.
The language of a "right to remain" is attractive. It is impossible
to deny the value of enabling people to stay in their homes, rather than
leaving them no option but to escape. The "right to remain" is also
often used in conjunction with a plea to respect the human rights of
refugees.8 3 Yet, because in practice it has been treated as an alternative
to the traditional institution of asylum, the measure of the value of a
"right to remain" must be its ability to compel the home government
to respect the human rights of its citizens or to deliver surrogate
protection in situ.
As implemented, the "right to remain" fails this test. First, there is
no evidence to date of an international commitment to intervene
against the root causes of refugee flows, a condition precedent to the
exercise of any genuine right to remain. 84 For the majority of the
world's refugees, located in parts of the South not perceived by the
North to be of strategic importance, the "right to remain" is illusory.
Michael Ignatieff has accurately noted:
[The inability of the U.N. to stop the nightmarish civil war
in Afghanistan; the collapse of Sierra Leone and Liberia; the
Indonesian repression of the East Timorese; the Russians'
bloody attempt to crush the Chechens. These are what Boutros-Ghali calls 'the orphaned conflicts,' the ones which the
West's promiscuous and selective attention span ignores .... 8s5

82. UNHCR, WORLD'S RE.FUGEES, supra note 1, at 43.

83.
The crucial link between the human tights system and the protection of refugees...
assists the Office in raising awareness of the relationship between refugee issues and
broader human rights concerns, particularly those related to the right to seek and enjoy
asylum and the right to freedom of movement, which includes "the right to return"
and "the right to remain."
Report of the UnitedNations High Commissionerfor Refugees, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 12,
at para. 13, U.N. Doc. A/50/12 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 UNHCR Report].
84. Peacekeeping on a Shoestring, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WKLY., Aug. 7, 1994, at 12.
85. Michael Ignatieff, Decline and Fall ofa Blue Empire, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WKLY., Oct.
29, 1995, at 33. In his farewell speech, former Secretary General Boutros-Ghali expressed
frustration at the failure of powerful states to make a firm commitment to meaningful intervention:
Where peacekeepers were asked to deal with warfare, serious setbacks occurred. The
first came in Somalia, and weakened the will of the world community to act against
genocide in Rwanda. In Bosnia, too, hard choices were avoided. The concept of
peacekeeping was turned on its head, and worsened by the serious gap between
mandate and resources....
A U.N. Exit and Entrance: Words of Regret and Hope, N.Y TWias, Dec. 18, 1996, at A8.
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Refugees from these and other distant conflicts have received no value
in return for the abandonment by states and UNECR of the traditional
commitment to provide asylum.
When the "right to remain" has been invoked, it has been for the
wrong reasons. Specifically, the "right to remain" has been relied on
only to legitimate non-entre policies that have contained would-be
refugees in perilous situations. 86 For example, when Turkey closed its
border to Iraqi Kurds, the international community responded by
creating a safe haven ("no fly zone") in northern Iraq. 87 When European
states imposed visa controls to prevent the escape to safety of Bosnians,
the international community created U.N. "safe areas," which became
home to about 800,000 people.8 8 When France decided to stop the
flow of Hutus out of Rwanda in order to shore-up its regional political
influence, it directed would-be refugees into camps under French protection in southwestern Rwanda.8 9 None of these interventions gave
the at-risk population a meaningful choice between remaining secure
in their own homes and seeking asylum. Access to refugee protection
abroad had already been denied, leaving the populations at risk stranded
inside their own countries. The "right to remain" was therefore a
hollow rationalization offered by powerful states for their clear infringement of the right to seek asylum. There has been no recognition
of the crucial difference between a right to remain (voluntarily, in safety
and dignity) and no right to flee (when that is the most effective means
to escape danger).90 Would-be refugees may indeed have remained
86. In a 1992 statement, the High Commissioner for Refugees appears to have recognized
both the utility of the "right to remain" as a deterrent to seeking asylum abroad, and the
consequential risks of such a strategy:
[Iln response to the burden on asylum states, how can my Office further develop the
preventive dimension of its operations so as to reduce the impetus to flight? ... How
far can we persuade people to remain where they are in order to prevent displacement
and "ethnic cleansing"? By doing so, are we not exposing their lives to danger? . . . I
am convinced that preventive activities can help to contain the dimensions of human
catastrophe by creating time and space for the political process.
Statement by Mrs. Sadako Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, to the Third
Committee of the General Assembly (Nov. 10, 1992), rrinted in 4 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 541,
542-44 (1992).
87.
The security zone was less a way to ease the suffering of the Kurds than a U.S. effort
to assist Turkey-a NATO member and an important partner in the international
sanctions effort against Saddam ....
There is no longer any doubt that the "no fly"
zone provides no protection against Iraqi grounds incursions.
Katherine Wilkens, How We Lost the Kurdish Game, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WKY.., Sept. 29,
1996, at 17.
88. Mikhael Barutciski, The Reinforcement of Non-Admission Policies and the Subversion of the
UNHCR: DisplacementandInternal Assistance in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-94), 8 INT'LJ. REFUGEE
L. 49, 74-75, 85 (1996).
89. Chris McGreal & David Harrison, Continent's spoils slip from Frenchfingers, MANCHESTER
GuARDIAN WKLY., Dec. 15, 1996, at 7.
90. James C. Hathaway, New Directions to Avoid Hard Problems: The Distortion of the Palliative
Role of Refugee Protection, 8 J. REFUGEE STUD. 288-94 (1995); Barutciski, supra note 88.
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within their own states, but not because they exercised a "right to
remain." They had no option but to remain.
Moreover, the empirical evidence suggests that, even when the "right
to remain" is operationalized, it fails to provide sufficient protection.
Human rights violations have continued even in the high profile
Kurdish "safe" area, and the Turkish military frequently carries out
cross-border operations in search of suspected members of armed Kurdish opposition groups. 9' Most important, Saddam Hussein's successful
military incursion into the Kurdish city of Irbil in September 1996
clearly demonstrates the continuing risk of Iraqi aggression. 92 The
Bosnian "safe zones" were never demilitarized as promised by the U.N.
Consequently, they were used as launching pads for government raids,
logically attracting Serb reprisals. 93 Nor was the number of troops
needed to defend these areas ever dispatched to Bosnia.94 By at least
the spring of 1995, it had become clear that the United Nations' "'safe
areas' [welre the most dangerous places in Bosnia."9' Fighting and
atrocities ultimately led to the deaths of thousands of civilians trapped
96
in such "safe areas" as Srebrenica and Zepa.
Similarly, France effectively abandoned the Hutus it had discouraged
from fleeing to Zaire. In the midst of extreme insecurity and instability, the French ended their peacekeeping mission and withdrew their
forces. Fighting between the Rwandan military and Hutu extremists
in one refugee camp led to the deaths of several thousand people.97
Compounding the hypocrisy, France blocked the applications of Rwan-

91. UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE WORLD's REFUGEES: THE CHALLENGE OF PROTECTION
COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 99-100 (1993).

84-85 (1993); U.S.

92. Wilkens, supra note 87, at 16.
93. Defending the Defensible, MANCHESTER GuARDLN WKLY., July 23, 1995, at 12.
94. William Shawcross, Don't Blame U.N. Personnelfor the Bosnia Failure,INT'L HERALD Thw°,

Dec. 3-4, 1994, at 8.
95. Julian Borger, U.N. Gives Peace-Keeping a Last Chane, MANCHETFR

GUARDIAN WKLY.,

June 25, 1995, at 3.

96. Boutros Boutros-Ghali acknowledged "that certain safe areas [were) used by the two
parties to the conflict to sustain their confrontation." Established without the consent of the
Bosnian Serbs, and used as military bases by the Bosnian government forces, the safe areas
provoked attacks on the, residents and relief personnel they were intended to protect.
UNHCR, WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 1, at 129. Between 10,000 and 12,000 Bosnian
Muslim men and boys are believed to have been killed when the Srebrenica "safe area" fell
to Bosnian Serb forces in July 1995. Another 8000 men were unaccounted for after the fall
of Zepa three weeks later. U.S. CoMziaTrE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 130

(1996).
97. In its report, the Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to
Rwanda concludes that the presence of militant communities operating inside the French-pro.
tected zone "made the Kibeho massacre possible, though certainly not inevitable." HOWARD,
ADELMAN & Asmu SUHRKE, EARLY WARNING AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 56 (Joint Evalu-

ation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide:
Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, Study 2, 1996).
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dan refugees seeking asylum in France, on the basis of98its half-hearted
efforts to protect Rwandans inside their own country.
Iraq, Bosnia, and Rwanda provide three examples of the "right to
remain" being used to provide superficial compensation for the denial
of asylum to individuals at risk of serious human rights abuse. None
of these in-country havens was safe. Instead, the concentrations of
underprotected civilians in defined areas within hostile or unstable
states proved an irresistible target to their enemies. In sum, rather than
serving to mobilize the resolve of the international community to
suppress human rights abuse, the "right to remain" has operated only
to legitimize the denial of protection options to refugees where the
interests of powerful governments were involved. 99 Ironically, refugees
in strategically less significant parts of the world may be comparatively
fortunate, as they have not been forced to "benefit" from international
efforts to establish in-country protection. For most refugees, the shift
from the right to seek asylum to the "right to remain" simply formalizes the de facto withdrawal of states from their legal duty to protect
refugees, and makes clear that refugees should no loriger expect to
benefit from the legal protections historically provided by UNHCR.
E. The Withdrawal of States from Refugee Protection
As described above, the international refugee protection system serves
fewer and fewer people, less and less well, as time goes on. Refugee
law as traditionally conceived is therefore no longer a meaningful
determinant of the treatment afforded involuntary migrants. ,Yet the
inhumane actions increasingly taken by states outside the rubric of law.
clearly demonstrate that the alternative of relegating refugee protection
to the realm of political discretion or humanitarian goodwill is fundamentally unacceptable. We therefore believe that the" answer is to
affirm the need for international law to bring both order and principle
to bear on the way states address refugee flows, while recognizing that
international law will be respected by governments only if it is seen
to be attentive to their basic concerns. In our view, the breakdown in
the authority of refugee law can largely be ascribed to two fundamental
shortcomings: the absence of a meaningful solution orientation and the
problem of individuated state responsibility.

98. Andrew Gumbel, France Blocks Refugees from Rwanda Pogroms, MANCHESTER GuARDIAN
WKLY., July 3, 1994, at 3.
99. See generally Bill Frelick, Preventive Protection and the Right to Seek Asylum: A PreliminatyLook
at Bosnia and Croatia,4 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 439 (1992); Andrew Shacknove, From Asylum to
Containment, 5 INTL J. REFUGEE L. 516 (1993).
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1. The Absence of a Meaningful Solution Orientation
Particularly in the North, resistance to honoring duties owed to
refugees follows from a growing resistance on the part of governments
to externally imposed changes to the composition of their societies.
Because there is no longer a pervasive interest-convergence between
refugees and asylum states, 100 the legal right of refugees to trump
immigration control rules means that persons not of a state's choosing
will effectively be entitled to join its community. In states having a
tradition of equating refugee status with the right to remain permanently in the asylum state, there is a fear that the arrival of refugees
may, if sufficiently widespread, lead to social changes not desired by
the host society. 01' Even in those Northern states that have a long
tradition of receiving immigrants, there is concern about the non-selective nature of the duty to admit refugees.
Concern about the impact of refugee arrivals on the make-up of an
asylum state's community is not limited to Northern states. Vitit
Muntarbhorn has argued that many states of East Asia, including
Brunei, China, Japan, and Malaysia, are preoccupied with avoiding the
arrival of refugees of distinct cultural or ethnic backgrounds. 10 2 As the
bonds created by common opposition to colonialism and apartheid
fade, some African governments are now affording truly dignified
protection only to those refugees who are most similar to the citizens
of the asylum state. 0 3
Where the community or its officials resist externally determined
social transformation, efforts to control the arrival of refugees, harsh or
otherwise, are the predictable result. One response is to condemn
governments for their prejudice, or at least for pandering to the uninformed nativism of parts of their citizenry. 1°4 Nativism, and even
racism, have undoubtedly shaped the refugee policies of many govern100. See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
101.
Unlike the East Europeans, many of the new asylum seekers have arrived without
readily transferable skills. This, combined with their different race and their alien
religions, is seen as posing extremely difficult social and political problems both now
and in the future.
Gil Loescher, The European Community and Refugees, 65 INTL AFAts 617, 623 (1989).
102. VITIT MUNTARBHORN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN ASIA 16-17, 68, 98, 116, 143

(1992).
103. "Mribal ties, not hospitality, have integrated the Togolese refugees in Benin. Other
refugees endure life in camps all over West Africa, including Benin, where thousands of Chadians,
Zairians, and Central Africans are in camps." Elizabeth Abbott, One Large Family Condemned to
Live Together, [TORONTO] GLoaa & MAI, Nov. 26, 1994, at D4.
104. VIcrOR MALAREK, HAVEN'S GATE: CANADA'S IMMIGRATION FIAsco 62-80 (1987);
Arthur C. Helton, United States ImmigrationPolicy: The Conflict Between Human Rights and Perceptions
of National Identity and Self-Interest, in LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE DISCRMINATION: NEw
ISSUES IN MIGRATION 235 (Howard Adelman ed., 1995).
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ments. The growing influence of ethnic nationalism in many states,
leading to a desire for segregation from "outsiders," clearly intensifies
the problem. 10 5 It is important to promote a breaking down of irrational fears of foreigners and, in particular, a credible understanding of
the democratic limits to communal closure.
However, it is presently politically unwise to insist that states permanently enfranchise all refugees. Such a stance holds refugees hostage
to a major project of social transformation. We need instead to accommodate the need of refugees to flee with the prevalence of often narrow
understandings of community inspired by the rise of ethnic nationalism and the demise of the Cold War interest-convergence. This accommodation will clearly not amount to a complete recognition of the
right of the present inhabitants of states to exclude all outsiders. Yet
the terms upon which refugees enter a foreign state could be qualified
to prevent refugees from becoming pawns in the internal struggles of
asylum states over the meaning of community. In particular, a solid
and dependable system of refugee protection need not have any enduring impact on the receiving state's communal self-definition. It could
instead be oriented to ensuring that, at least in most cases, refugees
ultimately repatriate to their own country when conditions permit.
This endorsement of temporary protection follows logically from the
fact that refugees are exempted from the usual rules of immigration
10 6
control solely on the basis of what amounts to a claim of necessity.
While they should be received with full respect for their human
dignity and attention to the disabilities inflicted upon them by involuntary migration, there is no principled reason to insist that they be
routinely admitted to permanent residence. We believe that it makes
sense to define the duration of stay for refugees as a function of the
risk that gives rise to the duty to admit them.
In referring to this approach as solution-oriented temporary protection, we do not mean to suggest that it should aspire to the generation
of solutions. Refugee status ends only when the violence or other
human rights abuse that induced flight is eradicated, matters clearly
beyond the province of the refugee protection system itself. To the
extent that the international community has begun to intervene against
the phenomena that force refugees from their homes, 10 7 the only true

105. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, BLOOD AND BELONGING: JOURNEYS INTO THE NEw NATIONALism 7-9 (1993).
106. Walzer suggests that refugees have a special entitlement to be taken into a national
community. This is because their claims "cannot be met by yielding territory or exporting wealth;
they can be met only by taking people in . . . [because their] need is for membership itself, a
non-exportable good." MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSnCE 48-49 (1983).
107. Before 1988, the United Nations Security Council had only passed 15 resolutions
outlining a role for the U.N. in maintaining international peace and security. By 1994, the
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solution to the plight of refugees is at last being promoted. The refugee
protection system, in contrast, is a palliative regime that protects
desperate people until a fundamental change of circumstances allows
them to go home safely.
Therefore, our reference to solution-oriented protection means that,
while not a source of solutions, refugee protection should be implemented in a way that takes full advantage of opportunities for solutions. To counter the perception of refugee protection as an unwanted
and externally imposed immigration system, repatriation must be made
viable. As discussed in Part III,108 repatriation will often be unsuccessful, when family and collective social structures of refugees have not
been preserved during the period of protection abroad, when refugees
are denied opportunities to develop their skills and personalities in the
asylum state, or when the place of origin sees the return of refugees as
a threat or burden. In such circumstances, repatriation efforts may lead
only to poverty, violence, and even further flight. On the other hand,
temporary protection can be structured in a way that recognizes and
protects core human rights, encourages self-reliance, and preserves the
social, political, and cultural identity of the refugee community. If
return is made practicable by an empowering system of repatriation
aid and development assistance, the solution-oriented protection system we propose has the potential to renew asylum capacity regularly.
As a reasonable and principled compromise between the needs of
refugees and the migration control objectives of host governments,
temporary protection will encourage states to live up to their international protection responsibilities, rather than avoid them.
This is because the repatriation of most, if not all, refugees sends a
clear signal that the system is not just a "back door" route to permanent immigration. As it becomes understood that refugees are received
on an extraordinary basis, and that their presence does not require any
fundamental adjustment to the host community's self-definition, the
implied threat presently associated with the arrival of refugees can be
defused. The failure to promote repatriation, on the other hand, is
inconsistent with the logic of refugee status as a situation-specific
trump on immigration control rules. Because refugees are admitted on
the basis of necessity, it cannot legitimately be asserted that they
should routinely be entitled to stay in the host state once the harm in
their own country has been brought to an end.

number of resolutions had increased to 78. At the same rime, the U.N.'s annual peacekeeping
budget has grown from around U.S. $230 million in 1987-1988 to U.S. $3.6 billion in 1993-94.
"[M]ore money was spent on U.N. peacekeeping operations in 1993 alone than in the whole of
the preceding 48 years." UNHCR, WoRLD's REFUGEES, supra note 1, at 98.
108. Seeinfra text accompanying notes 257-289.
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2. The Problem of Individuated State Responsibility
Even if the mechanisms of refugee protection are re-tooled to minimize conflict with migration control objectives, states may still seek
to avoid their responsibilities because of the problem of individuated
state responsibility. Under the present protection system, the government of the asylum state is solely responsible for delivering and funding the protection of all refugees who arrive at its jurisdiction. 10 9 A
shift to solution-oriented temporary protection would not alter that
fact.
In states of the South, concern about individuated state responsibility arises because the duty to protect refugees is primarily allocated on
the basis of accidents of geography and the relative ability of governments to control their borders. States closest to countries of origin and
those least able to afford systematic border controls or technologies of
deterrence will inevitably receive the most refugees. Consequently, the
poorest countries of the South are legally required to meet the needs
of most of the world's refugees. Some countries do offer to resettle
refugees from overburdened countries of first asylum on a limited basis,
but they are under no obligation to do so.
This chaotic distribution of the responsibility to provide refugee
protection is not offset by any mechanism to ensure adequate compensation to those governments that take on a disproportionate share of
protective responsibilities. To the contrary, any fiscal assistance received
from other countries or the UNHCR is a matter of charity, not of
obligation, and is not distributed solely on the basis of relative need.
For example, in 1993, UNHCR allocated more fimds to refugee protection in Europe alone than it did for the protection of three times as
many refugees in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East combined. 110 Even
by 1995, UNHCR had spent less to assist the nearly 1.7 million
Rwandan refugees in Burundi, Tanzania, and Zaire than on its residual
material assistance and other programs inside the former Yugoslavia."'

109. While the Refugee Convention urges international cooperation in its Preamble, its
specific provisions do not operationalize that objective. See generally infra text accompanying notes
245-251.
110. Report of the United Nations High Commissionerfor Refugees, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp.
No. 12, Table 1, U.N. Doc. A/49/12 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 UNHCR Report].
111. Total UNHCR expenditures in Burundi, Tanzania, and Zaire for 1995 were $183,597,500,
whereas total expenditures in the former Yugoslavia were $221,581,300. These statistics actually
understate the disparity of contributions, as additional expenditures of $293,238,700 were made
by other agencies to assist with relief work in former Yugoslavia, bringing the total international
relief work contribution there to $514,800,000. In contrast, UNHCR notes that "the international community's response has so far been limited" to a plea for a comparatively modest
supplementary amount of $70,500,000 to help the countries impacted by the arrival of Rwandese
refugees to repair damage to the environment and infrastructure. Report of the United Nations High
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Concerns about the inequitable allocation of the duty to protect
refugees do not preoccupy wealthier countries of the North, where the
number of asylum-seekers is considerably smaller and the resources to
respond to them are clearly much greater. In developed states, the
problem of individuated state responsibility manifests itself instead in
the arrival of significant numbers of persons who make fraudulent
claims to refugee status. Refugee law as implemented requires that
refugee status claims be verified and protection afforded in the particular country to which a refugee travels. The decision about where to
seek protection is, at least for the mobile and those with access to the
funds needed for international travel, largely that of the asylum-seeker.112
This right of the asylum seeker to choose the state in which to solicit
recognition of refugee status is a critical, if modest, compensation for
the failure of governments to ensure a uniformly inclusive understanding both of the refugee definition and of legally mandated standards of protection across states.
Because it is virtually impossible for most would-be immigrants in
the South to meet the highly selective immigration criteria set by
states of the North, 113 some persons who are not at risk in their own
country make asylum claim in developed countries as the basis for
securing at least physical admission into their desired country of immigration. Once inside, they hope to forge connections during the
often lengthy time required to process the refugee claim that will allow
them to immigrate, legally or otherwise.114 The normally complex
procedural systems and access to general guarantees of due process in
developed states means that approximately one billion dollars are wasted
each year to receive and process the applications of these non-genuine
claimants. 15 At least as important is the fact that the presence of
fraudulent asylum-seekers provides fodder to those who encourage the
Commissioner for Refugees, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 12, paras. 82, 169, and Table 1,
U.N. Doc. A/51/12 (1996).
112. See Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, Conclusion No. 15
(XXX) (1979), Refugees Without an Asylum Country [hereinafter ExCom Conclusion No. 15], para.
h(iii) and (iv). But see infra text accompanying notes 157-160.

113.
All of the world's more affluent countries keep their doors open to migrants from other
parts of the world-as long as they have skills which are in short supply, substantial
amounts of capital to invest or close family links with the state concerned. For the
person who lacks such attributes, however, the opportunities for admission are extremely limited.
UNHCR, WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 1, at 192.
114. EUROSTAT AND THE SECRETARIAT OF THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL CONSULTATIONS ON
ASYLUM, REFUGEE AND MIGRATION POLICIES IN EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA AND AUSTRALIA,
ASYI.Um-SEEKERS IN EUROPE 1985-1995 3 (1996).
115. If, for example, only 20% of asylum-seekers who travel to the North are non-genuine
claimants, their share of reception and processing costs amounts to U.S. $1.4 billion per annum.
See infra note 155.
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public to question the continuing logic of a commitment to interna6
tional refugee law."
For reasons discussed above, n 7 the answer to this manifestation of
the problem of individuated state responsibility is not mechanistic
burden-shifting toward states of transit. It is morally reprehensible and
legally wrong summarily to remove an asylum-seeker without regard
for the quality of protection ultimately provided. Most important, the
Northern commitment to deterrence of fraudulent claims can be advanced in a way that simultaneously responds to Southern concerns
that less developed countries are required to contend with unrealistic
and unsupportable refugee protection burdens and responsibilities. There
is, in short, an untapped interest-convergence between North and
South having the potential to address the problems inherent in a
system of individuated state responsibility.
The answer we propose is to shift away from particularized duties
and toward substantially greater collectivized protection efforts." 8 The
current system of unilateral, undifferentiated obligations is unfair and
ultimately unsustainable.' 9 Building on previous examples of interstate cooperation in refugee protection and other fields, we therefore
propose a new model of systematic and ongoing sharing within associations of states that we term "interest-convergence groups."'120 There
are precedents for efforts to collectivize the responsibility to protect
refugees, including the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese
Refugees (CPA),12 ' the International Conferences on Assistance to Refu-

116. In 1995, legislation was introduced by U.S. Senator Alan Simpson that would have
abolished the right to claim refugee status on the territory of the United States, deferring all
protection issues to U.S. consulates abroad. Martin Walker, Congress Ruled by Politics of Outrage,
MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WKLY., Apr. 30, 1995, at 6.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
118. See Peter Harder, Migration: A New International Dimension, 5(1) INT'L. J. REFUGEE L.
101, 104 (1993). See also Gervase Coles, Approaching the Refugee Problem Today, in REFUGEES AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 373, 408 (Gil Loescher & Laila Monahan eds., 1989).
119.
As the "system" malfunctions, the politics of refugee assistance and resettlement are
rather a diplomatic prisoner's dilemma. Any state unilaterally deciding to be generous
thereby eases pressure on non-cooperating states and reduces the incentive on the
international community to develop the type of strong machinery for cooperation which
is needed.
RICHARD B. I LLICH, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALIENS IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAw
66 (1984).
120. See generally Asha Hans & Astri Suhrke, Responsibility Sharing, in RECONCEIVING INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAw (James C. Hathaway ed., forthcoming 1997).
121. The international community's response to the mass flow of asylum-seekers in Southeast
Asia is the most substantial example of formal interstate cooperation to address a refugee
protection issue. The Meeting on Refugees and Displaced Persons in South East Asia, held in
1979, introduced a system of responsibility sharing based on intra-regional first asylum and
comprehensive extra-regional resettlement. Driven by a combination of humanitarian concern for
the plight of the "boat people" and the political interests of the United States and its alliance
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gees in Africa (ICARA I and Hl),122 and the International Conference
on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA). 123 In Part III, we draw on
the lessons of these and other examples of transnational cooperation to
suggest the basic elements of a practical and dependable system of
interstate allocation of the responsibilities and burdens of refugee
protection.
Not all states are able to contribute to refugee protection in an
identical manner. Interest-convergence groups therefore ought to define
obligations on the basis of a theory of "common but differentiated
responsibility" toward refugees. 124 There is a need to decide both how
partners, approximately 1.6 million refugees were resettled out of the region over the course of
a decade. By the late 1980s, however, countries outside the region were no longer willing to
accept large numbers of refugees for resettlement, leading countries of first asylum to return to
earlier interdiction policies. A second International Conference on Indochinese Refugees met in
June 1989, and adopted a "Comprehensive Plan of Action" (CPA) to respond to this new reality.
Under the CPA, first asylum remained contingent upon guarantees of extra-regional resettlement.
However, a highly contentious process for assessing eligibility for refugee status was introduced,
and those persons "screened out" were to be returned to Vietnam under the terms of a formal
The Comprehcnitv Plan
agreement between UNHCR and the Vietnamese government. Seegenerally
of Action for Indo-Chinese Refugees: An Experiment in Refugee Protetion and Control, in LAWYERS
COMMITTEE FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, UNCERTAIN HAVEN: REFUGEE PROTECTION ON THE FORTI-

ETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE 1951 UNITED NATIONS REFUGEE CONVENTION 11-60 (1991);
Hathaway, Labelling the "Boat People", supra note 29; Hiram Ruiz, The CPA: Tempstuout Year Lift
Boat People Adrift, in U.S. COmmITtEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 82-83 (1996).
122. The first International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA I), held
in 1982, was explicitly conceived as a pledging conference. It attracted primarily bilateral aid
from donor states who chose among programs designed by African states with the assistance of
UNHCR. A second conference (ICARA II),
held in 1984, focused on forging a consensus that
ongoing refugee-related development assistance to host states was required to sustain the viability
of asylum in Africa. See generally Barry Stein, Refugee Aid and Development: Slow ProgressSince ICARA
11, in REFUGEE POLICY: CANADA AND TlE UNITED STATES 143 (Howard Adelman ed., 1991);
Robert E Gorman, Taking Stock of the Second InternationalConference on Assistance to Refuecee in Africa
(ICARA II), 4 J. AFR. STUD. 4-11 (1987); Robert F Gorman, Refugee Aid and Devcdopmcnt in
Africa: Research and Policy Neds from the Local Perspective, in AFRICAN REFUGEES: DEELOPMENT
AID AND REPATRIATION 227 (Howard Adelman & John Sorenson eds., 1994).
123. The International Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA), held in 1989,
is viewed as a particularly successful example of regional cooperation that attracted extra-regional
fiscal support. CIREFCA- was conceived in the context of the Esquipulas Peace Accord, and
involved the provision of development assistance to refugees, returnees, and displaced persons.
Donor states worked collaboratively with governments in the region, assisted by UNHCR and
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Fifty-nine projects were funded between
1989 and 1994, at a total cost of approximately U.S. $420 million. The most important conduits
for assistance were U.N. bodies and NGOs, each attracting about 40% of total funds, mostly
provided by European states. See generally DENNIS GALLAGHER & JANELLE MILLER, CIREFCA:
AT THE CROSSROADS BETWEEN UPROOTED PEOPLE AND DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA
(Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development
Working Paper No. 27, 1990); GONZALO PEREZ DEL CASTIL.O & MARIKA FAHLEN, CIREFCA:
AN OPPORTUNITY AND CHALLENGE FOR INTER-AGENCY COOPERATION (May,

1995);
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AGUILAR ZINSER, CIREFCA: THE PROMISES AND REALITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CENTRAL AmImPCAN REFUGEES (1991).
124. The concept of common but differentiated responsibility has developed in international
environmental law, highlighting the reality that while states may share a common commitment
to a healthy environment, they have contributed differentially to environmental degradation and
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to provide safe and humane protection to the refugees (responsibility
sharing) and how to apportion the fiscal costs of meeting protection
needs (burden sharing). We argue for an approach to collectivized
protection that allows a balance to be struck between meeting the
responsibility to grant asylum and shouldering the burden of financing
protection. This balance is what we term "common but differentiated
responsibility."
Under a regime of common responsibility, all members of the interest-convergence group agree in advance to contribute to protect refugees who arrive at the territory of any state member of the group.
States will cooperate in a manner akin to participation in an insurance
scheme. It must be stressed that we are not suggesting that states
insure themselves against refugees, but rather that they minimize their
particularized risks by joining with others to make protection feasible
throughout the territories of all interest-convergence group member
states. The notion of differentiated responsibility recognizes that it is
unrealistic to expect all states to make an identical contribution both
to receiving refugees and to financing the costs of the protection
regime. We advocate allocational principles that take account of real
differences in the relative abilities and circumstances of states and seek
to maximize the overall commitment to protection by drawing on the
comparative strengths of each member government. Each participating
state would contribute by providing temporary protection, receiving
refugees whose special needs make temporary protection inappropriate,
resettling those refugees who cannot return home at the end of the
period of temporary protection, funding the protection system, or
through a combination of these roles.
A system of collectivized responsibility would respond to the desire
of Northern states to avoid the fraudulent claims resulting from the
individuated duty to admit every asylum-seeker into their territories
until the claim to refugee status is denied. To the extent that developed
states commit themselves to membership in refugee protection interest-convergence groups, they would secure access to a legitimate means
by which to dissociate the site of arrival from the place of asylum. This
is legally possible because the right of refugees to decide where to
solicit protection is not absolute, but follows from the risk of refoulement
or other rights abuse that might result if a refugee were compelled to
rely on the efforts of a government that may have lower standards than
those prevailing in the state whose protection the refugee has inhave varying capacities to take action to reverse the harm that has been done. Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, principle 7, 31 I.LM. 874. See generally Edith
Brown Weiss, InternationalEnvironmentalLaw: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New World
Order, 81 GEo. L.J. 675 (1993).
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voked. 125 Governments are legally entitled to allocate the responsibility
to protect refugees, so long as the assignment of protective responsibility is the result of common agreement among the states concerned,
and poses no risk to the refugee's right to protection against refoulement,
and to enjoy other basic human rights.
With agreements in place that authorize the asylum-seeker to be
sent to a safe country in his or her region of origin for refugee status
determination, there would be no incentive to make a fraudulent claim
in a country outside the region. As a result, Northern governments
would be able to preserve their migration control objectives without
blocking access to asylum-seekers by resorting to deflection and other
non-entre mechanisms. The problems of wasted resources and diminished support for refugee protection that confront Northern countries
could therefore be addressed without constraining access to first asylum
in any way.
The result of this trade-off would clearly be an increase in the
number of refugees protected in the South. But, because eighty percent
of the world's refugee population is already protected in the less
developed world, 126 even an agreement to assign the entire refugee
population of the North to protection in the South (which would not
be possible, for reasons elaborated in Part 111)127 would increase the
refugee population in the less developed world only marginally. The
resulting system, however, could address the growing concerns of
Southern governments regarding fairness and sustainability in meeting
the needs of the bulk of the refugee population.
In particular, a system of collectivized responsibility would mean
that states within a refugee population's region of origin would not be
required to contend independently with whatever refugees might arrive
at their territory. Each government belonging to an interest-convergence group would instead have access to a system that would fairly
distribute refugee protection responsibilities. A guarantee of shared
responsibility would enable states of the South faced with even a mass

125. Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 33(1). By way of comparison, asylum-seekers may
validly be returned to a country in which they have found protection if "they are protected there
against refoulement and they are permitted to remain there and to be treated in accordance with
recognized basic human standards until a durable solution is found for them." Executive Com-

mittee of the High Commissioner's Programme, Conclusion No. 58 (XL) (1989), Problem of
Refugees and Asylum Seekers Who Move in an Irregular Manner from a Country in Which They
Had Already Found Protection, pars. (0.
126. Of the total world refugee population of 15,337,000, the developed countries of Europe,
North America, Oceania, and Japan host only 2,715,300 refugees, or 17.7% of the world total.
This includes all Bosnians who have applied for asylum, who have been excluded from applying

for asylum, or who have been admitted under special temporary protection regimes. U.S.
COMMITrEE FOR REFUGEES, WoRLD REFUGEE SURVEY 4-5 (1996).
127. See infra text accompanying notes 384-387.
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influx to remain open to refugee arrivals, secure in the knowledge that
a speedy decision would be made to allocate protective responsibilities
among partner states. Equally important, because the state of arrival
would benefit from a binding guarantee of financial support from
extraregional members of the interest-convergence group, its own obligations would be limited to what it could reasonably afford.
We believe that developed states will be prepared to finance burden
sharing with the governments that agree to host refugees as the quid
pro quo for access to a system of responsibility sharing. 128 This is
because under the system we propose, all countries would remain
bound by the Convention's duty of non-refoulement. This obligation
prevents a state from returning the asylum-seeker to his country of
citizenship, normally the only state that is legally required to grant
readmission. 129 The ability of the sending state to remove the refugee
to any other country therefore requires the consent of the proposed
state of destination. Because the agreement of potential partner states
in the region of origin is essential to securing the flexibility desired by
Northern governments, it should prove possible to negotiate the collectivized protection arrangement in a way that advances the key goals
of the less developed world. 130 In particular, there is a need for dependable and adequate funding not only of basic refugee needs, but also of
the sorts of empowering and solution-oriented temporary protection
mechanisms that can make return viable while advancing the national
interests of the asylum state. 131 Most, or even all, of the funds required
could be garnered from the savings realized by the dismantling of
non-entr&e mechanisms and from the significant reduction in the number
of fraudulent claims to be processed in the North. The bargaining
leverage of the South ought to suffice to ensure that these funds are
reallocated to those who assume the responsibilities and burdens of
protection.
For the same reasons, and as a response to asylum and refugee
scholars who would justifiably oppose a complete bar on the reception
128. The viability of such agreements is suggested by the United States' successful bilateral
negotiation of refugee processing center arrangements for Haitian refugees with Jamaica and the
Turks and Caicos Islands, and of temporary safe haven accords with each of Dominica, St. Lucia,
Suriname, and Panama. See generally Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States
Relating to InternationalLaw, 89 AM. J. INT L L. 96, 99-102 (1995).

129. "The proposition that every State must admit its own nationals into its territory is widely
accepted and may now be regarded as an established principle of international law." THE
MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AcRoss BORDERS 39 (Louis B. Sohn & Thomas Buergenthal eds., 1992).

130. For instance, former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere is said to have made an offer to
settle a million Rwandan refugees in return for economic aid. Bonaventure Rutinwa, Beyond
Durable Solutions: An Appraisal of the New Proposalsfor Prevention and Solution of the Refugee Crisis
in the Great Lakes Region, 9J. REFUGEE STUD. 312, 316 (1996).
131. See generallyJacques Cu6nod, Refugees: Development or Relief?, in REFUGEES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 118, at 219, 241.
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of refugees from other regions of the world,1 32 it should be possible for
Southern countries to secure formal commitments from the developed
world to take on those aspects of the reception of refugees for which
extraregional states are often best suited. For example, very few Southern countries have been prepared to grant refugees permanent status,
even when return home has proved impossible for many years. 133 Both
by meeting the special needs that cannot be met locally and by filling
the residual resettlement role, extraregional states can contribute to the
viability of collectivized protection in a way that is consistent with
their preference for managed and regulated immigration.
The preceding discussion suggests three ways in which collectivized
protection would also benefit the vast majority of the world's refugees.
First and foremost, access to asylum would be promoted. Because the
arrival of refugees would no longer pose the risk of either unfair or
unsustainable obligations, states within the region of origin could
remain open to the provision of asylum. Access to asylum would also
be improved for the minority of refugees who need to flee to a state
outside their own region. Many such refugees are presently deflected
by visa control and other blunt responses to the problem of fraudulent
claims. Collectivized responsibility, in contrast, would allow governments to deter unfounded asylum claims without closing extraregional
escape routes.
Second, the dismantling of non-entrke systems would free up substantial sums of money presently spent to enforce non-entr~e and to process
fraudulent claims. Re-channelling funds presently wasted on the processing of non-genuine claims in the North would ensure a more
adequate funding base to address the needs of the majority of the
refugee population that is already protected within the regions of
origin.
Third, collectivized responsibility should result in firm guarantees
of access to extraregional resettlement in special needs cases, and in
cases where safe repatriation remains impossible after a reasonable
period of temporary protection. Whereas the present system allocates
protection outside the region largely on the basis of the relative wealth
and mobility of particular asylum-seekers, 134 a more structured sharing

132. For example, Deborah Anker of the Harvard Law School argues that the admission of
refugees has been an important means of countering xenophobic tendencies in the United States.
Moreover, Anker is of the view that the presence of refugee groups has had a positive impact on
U.S. human rights policies in relation to such countries as El Salvador and Haiti, and provided

the impetus to ensure that refugee law addresses important gender-based reasons for protection,
including female genital mutilation. Telephone interview with Deborah Anker (Dec. 15, 1996).
133. See supra text accompanying note 76.
134. See supra text accompanying note 112 and infra text accompanying notes 157-160.
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regime would allow these decisions to be made on the basis of relative
need.
There is also a fourth critical refugee interest that can be advanced
under a shift to collectivized responsibility. Sadly, refugee law as presently implemented affords few opportunities for the meaningful oversight of legal duties owed by governments to refugees. The interstate
complaint procedure envisaged by the Refugee Convention has never
36
been used, 135 and the surrogate protector role assigned to UNHCRI
has evolved into little more than a matter of discrete and private
representations to states. UNHCR has never drawn on the express
undertaking of Article 35 to formalize a system of periodic reporting
and collective scrutiny of respect for refugee rights. As a result, there
is no forum within which to require governments to engage in the
kind of dialogue of justification that is a standard feature of nearly all
other human rights systems. 137 Even the legal significance of the promo138
tional role played by UNHCR's Executive Committee is in decline.
With no sign that states are likely to advocate refugee rights in their
bilateral relationships, there is good reason to be concerned about the
direct enforceability of the refugee rights regime.
Under a system of collectivized responsibility, in contrast, governments will have a built-in incentive to take an interest in the ways
refugees are treated by other states. Even the states not designated to
provide temporary protection under the application of a particular
interest convergence group's responsibility sharing arrangement would
remain bound by the duty of non-refoulement set by Article 33 of the
Refugee Convention. The duty of non-refoulement proscribes not just the
direct return of refugees to the country of origin, but also actions that
risk the return of a refugee "in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers
of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened." Thus, any
country that wishes to avail itself of the flexibility afforded by a
responsibility sharing mechanism would be legally bound to ensure
that removal to a partner state does not amount to indirect refoulement.
135. Any dispute between state parties regarding the interpretation or application of the
Convention that cannot otherwise be settled may be referred to the International Court of Justice.
Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 38.
136. National implementing legislation, regulations, and decrees, as well as detailed information concerning the conditions of refugees are to be routinely supplied by state parties to the
UNHCR. More generally, states undertake to cooperate with UNHCR, and to facilitate its duty
to supervise the application of the Convention. Refugee Convention, supra note 4, arts. 35, 36,
41(c). It fills to UNHCR and to the state parties to ensure that refugee rights are implemented,
as the Convention does not provide a mechanism by which individuals can pursue their rights
directly. ATL. GRAHL-MADS EN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 59 (1966).

137. See Louis B. Sohn, Human Rights: Their Implementationand Supervision by the United Nations,
in Huas AN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 369, 373-79 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984).
138. Guy Goodwin-Gill & David Petrasek, The 44th Session of the UNHCR Executive Committee:
A View from the Side, 6(1) INT'L J. REFUGEE L 63 (1994).
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The system we envisage will promote practical accountability in two
ways.
In some countries, such as Canada, domestic constitutional rights
could be invoked. 139 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has developed a comprehensive line of cases recognizing that all individuals,
including aliens physically present within a member state, are entitled
to key human rights protections, including access to an effective remedy against rights violations.140 The United Nations Human Rights
Committee similarly recognizes that it is an individual's presence in
the jurisdiction that triggers the right to claim protection under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 141 Alien
status does not reduce that entitlement.14 2 The Committee specified
that the right to liberty and security of the person governs "immigration control" measures.143 More generally, the Committee has stated
1
that ICCPR Article 13 forbids arbitrary expulsions of aliens. 'M
Perhaps most significantly, the opportunities for legal oversight
presented by replacing non-entr6e schemes with responsibility sharing
arrangements would benefit more than just the particular refugee
claimants involved in a specific challenge. In essence, the refugee
protection community in developed states would be positioned to
police the quality of protection afforded refugees even in quite distant
parts of the world. This is because under a responsibility sharing
agreement, the relevant issue in a legal challenge to removal would
clearly be the quality of protection provided in the state designated to
receive the asylum-seeker. If the rights of persons similarly situated to
the particular asylum-seeker who launched the challenge are not being
respected, removal would probably be prohibited. Because it would be
in the interest of the governments seeking to effect removals to avoid
legal challenges of this kind, there would be an automatic incentive
for developed states both to take an active interest in the quality of
139. See James C. Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve, FundamentalJustice and the Deflection of
Refugees from Canada, 34(2) OSGOODa HALL L.J. 1, 4-7 (1996).
140. See, eg., Vilvarajah et al. v. United Kingdom, 215 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992); Cruz
Varas v. Sweden, 201 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992); and Beljoudi v. France, 234-A Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1992).
141. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) (adopted Dec. 16, 1966, entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
142. See, eg., UN-Human Rights Committee: Views of the Human Rights Committee under Article
5(4) of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Concerning
Communication No. 470/1991, 14 HUM. RTs. LJ. 307 (1993).

143. General Comment 8 of the Human Rights Committee, in Compilation of General Comments
and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, International Human Rights
Instruments, at 7, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1 (1992) [hereinafter HRC General Comments].
144. General Comment 15 of the Human Rights Committee, in HRC General Comments,
id. at 20.
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protection in destination states, and to ensure that the funds necessary
to protect refugees there are forthcoming.
Second, comparable scrutiny would occur within the interest-convergence group structure we suggest as the venue for implementation
of collectivized responsibility. As discussed in Part JII,145 specific decisions regarding the allocation of the responsibility to protect refugees
should be taken on the basis of four criteria, the most important of
which is the refugees' physical security. Group members must therefore
grapple collectively with the quality of protection available in the
states under consideration. In Part III, we outline a key role in interest-convergence group discussions for the UNHCR and for lead nongovernmental agencies working with refugees. 146 By creating a new
forum in which refugee rights must of necessity be discussed and by
providing for reasonable transparency of decision-making within that
forum, we believe that collectivized responsibility will significantly
advance the objective of promoting new mechanisms to scrutinize
refugee well-being.
Our goal, in sum, is to reconceive the mechanisms of refugee protection in a way that safeguards practical access to meaningful asylum.
In an international legal system based on the self-interest of states,
principled reform should anticipate and respond to official concerns to
maintain or establish effective migration control systems, and to minimize exposure to serious fiscal or other risks. We believe that governments will see that these priorities can be reconciled to a rights-regarding refugee protection system in which repatriation occurs at the
earliest safe opportunity, and states work together to share burdens and
responsibilities.
E The Ethics of Refugee Law Reform
Suggestions that the mechanisms of refugee protection need to be
reconceived are often met with trepidation by those deeply concerned
for the welfare of refugees. 147 This concern is understandable, given the
pattern of protection-reducing reforms introduced by most governments in recent years. We believe, however, that the deficiencies of the
present asylum system are so severe that the failure to explore change
would be unethical. The moral imperative is to move forward with a
4
reform strategy that is both principled and pragmatic.1 8
145. See infra text accompanying notes 378-381.
146. See infra text accompanying notes 348-355.
147. See, e&g.,Bill Frelick, Toward the Reformulation of InternationalRefugee Law: Symposium Report,
15(1) REFUGE 2 (1996).
148. John Haley, Some Thoughts on the Ethical Dimensions of the Project to Reformulate International
Refugee Law, 15(1) REFUGE 5 (1996).

HarvardHuman RightsJournal / Vol. 10
Access to protection by those in need is surely the primary objective,
Yet it is precisely this basic principle that is being undermined as states
erect an increasing number of barriers to access, force refugees from
their territories by severe rights denials, or contain them in unsafe
havens. If we have accurately ascribed the strategies of governments
determined to avoid unilateral and potentially indefinite responsibility,
then constructive alternatives to the present mechanisms of refugee law
should be considered. A clearly temporary approach to refugee protection, coupled with an effective interstate process for sharing the responsibilities and the burdens of protection, responds to the legitimate
operational concerns of states. It does not, however, compromise the
right of refugees to access solid and dignified protection.
Particularly in the North, the avoidance of refugee protection responsibilities plays to public perceptions that immigration policies are
out of control. 149 The imperative for governments to take crude steps
to keep refugees away as a demonstration that border control remains
viable will only abate if a credible policy alternative is proposed. 150 The
cycle of protection and repatriation that is the essence of a temporary
protection regime may offer that alternative.
It is in the interest of refugees to affirm that refugee protection is
a human rights remedy, which should be separated from immigration
policies. When refugees are grouped together with all other manner of
migrants, be they legal or illegal, skilled or unskilled, law-abiding or
undesirable, the fundamental distinction between refugees and other
migrants, namely the involuntary nature of the refugee's journey, is
lost.15' Advocates have demanded that governments take steps actively
to remind the public that refugees are not like other immigrants
because they have beenforced to flee their homes. 152 A commitment to
temporary protection, backed up by policies that will normally lead to
repatriation, would help separate refugee protection from immigration
policy in general, thereby restoring the focus of attention to the human
rights basis of refugees' presence in host countries. As Jordan's Crown
Prince El Hassan Bin Talal has observed:

149. This public perception has led states to undertake highly publicized programs of deterrence, such as "Operation Hold-the-Line" on the border between Mexico and the United States.
While the real value, of such initiatives in deterring illegal immigration is questionable, officials
promote them as a means of reassuring the public that governments are responding to a perceived
problem. SeeCONTROLLING I MIGRATiON: A GLOBAl. PERSPEcriVE 34-36 (Wayne A. Cornelius,
Philip L. Martin, & James F. Hollifield eds., 1994).
150. Commission on the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to
the Council and the European Parliament on Immigration and Asylum Policies, COM(94)23
final, at para. 12 [hereinafter European Commission Communication).
151. Seegenerally UNHCR, WoRLD's REFUGEES, supra note 1, at 196-98.
152. See,e.g., DAVID MATAS WITH ILANA SIMION, CLOSING THE DOORS: THE FAILURE OF
REFUGEE PROTECTION 27-28 (1989).
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A human rights basis for refugee law would not only invigorate a stagnant law, but would also stimulate the essentially
humanitarian tendencies of nations and jurists, reminding
them that behind the faceless words "refugee," "returnee,"
"economic migrant," lie the faces of a starving child, a des153
perate mother, or a sick old man.
A second ethical argument in favor of refugee law reform is the
promotion of a more equitable distribution of funds available for
refugee protection. As noted above, 154 the relatively recent breakdown
of refugee protection within Southern states derives in large measure
from competition for scarce resources between refugee and host communities. Under a more collaborative approach to refugee protection,
the same resources presently spent to receive refugees could be reassigned where they would be most likely to benefit the greatest number
of refugees. Industrialized states spend billions of dollars annually to
process the claims of the small minority of the world's refugee population that manages to evade non-entree schemes and to claim protection
in the North. 155 These same wealthy governments contribute less than
U.S. $1.2 billion each year to address the needs of the more than eighty
percent of refugees remaining in the South. 156 We believe that it is
nearly impossible to justify the present skew of resource allocations in
favor of the small minority of refugees--disproportionately young,
157
male, and mobile-who can seek asylum in the developed world.
The relative magnitude of the needs of refugees and of the host
communities in many less developed countries demands serious consideration of a system under which resource allocations are better
aligned with the real distribution of protective responsibility.
153. Crown Prince El Hassan Bin Talal, Refugee Law: Protectionforthe Minority, 6(1) J. REFUGEE
STUD. 4 (1993).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
155. According to one estimate, the cost of administering asylum procedures and providing
social welfare benefits to refugee claimants in 13 of the major industrialized states increased from
around U.S. $500 million in 1983 to some U.S. $7 billion in 1991. UNHCR, WoRLD's REFUGEES, sApra note 1, at 199.
156. Id. at 255.
157. Canada, like Western Europe and the United States, accepts only a small proportion of
asylum-seekers worldwide, and the majority of those accepted on humanitarian grounds or as
refugee claimants, are men. The majority of women with and without children, find temporary
(often leading to long term) asylum in refugee camps, or in resettlement zones where they await
repatriation to their home country or resettlement to a third country. It is well known that women
and girls constitute the majority of the population of camps. According to some estimates, at
least 75% of refugees are women and children, and in some countries women and children make
up 90% of the refugees, with large numbers of female-led households. See Wenona Giles, Aid
Recipients or Citizens? Canada's role in managing the gender relationsof forced migration, in DavatopMENT & DIASPoRA: GENDER AND THE REFUGEE EXPERIENCE 44 (Wenona Giles, Helene Moussa
& Penny Van Esterik eds., 1996).
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If the arrival of asylum-seekers in the North continues to be understood as giving rise to individuated obligations on the states of arrival,
wealthy governments will continue to spend even larger sums to avoid
responsibility for the welfare of all refugees who might come to their
borders.15 s If, on the other hand, a regime of collectivized responsibility
were to de-link the site of arrival from the duty to meet all protection
needs, 159 present investments in non-entre mechanisms could then be
reallocated to meet refugee needs more equitably in parts of the world
that are presently forced to contend with a disproportionate share of
protection responsibilities. 160 Extraregional resettlement could be reserved for those who truly require it, on the basis of need rather than
relative mobility.
A third ethical consideration follows from the practical opportunities that collectivized protection affords for supervision of respect for
refugee rights around the world. Because the ability to benefit from
responsibility sharing mechanisms legally depends on the respect of
refugee rights in the countries of asylum, even distant governments
have an incentive to monitor the quality of protection afforded. Moreover, unlike many contemporary bilateral and other burden-shifting
arrangements that exclude NGOs and even UNHCR from any meaningful participation, the more open interest-convergence groups structure proposed here would enhance the transparency of interstate decisions in regard to the protection of refugees.
What, though, of the possibility that at least some governments will
accept nothing short of complete discretion over immigration, and that
even a shift to the temporary and collectivized protection of refugees
may not be viewed as reconcilable to their interests? Similarly, how
will it be possible to ensure that shared responsibility for refugees does
158.
[Tihe representative of one major donor country, and valued partner of UNHCR, ....
[has observed that] "unless we can develop appropriate international machinery we will
see an intensification of pressure on all governments involved to concentrate on unilateral and nationally based solutions which will focus most heavily on immigration
controls and less and less on internationally agreed procedures and regimes."
Michel Moussalli, InternationalProtetion: The Road Ahead, 3 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 606 (1991).
159. See infra text accompanying notes 378-385.

160. While there is a legitimate concern to ensure that the savings realized are in fact
re-allocated to share the burden of overseas refugee protection, a recent review of refugee policy

carried out by the Norwegian government suggests this may be possible:
Refugee reception in Norway generally involves considerable costs borne by society. A

shift in refugee policy facilitating the repatriation of more persons will liberate more
resources in Norway. In this way we may be able to help more people should new acute
refugee problems occur. This help could either be given by concentrating our efforts

abroad, or by giving more persons protection in Norway.
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE AND THE MINISTRY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND LABOUR OF NORWAy,

WHITE PAPER No. 17: ON REFUGEE POLICY 10 (1994-95) [hereinafter NORWEGIAN WHITE
PAPER].
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not amount in practice to an abdication of responsibility and, in
particular, that resources saved in developed countries will actually be
dedicated to funding protection in the South more adequately? The
concern is that the refugee protection community may agree to a
shallower and more flexible mode of protection in order to secure
unimpeded access to quality protection, only to find that states do not
dismantle barriers to entry, or fail to bind themselves to a more
equitable distribution of protective resources.
It would be irresponsible to do no more than encourage governments
to embrace a policy of collectivized and solution-oriented protection,
then trust that all will work out for the best. This is not, however,
what is proposed here. We argue for an openness to reform of the
mechanisms of refugee law on purely instrumentalist grounds. Reform
makes sense not because temporary protection and shared responsibility
are necessarily better than permanent protection and particularized
responsibility, but as a means to counter the withdrawal of states from
their protective responsibilities. A willingness to discuss change is the
first step required to engender an honest and principled discussion with
states about the restoration of access to rights-regarding asylum and of
meaning to refugee law.
We are suggesting a package of reforms in which unimpeded access
to quality asylum is ensured under a collectivized model of temporary
protection. If, as some suggest, governments are not really interested
in finding a solution to these genuine problems, but are covertly
antagonistic to refugee protection in any form, this will become clear
in the process of debating and structuring reform. If states ultimately
refuse to join issue with a constructive alternative that preserves the
essential commitment to refugee protection, it will then be quite right
for the refugee protection community to denounce their duplicity.
There is, however, a need for us to open a dialogue with governments
that demonstrates a good faith approach to meeting the concerns of
states. If that effort ultimately fails, the refugee protection community
will still benefit from the strategic advantage of having forced governments to articulate any now-obscured reasons for them to refuse to
protect desperate people.
II. CAN REFORM OCCUR WITHIN THE PREVAILING
LEGAL FRAMEWORK?
For the reasons discussed in Part I, the moment is right to promote
a new paradigm of refugee protection that is both human rights-based
and pragmatic. Governments, however, exhibit little enthusiasm for
engaging in the kind of major negotiations needed to establish a new
international refugee convention. Moreover, members of official and
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nongovernmental communities alike have expressed concern that a
decision to abandon the present Refugee Convention when most states
appear focused on the promotion of narrowly defined self-interests may
result in a serious diminution in the quality of protection formally
guaranteed to refugees by international law.161 Sensitive to these con-

cerns, we therefore demonstrate in this Part that the kinds of reform
we propose can be undertaken without amending the formal legal
obligations owed to refugees.,

A. Solution-OrientedTemporary Protection
We advocate a system of rights-regarding temporary protection that
is dedicated to preparing refugees adequately for the eventuality of
return. Language and meaning are important in the debate about
temporary refugee protection. The use of the term "temporary protection," as opposed to permanent protection, can be confusing and troubling. In fact, ,the present international legal framework refers neither
to temporary nor permanent protection. While Article 34 of the Refugee Convention urges governments to "facilitate the assimilation and
naturalization of refugees," 162 the Convention requires states to afford
only temporary protection guaranteeing a critical series of fundamental
human rights to. refugees.163 , As observed during its drafting, the
Refugee Convention "was intended to give refugees a minimum number of advantages which would permit them to lead a tolerable life in
the country of asylum."164 Assimilation is required if and when return
165
proves impossible, but need not be immediately pursued.
The purpose of international protection is not . . . that a
refugee remain a refugee forever, but to ensure the individual's renewed membership of a community and the restoration of national protection, either in the homeland or through
integration elsewhere . . . . I[The Convention makes clear
that refugee status is a transitory condition which will cease
161. Joan Fitzpatrick, Revitalizing the 1951 Refugee Convention, 9 HARV. Hum. R'rs. J. 229

(1996).
162. Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 34.
163. See generally James C. Hathaway, The Meaning of Repatriation, INT'L J. RE uSn L.
(forthcoming).
164. Statement of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessnes and Related Problems, Mr.
Chance of Canada,U.N. ESCOR, at 4, U.N. Doc. B/AC.32/SR.22 (1950).
165. "It would of course be unrealistic to expect complete assimilation in less than a generation or two, and the best course would be to allow refugees to preserve their integrity as a
community at first and to welcome their assimilation when it became possible." Statement of Mr.
Cha of China, U.N. ESCOR, at 5, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.34 (1950). It is noteworthy that the

Chinese representative took this position in favor of respecting the integrity of refugee communities even though he was among those most strongly committed to an assimilationist optic.
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once a refugee
resumes or establishes meaningful national
166
protection.
The temporary nature of the obligation to provide protection is most
explicit in the permission the Convention grants states to revoke
refugee status whenever there is effective and meaningful change in a
refugee's country of origin, such that the need for protection no longer
exists.1 67 Just as under the Convention against Torture'6 and the
ICCPR, 169 the duty of non-refoulement under the Refugee Convention is
170
conditioned on the persistence of a threat to relevant human rights.
In this section, we define the critical baseline of rights in relation
to non-refoulement, security, basic dignity, and self-sufficiency presently
set by international law, which we endorse as an appropriate and
necessary starting point for our model of reform. In Part II,171 we posit
additional steps not mandated by international law that build upon
these fundamental rights and have the potential to make temporary
protection leading to viable repatriation a practical policy alternative.
1. The Refugee Convention
Some states erroneously believe that they are free to determine what
rights will be granted to temporarily protected refugees.1 72 In fact,
because temporary protection is precisely what is required by the
Refugee Convention, the regime of refugee rights of the Convention
applies. The structure of the Convention establishes a continuum under
which entitlement to rights increases as a refugee's attachment to the
asylum state deepens. The applicability of each right is a function of
whether a refugee satisfies the definition of one of five levels of attachment. 73 Some rights apply the moment a refugee becomes subject to
166. UNHCR, VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION v, 8 (1996).
167. Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 1(C).
168. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, art. 3, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., at 4, U.N. Doc.

A/RES/39/46 (1984) thereinafter Torture Convention].
169. ICCPR, supra note 141. The Human Rights Committee has considered the possibility
that extradition and expulsion decisions may expose individuals to violations of rights assured
under the Covenant and determined that the focus of analysis should be on the currency of the
risk. See Kindlerv.Canada, Communication No. 470/1991, Human Rights Committee, 48th Sess.,
para. 13.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/481D/47011991 (1993).

170. Even non-binding statements of principle, such as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, U.N. Res. 217A(II), U.N. GAOR, 3d Seas., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)
[hereinafter Universal Declaration], and the Declaration on Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 2312 (XXI),
U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1968) [hereinafter Territorial Asylum
Declaration], fail to posit a duty to grant refugees permanent admission to an asylum state.
171. See infra text accompanying note 262.
172. INTER-GOVERNMENTAL CONSULTATIONS, TEMPORARY PROTEcrION, supra note 50, at 19.
173. See JAmES C. HATHAWAY,

(forthcoming).
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the authority of a state, an interpretation that is implicit in the failure
to specify any particular degree of attachment. 174 Other rights, however, arise only once the refugee is actually physically present within
the territory of a state party,175 when the refugee is lawfully within its
177
territory, 76 when the refugee is lawfully residing or staying there,
178
or after the satisfaction of a durable residence requirement.
The governments that drafted the Convention therefore did not
envisage a situation in which all rights would be bestowed at the
moment of status recognition. Rights were instead to be granted
incrementally, and as a function of the increasing depth of the relationship between the refugee and the asylum state, presumed to result
from the passage of time.
However, governments frequently assert that they do not owe any
rights to refugees until they have determined that an asylum-seeker is
actually a Convention refugee and hence entitled to Convention rights.
Because it is one's de facto circumstances, and not the official recogni179
tion of these circumstances, that give rise to Convention refugee status,
some genuine Convention refugees are disadvantaged by this practice.
Unless status assessment is virtually immediate, the only acceptable
solution is to recognize that any person who claims to be a Convention
refugee is presumptively entitled to receive the provisional benefit of,
at least, the first two categories of Convention rights (namely, those
rights that apply to refugees regardless of their level of attachment to
an asylum state, and those that accrue upon mere physical presence in
a state party to the Convention). 80 More sophisticated rights (those
174. Refugee Convention, supra note 4, arts. 3 ("non-discrimination"), 5 ("rights granted apart
from this Convention"), 12 ("personal status"), 13 ("movable and immovable property"), 16(1)
("access to courts"), 20 ("rationing"), 22 ("public education"), 29 ("fiscal charges"), 30 ("transfer
of assets"), 31 ("refugees unlawfully in the country of refuge"), 33 ("prohibition of expulsion or
return--'refoulement'"), and 34 ("consideration for naturalization").
175. Id., arts. 4 ("religion") and 27 ("identity papers").
176. Id., arts. 18 ("self-employment"), 26 ("freedom of movement"), and 32 ("freedom from
expulsion").
177. Id., arts., 14 ("artistic rights and industrial property"), 15 ("right of association"), 16(2)
("access to courts"), 17 ("wage-earning employment"), 19 ("liberal professions"), 21 ("housing"),
23 ("public relief"), 24 ("labour legislation and social security"), 25 ("administrative assistance"),
and 28 ("travel documents").
178. Id., arts. 7(2) ("exemption from reciprocity") and 17(2) ("exemption from alien labor
restrictions"). Refugees are also to be exempted from alien labor restrictions when married to or
the parent of a national of the asylum state.
179.
A person is a refugee within the meaning of the 1951 Convention as soon as he fulfills

the criteria contained in the definition ..

.

. He does
not become
a refugee bccause of

recognition, but isrecognized became he is a refugee.
UNHCR, HANBOOK, supra note 16, at para. 28 (emphasis added).

180. The interpretation of the Refugee Convention as granting rights even prior to formal
verification of status is also clear from the specific incorporation of Article 9 in the Refugee

Convention. Article 9 allows governments provisionally to suspend the rights of persons not yet
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that require lawful presence, staying, or durable residence) need be
granted only when those more demanding levels of attachment are, in
fact, satisfied.
This formulation is compelled by the duty of states to implement
the Refugee Convention in good faith. 18 ' Absent the interpretation
posited here, a government could avoid all obligations under the
Refugee Convention by the simple expedient of refusing to consider
whether or not a person satisfied the refugee definition. Moreover, as a
matter of practical fairness, governments that wish to be relieved of
their presumptive (if minimalist) responsibilities toward all asylumseekers have the legal authority to take steps to expedite formal determination of refugee status. 8 2 Convention rights can thereupon be
withdrawn from persons found not to be Convention refugees. Refugees, on the other hand, have no comparable ability to force a disposition of their claims to be protected by the Convention.
In the result, asylum-seekers, even those not yet admitted to any
form of protection, should be understood to benefit from those rights
that inhere generally or by virtue of simple physical presence, until
and unless they are found not to be refugees. Once authorized in law
or in fact to remain in the asylum state, refugees are further entitled
to claim the rights that apply to refugees who are lawfully within the
territory of a state party. During any ensuing period of temporary
protection, those rights that are contingent upon lawful stay or residence must also be honored. Finally, in the event that "temporary"
protection becomes prolonged, its beneficiaries may claim those rights
that are contingent upon satisfaction of a durable (three-year) residence
requirement.
Beyond the requirements of the Refugee Convention, international
human rights standards are also directly relevant. The ICCPR guarantees most rights to all persons under a state's authority, not just to
nationals. 18 3 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) is of similarly general application, though it is

confirmed to be refugees if the asylum state is faced with war or other exceptional circumstance.

It follows from the inclusion of this provision in the Convention that, absent such extreme
circumstances, states cannot suspend rights pending verification of status. See HATHAWAY, RIGHTS
oF REFUGEES, supra note 173.

181. IAN SINCLAia, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 119-20 (1984).
182. If necessary, states can resort to a fairly constructed procedure for "manifestly unfounded
claims." For a definition of "manifestly unfounded claims," see Executive Committee of the High
Commissioner's Programme, Conclusion No. 30 (XXXIV) (1983), para. (d).
183. ICCPR, supra note 141, art. 2(1). The Human Rights Committee has emphasized that
"the general rule is that each one of the rights of the Covenant must be guaranteed without
discrimination between citizens and aliens." General Comment 15 of the Human Rights Committee, in HRC General Comments, supra note 143, at 18.
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within the discretion of less developed states to determine to what
extent economic rights will be extended to non-nationals. 184
a. Non-Refoulement
The most critical of all refugee rights is protection against refoulement. Article 33 of the Refugee Convention 8 5 requires that refugees
not be returned to situations where their lives or freedom would be
threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group, or political opinion. The right to protection
against refoulement applies as soon as a refugee comes under the authority of an asylum state, whether or not status has been formally adju6
dicated 186
The Refugee Convention requires that protection against refoulement
be guaranteed equally to those refugees who have entered a country
lawfully, and to those who have entered or remained illegally. Article
31 prohibits the penalization of refugees for illegal entry or presence,
provided that they present themselves to authorities without delay, and
show good cause for their illegal presence. 18 Pursuant to Article 32 of
the Convention, refugees who are lawfully in the territory of an asylum
state cannot be expelled at all, except for reasons of national security
or public order.1 88
UNHCR consistently identifies a commitment to non-refoulement as
an absolutely essential element of temporary protection, further specifying that admission to the country of asylum goes hand in hand with
ensuring true respect for that right.189 This right must be fully respected under any regime of temporary protection.
As a result, asylum seekers, even those not yet admitted to any form
of protection, should be understood to benefit from those rights that
184. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, art. 2(3), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
185. Rdfugee Convention, supra note 11. Non-refoulement also finds expression in Article 3 of
the Torture Convention, supra note 168, the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearances, art. 8(1), G.A. Res. 47/133, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49,
at 207, U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (1992), and the Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, para. 5, E.S.C. Res. 1989/65, Annex,
U.N. ESCOR, Supp. No. 1, at 53, U.N. Doc. E/1989189 (1989). Protection against rcfoulcnenet
derived from these non-refugee specific standards is not limited to persons at risk on account of
one of the five Refugee Convention grounds. Instead, all persons at risk of specific concerns such
as torture, extra-legal, execution, or enforced disappearance are entitled to protection against
return.
186. See supra note 174.
187. Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 31(1).
188. Id., art. 32(1).
189. "The minimum requirements of temporary protection include admission to the country
of refuge, [and] .. respect for the principle of non-refoulement." 1994 UNHCR Rcport, supra note
110, at 6.
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inhere generally or by virtue of simple physical presence, until and
unless they are found not to be'refugees. Once authorized in law or in
fact to remain in the asylum state, refugees are further entitled to claim
the rights that apply to refugees who are lawfully within the territory
of a state party. During any ensuing period of temporary protection,
those rights that are contingent upon lawful stay or residence must
also be honored. Finally, in the event that "temporary" protection
becomes prolonged, its beneficiaries may claim those rights that are
contingent upon satisfaction of a durable (three year) residency requirement.
b. Security
Given the levels of fear, trauma, and vulnerability experienced in
flight, refugees have a pressing need for a restored sense of security.
This goes far beyond the simple need to be protected from the threat
of refoulement. Most immediately, the security needs of refugees include
shelter from the risk of physical attack and assistance to meet basic
human needs.
There is no explicit guarantee of a right to physical security in the
Refugee Convention itself. The ICCPR's guarantee of the "inherent
right to life"'19 and to protection against "torture [and] cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment"'191 are, however, directly applicable. 192 Conclusion 72 of the UNHCR Executive Committee also affirms the importance of ensuring the physical security of refugees, while other conclusions require that special attention be paid to attending to the particular
194
security needs of women refugees 193 and of refugee children.
One of the most serious risks faced by many refugees is the possi19 5
bility of military or armed attack on refugee camps or settlements.
190. ICCPR, supra note 141, art. 6(1).
191. Id. art. 7.
192. The Human Rights Committee has held that states are not only obliged to refrain from
acts that may violate the rights enshrined in the Covenant, but that they also bear an affirmative
duty to take "legislative, administrative, judicial and other measures" so as to "prevent and
punish" any acts that violate Covenant rights, in any territory under their jurisdiction. General
Comment 20 of the Human Rights Committee, in HRC General Comments, supra note 143, at

30.
193. Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, Conclusions No. 39
(XXVI), "Refugee Women and International Protection," 54 (XXXIX), "Refugee Women," 60
(XQ), "Refugee Women," 64 (XLI), "Refugee Women and International Protection," and 73
(XLIV), "Refugee Protection and Sexual Violence."
194. Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme Conclusions No. 47
(XXXVIII), "Refugee Children" (hereinafter ExCom Conclusion No. 471, and 59 (XL), "Refugee
Children." See generally DEVELOPMENT & DIAsPORA: GENDER AND THE REFUGEE EXPERIENCE,

supra note 157.
195. See, ag., ROBERT GOEmAN, MITIGATING MISERY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE POLITICAL AND
HUMANITARIAN AsPEcTs OF U.S. AND GLOBAL REFUGEE POLICY 173-74 (1993).
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Executive Committee Conclusions, in particular Conclusion 48,196 require governments to take steps to mitigate the possibility of refugees
becoming the objects of armed attack.1 97 Tragedy can clearly ensue
when governments fail to meet this responsibility, as attacks on refugee
98
camps in Zaire made clear.
Beyond protection against attack, refugees frequently are in need of
critical forms of material assistance, including food, shelter, health care,
and clothing. Article 20 of the Refugee Convention requires states to
grant all refugees national treatment in terms of access to rationing
systems.' 99 Refugees who are lawfully staying in the territory of a state
party, including those in receipt of temporary protection, are further
entitled to receive the same access to public housing, public relief and
assistance, and social security as is afforded to nationals. 2° ° This generally applicable duty is reinforced by Articles 9, 11, and 12 of the
ICESCR, 20 though the ICESCR, unlike the Refugee Convention, allows less developed countries to decide the extent to which economic
20 2
rights will be extended to non-nationals.
Finally, an exceedingly important aspect of security is the provision
of identity documents to refugees. Article 27 of the Refugee Convention stipulates that refugees without a valid travel document have an
absolute right to be issued identity papers. 20 3 Yet governments are
often reluctant to grant identity documents to individuals who are not
permanent residents or citizens. For example, recipients of temporary
protection in Germany who do not have a national passport are granted
an identity document by German authorities only in exceptional and
compelling circumstances. 2°4 Refugees need to be provided with valid

196. Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme Conclusion No, 48
(XXXV), "Military or Armed Attacks on Refugee Camps and Settlements," para. 3.
197. See also Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme Conclusions No.
27 (XXXIII), "Military attacks on refugee camps and settlements in Southern Africa and elsewhere,"
32 (XXXIV), "Military attacks on refugee camps and settlements in Southern Africa and elsewhere,"
and 45 (XXXVII), "Military and Armed Attacks on Refugee Camps and Settlements."
198. See, eg., James C. McKinley, Jr., Strife on Zaire Border Erupts Into Open War With Rwanda,
N.Y. Tuias, Nov. 2, 1996, at 1.
199. Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 20.
200. Id., arts. 21, 23, 24.
201. ICESCR, supra note 184, art. 9 ("the right of everyone to social security, including social
insurance"), art. 11 ("the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his
family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of
living conditions"), and art. 12 ("the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health").
202. The relative stringency of the duty on all state parties to the Refugee Convention to
extend socioeconomic rights to refugees is discussed in HATHAWAY & DENT, supra note 40, at
39-40, 45, 50.
203. Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 27.
204. INTER-GOVERNMENTAL CONSULTATIONS, TEMPORARY PROTECTION, supra note 50, at
122-23.
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identity documents to ensure that they will be able to access the basic
services to which they are entitled. More fundamentally, identity documents are an important symbol of security, and convey to a refugee an
205
important message of recognition and protection.
c. Basic Dignity
The hardships inherent in refugee flight often serve to strip away
the basic human dignity of refugees. International law accords particular attention to the restoration of some of that lost dignity by requiring
respect for rights of nondiscrimination, family unity, freedom of movement and association, and freedom of religion.
Refugees, or particular groups of refugees, are subjected to discriminatory treatment on many fronts, including even the degree to which
they can count on officials of the asylum state to provide them with
physical protection. 20 6 Article 3 of the Refugee Convention guarantees
that refugees shall benefit from all Convention rights without discrimination as to race, religion, or country of origin.20 7 More broadly, Article
2(1) of the ICCPR and Article 2(2) of the ICESCR require state parties
to ensure that all persons subject to their jurisdiction benefit from the
broad-ranging rights recognized in those Covenants without distinction
of any kind.2° s Most important of all, Article 26 of the ICCPR provides
that all persons are entitled to the equal protection and equal benefit
of the law.20 9 This means that refugees cannot be discriminated against
in either the enforcement of existing laws or in the allocation of legal
rights. Any differential rights allocation relative to nationals must
therefore derive from the distinct capabilities and potentialities of
210
refugees relative to citizens.
One of the strongest emotional needs of refugees is to be reunited
with close family members who have been left behind in the country
of origin, or in a country of provisional asylum or transit. While the
Refugee Convention is silent as to the question of reuniting refugees
205. Maciej Domanski, Insights from Refugee Experience: A Background Paperon Temporary Protection, in RECONCEIVING INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW, supra note 120.
206. See AmNESTY INTERNATIONAL, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, FAILED BY THE SYSTEM: POLICE ILL-TREATMENT OF FOREIGNERS (1995). For example, authorities initially did little
to curb widespread violence against asylum-seekers by neo-Nazi groups in Germany, perhaps due
to a combination of pressure from legal right-wing extremist groups and what appeared to be
tacit support for such action among large segments of the German public. Louis Wiesner & Steve
Edminster, Asylum Seekers, Other Foreigners,and Neo-Nazi Violence in Germany, in U.S. COMMIrEE
FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 121-25 (1993).
207. Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 3.
208. ICCPR, supra note 141, art. 2(1); ICESCR, supra note 184, art. 2(2).
209. ICCPR, supra note 141, art. 26.
210. This understanding of the duty of nondiscrimination is developed in HATHAWAY, RIGHTS
OF REFUGEES, supra note 173.
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with close family members, the Final Act of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries, at which the Convention was adopted, recommends that
states "take the necessary measures for the protection of the refugee's
family."'211 UNHCR Executive Committee Resolutions 22 and 24 simi2 12
larly call upon governments to respect the principle of family unity.
More generally, Article 10 of the ICESCR requires that the widest
possible protection and assistance be granted to the family; 213 Articles
17, 23, and 24 of the ICCPR have been interpreted by the Human
Rights Committee to prohibit arbitrary or unlawful interference by
states with the families of non-citizens; 214 and Article 10 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child urges the expeditious reunification
215
of children with their parents.
These general provisions notwithstanding, international law does
not yet require affirmative actions to bring families together. Governments have therefore sometimes drawn a distinction between a duty
to maintain the unity of refugee families when they arrive together,
and a discretion to reunite families that have become separated during
flight. 216 While not mandated by international law, it is our view that
positive efforts to effect reunification are the most effective method of
delivering temporary protection in a dignified manner that promotes
return.
A third aspect of human dignity that is protected under the refugee
rights regime is freedom of movement and association. States often
severely restrict the freedom of movement of refugee communities
because of security concerns, or in an attempt to avoid a degree of local
integration felt to be inconsistent with successful repatriation. 217 Yet
Article 26 of the Refugee Convention grants refugees lawfully in the
territory of any asylum state the same freedom of movement as is
211. Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees
and Stateless Persons, Refugee Convention, supra note 4, part IV, para. B.
212. ExCom Conclusion No. 47, supra note 194, para. 1; Executive Committee of the High
Commissioner's Programme Conclusion No. 22 (XXXII), "Protection of Asylum Seekers in
Situations of Large-Scale Influx" [hereinafter ExCom Conclusion No. 22]. See also
Executive
Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme Conclusion No. 47 (XXXVIII), "Refugee
Children."
213. ICESCR, supra note 184, art. 10.
214. ICCPR, supra note 141, arts. 17, 23, 24. The Human Rights Committee has affirmed
that these family-related rights apply equally to citizens and non-citizens. General Comment 15
of the Human Rights Committee, in HRC General Comments, supra note 143, at 19.
215. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, art. 10, reprinted in 28 I.L.M.
1448.
216. Even the reunification of unaccompanied refugee children with a close relative is often
dealt with on an exceptional and discretionary basis. See EVERETT M. RESSLER, NEIL BOOTHcIY,
& DANIEL J. STEINBOCK, UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN: CARE AND PROTECTION IN WMYARS,
NATURAL DISASTERS, AND REFUGEE MOVEMENTS 256 (1988).

217. Manuel Angel Castillo & James C. Hathaway, Temporary Protection, in RECONCEIVING
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE lAw, supra note 120.
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applicable to aliens generally. 218 Article 12(1) of the ICCPR goes
farther, and extends absolute freedom of movement to all persons
lawfully within a state's territory, subject only to restrictions that are
necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or
morals, or the rights and freedoms of others. 219 Article 15 of the
Refugee Convention, again applicable to all refugees lawfully staying
in the territory, guarantees the same right to freedom of association as
is accorded to most favored nationals of a foreign country, though it
does not extend to political or profit-making associations. 220 The ICCPR
extends freedom of association absolutely, subject only to the kind of
truly vital limitations noted above in relation to Article 12(1).221 As
we highlight later in this Article, freedom of movement and freedom
of association are both central to a solution-oriented approach to refu222
gee protection.
Finally, freedom of religion is guaranteed to all refugees within a
state's territory by Article 4 of the Refugee Convention, at least to the
same degree accorded to nationals. 223 Article 18 of the ICCPR more
broadly protects freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, limited
only to the extent necessary to protect public safety, order, health,
224
morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
d. Self-Sufficiency
The drafters of the Refugee Convention were conscious of the need
to enable refugees to become self-sufficient as quickly as possible, so
as to reduce the burden on asylum states. 225 Self-sufficiency promotes
dignity, helps refugees provide for their own economic security, and
allows refugee communities to develop skills that will ultimately assist
in making repatriation successful. The Refugee Convention accords
refugees lawfully staying in an asylum state the right to pursue wageearning employment on the same terms guaranteed to most favored
foreigners. 226 After three years residence in the country, or if the
refugee's spouse or children are nationals of the asylum state, no
218. Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 26.
219. ICCPR, supra note 141, art. 12(1).
220. Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 15.
221. ICCPR, supra note 141, art. 22(1).
222. Specifically, we suggest that refugee communities should be encouraged to self-organize
and freely associate in Refugee Development Councils (RDCs), which would play a significant
role in representing refugee needs in the asylum state and during repatriation. See infra text
accompanying notes 266-268.
223. Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 4.
224. ICCPR, supra note 141, art. 18.
225. See Memorandum by the Suretary-Generalto the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related
Problems, U.N. ESCOR, at 6-7, U.N. Doc. E/AC.3212 (1950).
226. Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 17(1).
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restrictions whatsoever on access to employment are permitted. 227 Opportunities for self-employment and for professional practice are also
guaranteed to refugees lawfully staying in the state, albeit only to the
228
extent guaranteed to aliens generally.
Self-sufficiency is also advanced through the education system. As
soon as refugees come under the authority of any asylum state, Article
22 of the Convention requires that elementary education be made
available to them on terms of equivalency with nationals of the asylum
state. 229 Education beyond the elementary level is to be afforded on
the same basis as is granted to aliens generally in the same circumstances. 230 The ICESCR requires states to move progressively toward
231
accessible and free secondary and higher education for all persons.
2. Recent Challenges to the Applicability of the Refugee Rights
Regime
The combination of rights derived from international refugee law
and international human rights law sets a critical baseline that governs
any regime for the temporary protection of refugees. In particular,
temporarily protected refugees are to be protected against refoulement
and granted rights necessary to ensure their security, basic dignity, and
self-sufficiency. In contrast to this fairly clear statement of duties owed
to refugees, UNHCR has recently given tacit approval to the use of
temporary protection as an opportunity or excuse to restrict refugee
rights. Soon after the outbreak of the Yugoslav conflict, UNHCR
stated that "persons fleeing from the former Yugoslavia who are in need
of international protection should be able to receive it on a temporary
basis." 232 UNHCR recognized that in the context of a mass movement
of refugees, it is impractical to require all asylum-seekers to undergo
individualized determination of status. Emphasizing that refugee protection does not presuppose permanent exile, UNHCR acknowledged
the logic of responding to the exodus from the former Yugoslavia by
a simplified admissions procedure that would lead only to temporary
protection. Temporary protection was endorsed as a pragmatic and
flexible means to provide refugees with safety and a reasonable degree
233
of stability.
227. Id. art. 17(2).
228. Id. arts. 18-19; ICESCR, supra note 184, art. 7.

229.
230.
231.
232.

Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 22(1).
Id. art. 22(2).
ICESCR, supra note 184, art. 13(2).
A Comprehensive Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in the former Yugoslavia, at 4,

U.N. Doc. HCR/IMFY/1992IY (1992).

233. UNHCR, Background Note to the Informal Meeting on Temporary Protection,Jan. 18, 1993,
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UNHCR has, however, demonstrated an inconsistent approach to
the definition of precisely what rights are owed to refugees protected
on a temporary basis. On the one hand, UNHCR has occasionally
insisted on the full application of the Refugee Convention to the
beneficiaries of temporary protection. 234 It has accurately observed that
many of those who fled the former Yugoslavia are in fact Convention
refugees, and should therefore be afforded substantially the same treatment as formally recognized refugees. 235 Regrettably, UNHCR has
sometimes departed from this principled position, suggesting that the
legal content of temporary protection is not well-defined and not
necessarily filly governed by the Refugee Convention. 236 It has engendered unnecessary confusion by suggesting that temporary protection
is a "complementary protection measure," 237 rather than a means of
implementing obligations under the Refugee Convention as such. In
elaborating what temporary protection is, and what rights it entails,
the UNHCR has consistently emphasized only the duty of admission,
respect for the principle of non-refoulement, for basic human rights as
and
defined in Conclusion 22 of the UNHCR Executive Committee,
238
repatriation to the country of origin when conditions permit.
In taking this position, UNHCR may be seen to suggest that states
are not required to respect all obligations under the Refugee Convention in the context of providing temporary protection to refugees.
Conclusion 22, often identified by UNHCR as the primary source of
applicable minimum standards, lays out a fairly comprehensive list of
some of the basic rights, protections, and standards of treatment that
234. Draft Report of the 21 June 1995 Inter-SessionalMeeting of the Sub-Committee of the Whole on
InternationalProtection,U.N. Doc. EC/1995/SCRICRP (1995), at 2. See also 1995 UNHCR Report,
supra note 83, at 4.
235.

The need for international protection in situations of mass influx is normally manifest
and, as in the case of the former Yugoslavia, most of the asylum-seekers may also be
refugees within the meaning of the Convention and Protocol. Such a group should not,
in accordance with the principle of non-discrimination, be subjected to any substantial
difference in the standards of treatment given to other refugees.
UNHCR, The Scope of International Protection in Mass Influx, U.N. ESCOR, at 4, U.N. Doc.
E/1995/SCPICRP.3 (1995).

236.
The standards applicable in situations of mass influx may be regarded as complementary, interim measures of protection, and not as a substitute for the provisions of the
Convention and Protocol . . . .After a limited period, and in the absence of other
developments, these standards should evolve into, or be replaced by, refugee status or
a legal status and protection standards commensurate with refugee status.
Id. at 2-4.
237. UNHCR, UNHCR strategy towards 2000, Sept. 21, 1996, at 5.
238. See, e g., Comprehensive Response, supra note 232, at 4; UNHCR, Background Note, supra
note 233, at 2; UNHCR, Background Note: Informal Meeting of Government Experts on Temporary
Protection, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/ACI820 (1994); UNHCR, Note on
InternationalProtection, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., at 23, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/830 (1994).
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govern a grant of temporary protection. 239 It is nonetheless an insufficient definition of applicable rights, as it makes no reference to a
number of fundamentally important rights that are explicitly required
by the Refugee Convention, including rights to identity documents,
to education, and tO seek employment. 240
In addition to understating the duty of states, UNHCR's failure to
link standards of treatment expressly to the Refugee Convention and
international human rights law sends an unfortunate and unwarranted
signal that these legal standards are negotiable. There is often no
recognition by UNHCR of the fact that refugees, whether protected
temporarily or permanently, whether they arrive individually or as part
of a mass influx, are prima facie entitled to the protections set by the
Refugee Convention and international human rights law. By grounding
its protection efforts in a non-binding resolution of its Executive
Committee rather than working from clear statements of relevant
international law, UNHCR has, perhaps unwittingly, given solace to
those who prefer to treat refugee protection as a matter of discretion,
rather than of binding obligation.
While some human rights treaties allow states to suspend rights in
times of dire national emergency,24 1 the Refugee Convention includes
no provision for a generalized suspension of duties owed to refugees. 242
UNHCR, as supervisory authority for the Refugee Convention, therefore ought not to have given its approval to rights suspensions not
authorized by international law. The ambivalence and internal conflict
in UNHCR's position may, to a degree, reflect the difficult balance
inherent in designing and delivering an effective system of protection
that is truly rights-regarding but operates at all times with an eye to
safe and successful repatriation. States have sometimes asserted that
automatic, full recognition of rights may accelerate integration in the
country of asylum and make return home less likely. 243 As such, they
continue to invest considerable amounts of time and financial resources
in efforts designed to avoid obligations under the Refugee Convention.
239. ExCom Conclusion No. 22, supra note 212.
240. Seesupra text accompanying notes 203-205 and 225-231.
241. Seegenerally JOAN FITZPATRICK, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CIsIs: THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM FOR PROTECTING RIGHTS DURING STATES OF EERGENCY (1994).
242. Article 9 allows provisional measures to be taken "in time of war or other grave and
exceptional circumstances," but only pending the conclusion of particularized investigations
necessary to verify a claim to refugee status. Refugee Convention, spra note 4, art. 9.
243. However, some states now acknowledge that according temporarily protected refugees
their rights is not necessarily inconsistent with a commitment to the promotion of repatriation.
Experience has shown that those who master their life in exile often are better qualified
for managing the transition that is involved in resettling in the country of origin...
[Ihere is really no contradiction between measures aimed at an active, self-reliant life
in Norway and measures aimed at repatriation and participation in reconstruction.
NORWEGIAN WHITE PAPER, supra note 160, at 7-8.
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UNHCR undoubtedly felt pressured to accept European-style temporary protection (including reductions in the rights entitlement of refugees) in order to keep European doors at least partially open to receiving Bosnian refugees. 244
The question nonetheless remains why UNHCR failed to demonstrate to governments the ability of the Refugee Convention and
international human rights law in general to deliver the flexibility
required. The model of temporary protection advocated here, in contrast, takes as its starting point the rights regime established by the
Refugee Convention and international human, rights law. Notwithstanding UNHCR's sometimes ambivalent defense of these standards,
we believe that a full respect for the general framework of refugee
rights under all circumstances need not be a serious impediment to
the feasibility of protection, particularly where responsibilities toward
refugees are shared among states.

B. Collectivized Responsibility
The second reform proposed here is that the system of solution-oriented temporary protection be implemented in a less atomized way.
While each state party assumes particularized obligations under the
Refugee Convention, nothing in the current legal regime prevents
governments from working together and sharing resources to meet
those duties. In fact, sharing the burdens and responsibilities of refugee
protection not only makes practical sense as a means to combat the
withdrawal of states from the duty to protect refugees, but is consistent
with general norms of international law.
The Preamble to the Refugee Convention' endorses a degree of
collaboration among states that has yet to be operationalized, 245 and
subsequent international instruments, regional conventions, and conclusions of the Executive Committee of UNHCR also stress the im2 6
portance of burden sharing. 4
244. Vincent Cochetel, Position du HCR par rapport i la protectiontemporaire et au statut humani-

taire, in LE DROIT
STATUT DE R

D'ASILE AU REGARD DE LA CRISE YOUGOSLAVE-PROTECTION TEMPORAIRE ET

UGI9 6 (France Terre d'Asile ed., 1993).

245.
Considering that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain
countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations
has recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without
internationalco-operation ....
(emphasis added)
Refugee Convention, supra note 4, preamble.
246. Article 2(2) of the United Nations' 1967 Declaration on Territorial Asylum recognizes
that when a state finds it difficult to continue granting asylum, other states shall, "in a spirit of
international solidarity," take steps to "lighten the burden on that state." Territorial Asylum
Declaration, supra note 170, art. 2(2). The 1969 OAU Convention similarly emphasizes the
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The Conclusions of the UNHCR Executive Committee contain frequent references to the principle of sharing the burden and responsibility of refugee protection. For example, Conclusion 22 on the Protection of Asylum Seekers in Situations of Large-Scale Influx stresses
the need to "establish effective arrangements in the context of international solidarity and burden sharing for assisting countries which
receive large numbers of asylum seekers. '247 The Conclusion points out
that a satisfactory solution of the problem cannot be achieved without
international cooperation, and then goes on to frame such cooperation
as an obligation. 24 Conclusions 52 and 62 stress the importance of the
"principle of international solidarity" in ensuring effective refugee protection. 249 More recently, in its 1996 Note on International Protection,
the UNHCR reiterated "the need for tangible international solidarity
with low-income developing countries confronted by a sudden mass
refugee influx." 250 Numerous U.N. General Assembly resolutions echo
these conclusions. General Assembly Resolution 46/106, for example,
which notes the importance of attaining durable solutions to refugee
problems, calls on the UNHCR to explore "ways in which State respon251
sibility and burden sharing mechanisms might be strengthened."
General international legal principles support cooperation among
states in addressing issues of transnational importance. For example,
Articles 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter obligate states to take "joint
and separate action in cooperation with the [United Nations]" to
promote peaceful and friendly relations among states, including by the
252
promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights.
This principle is affirmed in more specific documents, including the

1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States. 253 Clearly, states are com-

importance of "African solidarity and international cooperation" in "lightenting] the burden" of
a state granting asylum. OAU Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 11(4).
In the Inter-American context, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees also underlines
the need for the international community to be involved in refugee protection in the region. OAS
Cartagena Declaration, supra note 4, part II,
para. (k).
247. ExCom Conclusion No. 22, supra note 212, part 1, para. 3.
248. "States shall, within the framework of international solidarity and burden sharing, take
all necessary measures to assist, at their request, States which have admitted asylum-seekers in
large-scale influx situations." Ia,part IV, para. 1 (emphasis added).
249. Executive Committee ofthe High Commissioneres Programme Conclusion No. 52 XXXIX),
"International Solidarity and Refugee Protection." See also Executive Committee of the High
Commissioner's Programme Conclusion No. 62 (XI.I), "Note on International Protection."
250. UNHCR, Note on International Protection, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., para. 17, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.96/863 (1996).
251. G.A. Res. 461106, U.N. GAOR, 46th Seas., Supp. No. 49, at 176, U.N. Doc. A/46/49
(1991).
252. U.N. CHARTER, arts. 55, 56.
253. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
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mitted in principle to sharing burdens and responsibilities, and are in
some circumstances legally obliged to act collectively.
There is no impediment to a system under which claims to refugee
status and protection are delivered by a state other than that in which
asylum is first requested. Safeguards must exist to eliminate the prospect of indirect refoulement or the violation of other human rights, as
discussed in Part 1.254 Such a risk would exist, for example, where there
is a significant and relevant disparity between the two states in the
interpretation of Convention refugee status, or in the essential fairness
of the procedure by which status is verified. The nature of the responsibility sharing system also must not interfere with the right of UNHCR
to supervise the application of the Refugee Convention, 255 a concern
addressed by including UNHCR as a formal member of each interestconvergence group. So long as these requirements are respected, the
Refugee Convention affords the flexibility necessary to allow governments to make decisions among themselves as regards the place in
which status is assessed and asylum is granted.
III. RECONCEIVING THE MECHANISMS OF REFUGEE
PROTECTION
The present international legal framework will support a shift to the
implementation of refugee law through a system of rights-regarding
temporary protection. In a more fundamental sense, though, the Refugee Convention suffers from what Gervase Coles has accurately termed
an "exile bias."2 56 That is, while it links the duration of refugee status
to the continuation of risk in the refugee's home state, it says nothing
about how best to make repatriation a viable form of solution. This
lapse reflects the Cold War-era pessimism that refugees would never
return home. The prerogative of governments to withdraw protection
when durable safety is restored in the country of origin is codified, but
states are left largely to their own devices to decide how to implement
termination of status. General human rights standards, such as the
duty to avoid cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, 257 clearly set a
minimalist standard for the way in which repatriation should be effected. There is, however, no international legal duty to proactively
make repatriation viable. Similarly, the Refugee Convention says noth-

operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625
(XXV), Annex, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 122, U.N. Doc. A18028 (1971).
254. See supra text accompanying notes 125, and 133-146.
255. See supra text accompanying note 136.
256. Coles, supra note 118, at 390.
257. ICCPR, supra note 141, art. 7; Torture Convention, supra note 168, arts. 1, 2.
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ing about how states might cooperate to make refugee protection a
fairly apportioned and sustainable endeavor.
We therefore propose activist measures that build on the guarantees
of the Refugee Convention to facilitate a workable reform of the
mechanisms of international refugee law. Five principles should govern
this transition.
First, governments will only make a continuing commitment to
refugee protection if a reform proposal is firmly solution-oriented.
Temporary protection must be an empowering experience for refugees
and their communities, delivered in a way that is dedicated to preparing refugees for a successful return when and if conditions allow.
Second, some needs-based exceptions to the norm of temporary
protection must be recognized. In particular, temporary protection
ought not continue when there is a risk of psychosocial damage to the
refugee population. Equally important, the overall duration of temporary protection should be subject to principled limits. The system must
therefore have the capacity to offer residual solutions to those refugees
whose special needs make temporary protection an inappropriate response, or who are ultimately unable to return home at the end of a
reasonable period of temporary protection.
Third, the protection system should anticipate and facilitate viable
repatriation. Whether voluntary or mandated, return to the country of
origin in conditions of safety and dignity is an important means to
continually regenerate asylum capacity. The feasibility of repatriation
is enhanced when a clear commitment is made from the outset to
support the family and communal structures of refugee communities,
to keep links between the refugee and stayee communities alive, and
ultimately to support return by a meaningful system of repatriation
aid and development assistance.
Fourth, sub-global interstate associations, organized on the basis of
trade, security, and other common interests, are an effective forum
within which to collectivize this commitment to a more solution-oriented system of refugee protection. Because governments are already
accustomed to practical collaboration in such associations, they are a
sensible site in which to promote efforts to implement concrete mechanisms of collectivized protection.
Fifth, the obligations assumed by cooperating states should be defined
on the basis of a theory of common but differentiated responsibility.
This approach takes account of the very real differences in the manner
in which different countries can best contribute to the successful
implementation of a collectivized refugee protection regime. It is a
practical means to preserve a continuing shared commitment to refugee
protection without persisting in the unrealistic assumption that all
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countries are able and willing to make identical contributions to the
implementation of refugee law.
Taken together, we believe that these five "building blocks" suggest
a holistic structure that will enable states to protect their legitimate
interests in migration control and fiscal and other resource accountability without withdrawing from the legal duty to meaningfully
protect refugees.
A. Solution-OrientedTemporary Protection
The refugee rights framework lays the groundwork for a solutionoriented approach to temporary protection. 258 Respect for non-refoulement, security, basic dignity, and self-sufficiency establishes a context of
259
mutual trust within which solutions to refugeehood are possible.
Beyond these basic legal requirements, however, an effective commitment to preparation for repatriation during asylum entails four additional elements: respect for social structures, development of skills and
resources, promotion of linkages with internally displaced and stayee
communities, and confidence-building.
1. Respect for Social Structures
If repatriation is to be a viable solution, it is important that refugees
not be deprived of the structures that define their social identity and
provide critical support in their daily lives. When refugees are compelled to abandon patterns of life rooted in family or community
cooperation, they are less productive during temporary protection, and
will often be less able to ultimately resume life in their country of
origin.
For most refugees, the preservation of family ties is of primary
importance. Separation from family is a source of extreme anxiety and
fear for many refugees, and often interferes with efforts to become
self-sufficient in the asylum country.260 Even though international law
has yet to recognize a full-fledged right to family unity,261governments
that wish to have the option of eventual repatriation clearly have an
interest in keeping family units together.262 In particular, families are
critically important sites for perserving language, religion, and cultural
traditions. Lengthy separation may also lead to family break-ups and
258. Seesupra text accompanying notes 162-231.
259. Sewinfra text accompanying notes 315-316.

260.

CANADIAN COUNCIL FOR REFUGEES TASK FORCE ON FAMILY REUNIFICATION, REFUGEE

FAMILY REUNIFICATION

14-20 (1995).

261. Scesupra text accompanying notes 211-215.
262. Castillo & Hathaway, supra note 217.
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encourage separated individuals to build new relationships in the coun2 63
try of asylum, thereby generating a barrier to returning home.
Even when governments allow family reunification, only a narrow
category of relatives, most often a spouse and children, are typically
allowed to join the refugee. 264 This approach fails to recognize that
there are significant cultural differences in how family relationships are
defined. In many parts of the world, the extended family is an essential
part of a common survival strategy. Family reunification should be
approached on a functional, rather than on a purely categorical basis.2 65
Officials should be encouraged to examine the nature of the family
relationship, and to allow reunification in instances where it satisfies a
functional understanding of family.
The promotion of community life among refugee populations is a
second important means to encourage refugees to devise collective and
shared solutions to meet their own needs. 266 So often almost all decisions impacting refugees' lives are made by people outside the refugee
community. Particularly for refugees who have fled authoritarian or
repressive regimes, this paternalism may reinforce a past sense of
powerlessness and discourage independent efforts by the refugee community to plan for and facilitate repatriation. 267 Protection needs to be
delivered in a manner that avoids these pitfalls. In many instances of
mass influx, entire communities will have fled, and can be recreated or
relied upon in establishing refugee organizations. States should use
some creativity in encouraging a process of self-organization. Robert
Gorman and Gaim Kibreab recommend that formal standing be given
to a Refugee Development Council (RDC), which would become both
a means of reflecting needs and interests, and of unleashing the com2 68
munity's skills and energies.
263. John R. Rogge, Repatriation of Refugees: A Nor-So-Simple "Optimum" Solution, Paper
Presented to the Symposium on Social and Economic Aspects of Mass Voluntary Return of
Refugees from One African Country to Another (Jan. 1991), at 39 (on file with authors); Castillo
& Hathaway, supra note 217.
264. See generally James C. Hathaway, Towards a Contextualized System of Family Class
Immigration, Background Paper for the National Consultation on Family Class Immigration
(June 1994) (on file with authors).
265. Id. The functional approach is endorsed by the Canadian Human Rights Commission,
and judicially approved by Justice L'Heureux Dub6 of the Supreme Court of Canada, "It is the
social utility of families that we all recognize, not any one proper form that 'the family' must
assume; it is the responsibility and community that the family creates that is its most important
social function and its social value." Canada(A.G.) v. Afossop [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554, 632 (IHeurex
Dub6, J., dissenting) (quoting Jane E. larson, Discussion, 77 CORINELL L. REv. 1012, 1014).
266. See generally N. lavik, H. Christie, 0. Solberg, & S. Varvin, A Refugee Protest Action in a
Host Country: Possibilitiesand Limitations of an Intervention by a Mental Health Unit, 9(1)J. REFUGEu
STUD. 73, 86 (1996).
267. See Maciej Domanski, supra note 205.
268. Robert F. Gorman & Gaim Kibreab, Repatriation Aid and Development Assistance, in
RECONCEIViNG INTERNATIONAL RFUGEE LAW, stora note 120.
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At present, however, some states discourage efforts by refugee communities to self-organize and self-govern. 2 69 This attitude is problematic, as the failure to evolve as a collectivity interferes with any real
chance the refugee community may have to become substantially selfsupporting during temporary protection. It may also thwart traditional
means of providing emotional support, particularly in dealing with
crisis and trauma. A lack of a collective identity moreover means that
cultural life, religion, and language will not flourish, and that the
community will instead eventually come to identify with the practices
and language of the host society.270 The likelihood of successful repatriation is, of course, correspondingly reduced.
Caution is, however, warranted on two counts. First, any person who
is excluded from refugee status must be removed from the refugee
population with dispatch. If there are "serious reasons for considering"
that an individual has committed a crime against peace, a war crime,
a crime against humanity, a serious non-political crime outside the
asylum state, or an act contrary to the principles and purposes of the
United Nations, mandatory exclusion from refugee status follows automatically.27' International law affords states no latitude to treat such
persons as refugees, given the inevitable risk that their commingling
with genuine refugees may undermine the public commitment to
refugee protection.27 2 When serious criminals are allowed to remain
among the refugee population, as were the architects of the Rwandan
genocide in Zairian refugee camps, they may use force to distort the
27 3
refugee community's exercise of free will.
Second, care is warranted where there is evidence that indigenous
communal structures are oppressive or discriminatory toward women
or minorities. To revalidate that inequality and domination during
refugee protection would be unjust and ironic, as the circumstances of
refuge have been shown to have the potential to empower marginalized

269. Both Zaire and Tanzania banned the Rassemblementpour le retourdes refugift et de la d6mocratie
au Rwanda (RDR), established by Hutu refugees in 1995. There was no accusation that they had
been involved in the Rwandan genocide. RDR actively campaigned for increased security in
Rwanda to enable Rwandese refugees to return, and for dialogue with the Rwandese government.
In August 1996, seven RDR leaders had their refugee status withdrawn without any clear
explanation. They were then arrested and detained for two days before being handed over to
Rwandese authorities. The leaders who were forcibly expelled appear to have been targeted
because their political opinions and activities undermined efforts to encourage early repatriation.
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, RWANDA: HUMAN RIGHTS OVERLOOKED IN MASS REPATRIATION 11

(1997).
270. See supra text accompanying note 260.
271. Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 1(0.
272. HATHAWAY, LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 4, at 214-31; Guy S. GOODwN-GiLL,
THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 95-114 (2d ed. 1996).
273. James C. McKinley, Jr., Zaire Rebel Calls a Truce, but Refugees Remain in Danger, N.Y
TIMEs, Nov. 5, 1996, at A8.

HarvardHuman Rights Journal / Vol. 10
groups, particularly women. 274 Concern to avoid support for oppressive
social structures must, however, be balanced against recognition that
the meaningful enfranchisement of dispossessed members of a community does not result from imposition by outsiders of new structures of
authority. Real change, while it may be externally stimulated, comes
from within the community.275 To the extent that there is no realistic
short-term alternative to collaboration with collective organizations
that are dominated by men and/or by members of a predominant
ethnic or religious group, the needs of women and minorities should
be acknowledged by assisting individuals or groups to disengage from
the larger refugee community to avoid serious oppression, or to escape
violence. When the protection needs of marginalized sub-groups are
not temporary in nature, permanent protection in a resettlement state
276
will be required.
2. Development of Skills and Resources
We have earlier summarized the international legal rights of refugees
to access both wage-earning employment and education. 277 These rights
serve the twin aims of fostering self-sufficiency in the country of
asylum and developing skills that will be useful after repatriation. The
promotion of harmonious and solution-oriented temporary protection
argues for reinforcement of these basic rights in several ways.
In particular, it is critical that economic development programs
oriented to refugee needs be instituted in asylum states. It can be
extraordinarily debilitating for refugees to be required to depend on
formal assistance programs. 278 A serious commitment to creative forms
of economic development will reduce the medium-term fiscal burden
of providing asylum, and will allow the refugee population to remain
vital and able to contribute to their home communities upon repatriation.
Refugee development programs should be designed in a way that
takes the needs of the host community into account. Resentment can
274. The experience of Guatemalan women refugees in Mexico is illustrative. See Guadalupe
Garcia Hernandez & Natividad Garcia, Mama Maquin Refugee Women: Participationand Organization, in DEVELOPMENT AND DIASPORA: GENDER AND THE REFUGEE ExPERIENCE, supra note
157, at 258, 262.
275. Gorman & Kibreab, supra note 268, at 63-64, 78-79, 119-20.
276. See generally SUSAN FORBES MARTIN, REFUGEE WOMEN 16-23 (1991).
277. See supra text accompanying notes 226-231.
278. "Provision of free inputs may foster dependence and paternalism, which inhibits the
long-term viability of resettled communities. Settlers continue to expect that everything will be
done for them and may develop a welfare syndrome." VWronique Lassailly-Jacob, Governmcnt-Sponsored Agricultural Schemes for Involuntary Migrants in Africa: Some Key Obstacs to thir Economic
Viability, in AFRICAN REFUGEES: DEVELOPMENT AID AND REPATRIATION, supra note 122, at
209, 221.
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otherwise develop in situations where a local community perceives that
a refugee community enjoys a better standard of living than it does.
In countries where the local community itself may be disadvantaged
or impoverished, the sudden arrival of international relief agencies keen
to provide assistance to a refugee community can lead to hostility, or
even violence, intended to force the refugees out. 279 Nor are such
attitudes confined to the poor states of the South. Northern stereotypes
increasingly portray refugees as exploiters of welfare and health care
programs, and have led to armed attacks and other violence against
refugees by citizens worried about their own economic security.280
The objective should therefore be to treat refugees as empowered
agents for development instead of burdens on development. 28 1 Specifically, Gorman and Kibreab suggest that it would be beneficial to
encourage Refugee Development Councils to work collaboratively with
a Local Development Council (LDC), representing the economic, political, and geographical interests of the host community. Jointly, the
RDC and the LDC, with the support of UNHCR, relief and development agencies, and governmental bodies where necessary, could structure a program of refugee economic development in a way that fosters
282
local development as well.
If a model of LDC/RDC cooperation is instituted as soon as a viable
refugee community is in place, it should be possible to foster a pattern
of collaborative economic and social interaction that erodes the mutual
distrust between local and refugee communities. 283 Even when refugees
are fewer in number or widely dispersed, umbrella RDCs and LDCs,
made up of many different nationalities and representing a variety of
neighborhoods, would still offer a vehicle for ongoing dialogue between
refugees and their neighbors. Given current attitudes of suspicion and
intolerance in many asylum states, a process that facilitates a closer
relationship and a direct exchange of information between refugees and
their hosts would likely enhance the overall quality of protection.

279. Lassailly-Jacob highlights this concern in a variety of refugee settlement schemes in
Africa. See id. at 221.

280. See Eva Wakolbinger, Austria: The Danger of Populism, in NEw XENOPHOBIA INEUROPE
10 (Bernd Baumgartl & Adrian Favell eds., 1995); Charles Westin, Sweden: Emerging Undercurrents
of Nationalism, in NEw XENOPHOBIA INEUROPE, id at 332.
281. Gorman & Kibreab, supra note 268, at 87-88.
282. Id. at 88-95.
283. In Canada, for example, large numbers of Somali refugees moved into a concentrated
block of high-rise apartments in Toronto over the space of a few years. Tension and open disputes
developed between the refugees and other residents, fuelled by poor communication and misunderstandings. By the time efforts were made to mediate the conflict, there was a great deal of
bitterness and mistrust in both communities. See Edward Opoku-Dapaah, SOMALI REFUGEES IN
TORONTO: A PROFILE 43 (1995). See also A Home Called Dixon, [TORONTO] GLOBE & MAIL, Nov.

28, 1993, at Dl.
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In addition to a creative approach to economic development, education for refugees should promote both self-sufficiency and return. While
it is important that refugees be educated in the language of their host
culture, the failure to also provide instruction in the language of the
refugees' country of origin will work against the viability of repatriation. Bilingual education that is partially based on the curriculum in
28 4
the refugees' home country is preferable.
Beyond encouraging solution-oriented economic development and
education, refugees should be encouraged to garner resources that will
assist them in re-establishing themselves upon repatriation. At present,
a number of Northern countries provide money to aid in the return
process. These funds would cover the costs of transportation and moving, and sometimes finance basic needs or provide food for an initial
28 5
period of time after return.
The resources available to returning refugees could be enhanced by
establishing a system of refugee saving and investment during asylum,
designed to promote a sense of refugee self-reliance. Refugees should
be encouraged to make deposits to a "repatriation savings account"
during their time in the asylum state, which would be supplemented
by matching funds from the host state or UNHCR.286 The savings
account, including both contributions and matching funds, would be

accessible to the refugee when repatriation occurs or when permanent
resettlement becomes necessary.

3. Promotion of Linkages with Internally Displaced and Stayee
Communities

The viability of refugee repatriation will be assisted by the promotion of contacts between refugee communities and the internally displaced and stayee populations in the country of origin. The internally

displaced, like refugees, are forced to flee their homes, but are not able
284. For example, Rwandan children studying in refugee camps in Tanzania followed the

Rwandan curriculum to ease their integration upon repatriation. UNHCR SUB-OFFICE NGARA,
BASIC DATA ON REFUGEE CARE AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAMME, para. 2.4 (unpublished
pamphlet on file with authors). See also INTER-GOVERNMENTAL CONSULTATIONS, lTEMPORARY

PROTECTION, supra note 50, at 82, 108, 131 (regarding the availability of mother-tongue
education for Bosnian refugee children in Denmark, France, and Italy).
285. The Danish model sensibly recognizes the importance of providing financial assistance
to cover the costs of moving equipment that may be integral to the practice of a trade back to
the country of origin, thereby ensuring that repatriation does not require refugees to abandon
new-found means of livelihood. INTER-GOVERNMENTAL CONSULTATIONS, TEMPORARY PROTECTION, supra note 50, at 84-85. Repatriation programs in the South, usually administered by
UNHCR, similarly provide returnees with grants or allowances. For example, Mozambican
refugees who repatriated in 1994 and 1995 received enough food for 10 months. U.S. COMMITTER
FOR REFUGEES, WoRLD REFUGEE SURVEY 59 (1996). See also UNHCR, supra note 91, at 106.
286. Castillo & Hathaway, supra note 217, at 42.

1997 / InternationalRefugee Law
or willing to flee to another country. They will sometimes suffer more
severely than refugee communities, as it can be more difficult for
international relief to reach them. In addition, they may continue to
be subject to violence, human rights abuse, or other concerns that led
to their displacement. 287 Stayee communities are composed of persons
who are not displaced from their homes. Some may not have been
affected by the events that forced the refugees and internally displaced
from their homes, while others may have been directly affected, but
were unable to flee or were fiercely determined to remain.
Refugees away for some time will likely face the prospect that most
of their property was taken by those who stayed behind. If the latter
are required to relinquish these interests, they may resent the idea of
receiving returnees. Gorman and Kibreab recommend that as part of
the strategy to plan for repatriation from the outset of temporary
protection, early efforts be made to organize meetings between "representatives of refugee communities, stayees, and internally displaced
persons to start the process of reconciliation, healing, confidence building, and settlement of property rights. '288 If adequately supported by
UNHCR and international development agencies, this dialogue can lay
the groundwork for sustainable programs that will effect the meaningful reintegration of refugees in their home communities.
Wherever possible, efforts should therefore be made to organize
collective bodies within countries of origin, representing the varying
interests of the internally displaced and stayee communities. These
bodies, Country of Origin Development Councils (CODCs), would
serve as counterparts to Refugee Development Councils. In some cases,
it may be appropriate to include government officials from the country
of origin in these meetings. Aside from preparing for return, this
process might make a meaningful contribution to resolving the root
cause of flight itself. The ultimate aim would be for CODCs and RDCs
to merge after repatriation.
4. Confidence-Building
Most fundamentally, refugees need to know when it is genuinely safe
to go home, and whether or not they will be able to survive and
support their families upon return. Reliable and meaningful information about conditions in the country of origin must therefore be made
available to the refugee community on an ongoing basis, and concrete
steps must be taken to ensure the feasibility of re-establishment.
287. UNHCR,WoRLD's REFUGEES, supra note 1, at 173. See generally Francis M. Deng, The
InternationalProtection of the Internally Displaced, 7 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. SpECALcISSUE 74 (1995).
288. Gorman & Kibreab, supra note 268, at 103.
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A variety of means can be used to foster confidence in the accuracy
of information. In particular, periodic visits to the country of origin
should be arranged for members of Refugee Development Councils,
who would then be able to test the viability of a program of return,
jointly administered with the local Country of Origin Development
Council, and more generally be positioned to convey information firsthand
to the refugee community. With appropriate safeguards, officials from the
country of origin can also be brought in to meet with refugees in the
289
country of asylum.
A second important confidence-building measure is to allow individuals in receipt of temporary protection to attempt repatriation
voluntarily when circumstances become viable, backed by a guarantee
that they will be allowed to return to the country of asylum if the
situation in the home country is ultimately judged by the refugee to
29°
be unviable.
Where refugees have fled from war, a necessary part of confidencebuilding is to prepare them for some of the difficult and dangerous
legacies of armed conflict, such as anti-personnel mines.2 91 In such
circumstances, training in mine awareness and mine detection should
be an integral part of the lead-up to return. Similarly, individuals who
witnessed human rights violations before fleeing are often fearful that
they may be at risk of violence at the hands of the perpetrators.
Carefully designed witness protection programs and other credible
security measures are needed to provide refugees with the confidence
to attempt return.
The explicitly palliative mandate of refugee law means that it should
not, in and of itself, be expected to generate the solutions that make
return in safety and dignity possible; this is the role of the international
security and human rights regimes. Refugee law can, however, be made
to operate in harmony with interventionist efforts, thereby giving

289. UNHCR stresses the importance of involving officials from the country of origin in the
repatriation process, but cautions that visits from authorities of the home country should take
place only if the refugees have been consulted and have no objections to such a meeting. UNHCR,
supra note 166, at 14, 28-29, 44-49.
290. Some Northern governments are clearly sensitive to this concern. Refugees who opt to
repatriate from Denmark, for example, can re-claim temporary residence in Denmark for up to
three months after attempting to re-establish themselves in their country of origin. If the attempt
to return proves unsuccessful within that time period, the Danish government will provide
financial support, including transportation and some moving expenses, to enable the refugees to
return to Denmark. INTER-GOVERNMIENTAL CONSULTATIONS, TIeMPORARY PROTECTION, supra
note 50, at 84-85. In contrast, short-sighted bureaucratic action on the part of the UNHCR and

the Malawian government had the effect of cutting food rations for refugees who had made
provisional return visits to Mozambique, effectively penalizing them for making an early attempt
at repatriation. LAWYERS COMM1-rEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 41, at 113--37.

291. See CARVER, supra note 44, at 127.
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governments the confidence they need to remain open to the arrival of
involuntary migrants.
B. PrincipledLimits to Temporary Protection
There will always be some cases that should be diverted from the
usual system of temporary protection. Unaccompanied minors and
individuals who have been severely traumatized by torture should be
292
treated as special cases, and resettled immediately. As discussed above,
women or minorities who need to escape from the risk of violence or
serious oppression within the refugee community may also require
permanent protection in a resettlement state.
More generally, the duration of temporary protection must be constrained to ensure that it does not simply amount to "warehousing,"
discussed in Part 1.293 Extending temporary protection indefinitely is
both inhumane (in that it does not allow refugees to recover a sense of
stability and certainty in their lives) and impractical (as a time comes
that
when a refugee community has been away from home for so long
294
successful repatriation and reintegration is nearly impossible).
One of the most difficult questions that is asked about temporary
protection is whether the threats that lead to refugee movements are
ever sufficiently short-lived that protection can be viably delivered on
a temporary basis. What is a reasonable period of time? What should
happen when the reasonable period of time has expired? The analysis
of state practice earlier in this Article reveals a considerable divergence
in setting time limits. 295 It is difficult to establish a universally applicable duration for all grants of temporary protection. Where the refugee
and host communities are socially and culturally similar, the refugee
community might more easily maintain culture, language, and heritage
in a way that keeps repatriation alive as a viable and humane option
for a longer period of time, as has been the case of Afghan refugees in
Pakistan. 296 In other situations, where the differences between the two
communities may be considerable, it would be reasonable to grant
297
permanent status after a shorter period of time has passed.
292. See supra text accompanying notes 274-276.
293. See supra text accompanying note 66.
294. See Bill Frelick, Afterword: Assessing the Prospects for Reform of InternationalRefugee Law, in
RECONCEIVING INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAw, supra note 120.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 71-76.
296. See AUDREY C. SHALINSKY, LONG YEARS OF ExILE: CENTRAL ASIAN REFUGEES IN
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN 126 (1993).
297. Prolonged exile inevitably leads to a degree of cultural assimilation of refugees with their
host society. A study of Ethiopian refugees in the United States, many of whom had been outside
Ethiopia for at least a decade, suggested that special measures would be necessary to bridge the
considerable culturation gap that had developed. Peter H. Koehn, Refugee Resettlement and Repatriation in Africa: Development Prospectsand Constraints,in AFR IcN REFUGEES: DEVELOPMENT AID
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It is, however, necessary to establish an outside time limit to temporary protection. In no situation should temporary protection continue indefinitely. The psychosocial needs of refugees ultimately call
for enduring stability and security.298 Interminable refugee status may
also contribute to national or regional insecurity. Disaffected youth
who are born and raised in refugee camps, for example, sometimes turn
to arms as a means of mitigating their sense of hopelessness. 299 More
generally, the long-term presence of a population with little or no stake
300
in a political community can be socially destabilizing.
There is very little empirical data to guide the designation of an
appropriate outside time limit for temporary protection. In our view,
however, there are two important perspectives to balance. First, the
authorized duration of temporary protection must be long enough to
make-a meaningful contribution to the revitalization of asylum capacity. It should therefore be long enough to allow many, if not most,
refugee-producing phenomena to come to an end. Balanced against the
concern to ensure the viability of temporary protection, though, must
be a clear commitment to constrain its duration to a timeframe that
is reconcilable to respect for the psychosocial needs of refugees. If there
is evidence that continued temporary protection exacts a serious and
irremediable cost to refugee well-being at a particular point in time,
that time ought logically to constitute the moment at which temporary
301
protection is brought to an end.
Clearly, solid social science research is required to establish both
these determinants of the length of temporary protection. There is,
however, at least tentative evidence to suggest that five years is a
reasonable approximation of a temporary protection period that is long
enough to facilitate solutions, yet short enough to be a humane form
of protection for most refugees. In relation to viability, a United
AND REPATRIATION, supra note 122, at 97, 100-01 (1995). See also Bill Frelick, Afterunrd Assessing
the Prospectsfor Reform of InternationalRefugee Law, in RECONCEIVING INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE
LAw, supra note 120.
298. Barry N. Stein, Prospectsfor and Promotion of Voluntary Repatriation, in REFUGE OR ASYLUM?
A CHOICE FOR CANADA 190, 200 (Howard Adelman & C. Michael Lanphier eds., 1990). See also
UNHCR, WORLD's REFUGEES, supra note 1, at 89.
299. Van der Meeren, supra note 78, at 262. See generally Nguyen Ba Thien & Brigitte
Malapert, The Psychological Consequencesfor Children of War Trauma and Migration, in REFUGEESTHE ThAUMA OF ExILE 248 (Diana Miserez ed., 1988) (discussing the wide variety of serious
psychosocial challenges that refugee children face, and the importance of an environment of
security and stability to addressing those needs).
300. THOMAS HAmbiAR, DEMOCRACY AND THE NATION STATE: ALIENS, DENIZENS, AND
CITIZENS IN A WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION (1990).

301. For example, a recent U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals ruling refused to condone the
removal of a young Nicaraguan man whose claim to refugee status was rejected when the
Nicaraguan civil war ended, but who had been residing in the United States for eleven years. In
re O.J.Q., 1996 WL 393504 (B.I.A. 1996). See also Patrick McDonnell, Man Rulcd Too Americanized
to Deport, L.A. 'IMMES,July 12, 1996.
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Nations survey of the 1970-1980 decade showed that large-scale repatriation took place within five years of the commencement of mass
exodus in about one-half of cases. 30 2 With regard to the psychosocial
need for permanency, a study of the integration of Vietnamese refugees
in Finland reveals that acculturation did not take place for the majority
of the refugees until after five years away from home. 30 3 The cultural
disjuncture between home and host communities in this case is obviously extreme, suggesting that five years is not an unreasonable estimate of the earliest point at which repatriation may be said to be
unviable from a psychosocial perspective. Taken together, these two
studies suggest that temporary protection could be a meaningful response to a significant proportion of the refugee population.
In fact, this historical record likely significantly understates the
potential value of temporary protection. The fifty percent repatriation
rate noted in the U.N. survey occurred during an era when conflicts
were slow to abate due to the support received from superpower rivals.
Also, temporary protection has rarely been delivered in a manner that
focuses on preparing for successful repatriation, and there has been no
systematic effort to define the site of protection to promote functional
and cultural compatibility between refugee and host populations, as
we propose below. 3° 4 If these concerns are taken seriously, temporary
protection is likely to be viable even beyond five years, allowing it to
meet the needs of an even greater proportion of the refugee population.
Moreover, to the extent that improved international and regional efforts to address the "root causes" of refugee flight evolve in practice,
repatriation will more frequently and more quickly become a realistic
solution to refugeehood. Such a shift will further minimize the need
to resort to more permanent forms of refugee protection. There is
therefore every reason to see temporary protection as a realistic means
of responding to the needs of many, though not all, refugees.
Nevertheless, some refugee crises clearly will not be resolved by the
expiration of the temporary protection period, and the need for protection will remain very real. The state in which temporary protection
was provided might elect to grant permanent status to some of those
refugees who require permanent status, 30 5 particularly where meaning-

302. Sadruddin Aga Khan, United Nations Study on Human Rights and Massive Exodus, U.N.
ESCOR, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1503 (1981).
303. Karmela Liebkind, SelfReported Ethnic Identity, Depression and Anxiety Among Young Vietnamese Refugees and their Parents, 6 J. REFUGEE STUD. 25, 34-35 (1993).
304. See infra text accompanying notes 378-380.
305. For instance, while the majority of Guatemalan refugees in Mexico have chosen to
repatriate, many in the younger generation, after growing up in Mexico, preferred to stay and
look for employment rather than return to agricultural life in Guatemala. U.S. CoMMiTrEE FOR
REFUGEES, Woju.D REFUGEE SURVEY 190, 195-96 (1996).
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ful support is received from other governments. In other cases, refugees
unable to go home will need to be offered permanent resettlement in
other states. Refugees should benefit from a firm guarantee to make
permanent residence in a safe state available at the expiration of the
temporary protection period. We believe that this will be possible
where governments adopt a commitment to differentiated forms of
30 6
responsibility sharing, as discussed below.
C. Viable Repatriation
If refugee protection has actually been delivered in a firmly solution-oriented manner as discussed above, voluntary repatriation when
conditions allow should be a viable and attractive option. It may
sometimes, however, be necessary for the countries of origin and asylum, along with UNHCR, to establish an orderly program to facilitate
voluntary return, as a sudden influx of returnees in a short period of
time may destabilize a situation that has only recently become secure.30 7 The UNHCR should be allowed to monitor the return and
reintegration process and to provide aid and advice as required.
With appropriate support, 3°s and with ready access to impartial
information regarding conditions in the country of origin,30 9 refugees
themselves will generally be the best judge as to when it is safe enough
to return and when the home country offers reasonable prospects for
economic survival. Some refugees may decide to go home before an
official decision has been taken to bring temporary protection to an
306. See infra text accompanying notes 378-391.

307.
Such plans commonly include amnesties for political offences, assurances of safe passage
for returning refugees, material assistance to help them re-establish themselves and
provisions for international presence of some kind to monitor their safer Organized
plans are also likely to have greater resources behind them, though rarely at the level
desired.
UNHCR, supra note 91, at 106.
308. For example, France has provided some financial assistance in a limited number of
repatriations to Sarajevo. Id. at 111.
The Norwegians are also said to be considering instituting a financial incentive scheme that
would be available to returnees who have benefirted from at least one year of temporary protection.
NORWEGIAN WHITE PAPER, supra note 160, at 106.
In the United States, however, TPS incorporates no provisions to encourage or facilitate
repatriation. At present, TPS beneficiaries who want to return home, but are uncertain about job
and housing prospects in their home country, might decide against returning or simply be
financially unable to go home. Refugee advocacy groups in the United States have emphasized
that TPS is unlikely to succeed unless incentives to return are introduced. Sce, e.g., Frelick and
Kohnen, supra note 62, at 354.
The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Germany have similarly failed to make' any
provision for the facilitation of repatriation. INTER-GOVERNMENTAL CONSULTATIONS, TEiMPORARY PROTECTION, supra note 50, at 123, 155, 221.

309. See supra text accompanying notes 290-291.
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end. In fact, refugees may even decide to return before the conflict or
other reason for flight has been fully resolved. 310 It will be necessary
to build in safeguards to discourage unsafe returns and to minimize
the potential for abuse of repatriation grants and allowances. Ultimately, of course, it is fully within a refugee's rights to return home
at any time. 311
If and when the risk that gave rise to refugee status comes to an
end, however, refugee status may legitimately be withdrawn and mandated repatriation pursued. Commentators sometimes fail to make clear
that the issue of refoulement does not arise in regard to persons who have
ceased to be refugees by reason of a fundamental change of circumstances in their country of origin. 312 This transition in status is in
keeping with an understanding of refugee protection as a human rights
remedy, rather than an alternative path to permanent immigration. As
observed in Part I, the necessity-based logic of temporary protection is
important in convincing states to end efforts to avoid responsibility
313
toward refugees altogether.
At precisely what point, though, is the termination of temporary
protection and the commencement of mandated repatriation justified?
Jurisprudence under the Refugee Convention adopts the view that
repatriation consequent to a change of circumstances is permissible
when the "root cause" of flight has come to an end by virtue of a
fundamental change in the country of origin that is substantial, effective, and durable. 314 This test ensures that refugee status ends only
when there is no longer an objective foundation for the refugee's fear
of persecution.
The UNHCR should play an important part in decision-making
about the appropriateness and viability of repatriation, including securing input from the Refugee Development Councils. With the benefit
of this information, decisions on the cessation of refugee status would
most logically be taken jointly by all interest-convergence groups that
allocated responsibility for a particular refugee population, thereby

310. Return is not voluntary, however, if it is primarily motivated by a desire to escape
conditions in the country of asylum. UNHCR, supra note 166, at 11.
311. Universal Declaration, supra note 170, art. 13(2); ICCPR, supra note 141, art. 12(4).
312. See, eg., B.S. Chimni, The Meaning of Words andthe Role of UNHCR in Voluntary Repatriation,
5 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 442, 454 (1993).
It is my view that to replace the principle of voluntary repatriation by safe return, and
to substitute the judgement of States and institutions for that of the refugees, is to
create space for repatriation under duress, and may be tantamount to refoulement.
If indeed "safe return" is possible, however, there is no legal basis for either the continuation of
refugee status, or for invocation of protection against the risk of refoulement.
313. See supra text accompanying note 105.
314. See HATHAWAY, supra note 4, at 199-205; GOODWIN-GL, supra note 273, at 84-88;
UNHCR, supra note 166, at 9.

HarvardHuman Rights Journal / Vol. 10
ensuring a consistent response. If temporary status has been granted
on a group basis and similarly terminated, asylum states will have to
be prepared for the possibility that some individuals will assert that
the changes do not obviate the precise basis for their particularized
claim to refugee status, or even that new dangers sufficient to warrant
protection have emerged. Such claims will have to be examined to
determine whether the individual is eligible for protection under the
terms of the Refugee Convention or other international human rights
instruments.
Ultimately, if true stability is restored in the country of origin yet
efforts to promote voluntary repatriation do not succeed, mandated
repatriation will become necessary. It should, however, be carried out
in a way that is minimally violative of the dignity of returnees. Human
rights groups should be involved in the return process to ensure that
officials do not resort to treatment that violates the rights of the
returnees. 315 Officials should also work actively with the Refugee Development Council representatives of the resisting returnees to attempt
to negotiate a non-coercive means of effecting repatriation. This is both
a matter of law and of logic: a punitive approach to mandated repatriation will be less successful than efforts that respond to the human
316
dignity of those to be repatriated.
Repatriation, be it voluntary or mandated, is not an end in itself.
The refugee crisis does not truly come to an end until it is clear that
there has been successful reintegration. The UNHCR calls reintegration "the anchor of repatriation."' 317 Governments will need to work
with UNHCR and other intergovernmental organizations to ensure
that conditions in the country of origin (now the country of return)
stabilize, divisions are healed, law and order returns, civil society
begins to flourish, and development prospects brighten. Carefully designed forms of empowering development assistance will continue to
be of crucial importance, the cost of which should continue to be borne
equitably by the international community. Equally important, durable
repatriation requires that returning refugees not be excluded from
systems of governance, but rather be fully included in the processes of
3 18
political decision-making.
315. International human rights standards apply, particularly those that prohibit cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. See,ag., ICCPR, supra note 141, art. 7 ("No one
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.").
316. In May 1995, for example, attempts to remove a group of 94 individuals scheduled to
be repatriated to Vietnam from High Island Detention Centre in Hong Kong, led to a riot
involving 2000 detainees and 1500 police. U.S. COMMIrTE FOR REFUGEES, WOR.D REFUGEE
SURVEY 84 (1996).

317. UNHCR, supra note 166, at 78.
318.
Events in Rwanda most dramatically support the hypothesis that repatriation is gen-
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Put simply, the international community cannot abandon the returning population. Human rights monitoring should be implemented
to ensure safety (especially if other refugees are still returning) and to
identify, and hopefully prevent, potential for renewed conflict. There
may also be an important international role in mediating conflicts that
are likely to arise regarding property disputes and in the process of
bringing human rights violators to justice. The importance of this final
phase cannot be overstated. If reintegration does not occur, another
319
refugee crisis may well be in the offing.
D. Collectivized Protection
The present, loosely constructed system of international cooperation
in refugee protection is characterized by vague promises of solidarity
among governments, accompanied by often undependable funding. It
has proved unable to answer the concerns of front-line receiving states,
which have become increasingly and understandably loathe to rely on
purely discretionary support. 320 The shift to a system of more collectivized protection advocated here can only be realized if a solid basis
for interstate cooperation is established.
In an ideal world, a system to share the burdens and responsibilities
of refugee protection would operate at the global level. A universal
system could spread the costs of providing asylum among the largest
number of states, thereby minimizing the risk of an unacceptably high
cost being imposed on any particular government. It is also morally
attractive. 321 But Asha Hans and Astri Suhrke urge that the historical
record compels the conclusion that "any sharing scheme must be based
on the realpolitik assumption that legal obligations and humanitarian
considerations alone rarely suffice to persuade states to admit refugees
.... -322 They convincingly argue that regimes of common responsibility are most logically pursued at the sub-global level where there is
erally destabilizing to the country of origin. Successful integration, not only economic
but political, so that newcomers have a stake in the success of their new homeland,
must become the priority of the international system if such events as'occurred in
Rwanda in 1994 are not to be repeated. Such integration will never be accomplished

through relief programs.
Barbara Harrell-Bond, Refugees and the International System: The Evolution of Solutions 15
(July, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors).
319. U.S. COMaMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 80-81 (1996).
320. In mid-March 1995, 40,000 Rwandan and other refugees attempted to flee Burundi to
Tanzania. Only about half managed to cross the border before the Tanzanian government closed
the frontier on March 31. "Failure of the international community to give adequate assistance to
Tanzania was the main reason for the closure of the border." Rurinwa, supra note 130, at 298.

321.

ANTHONY

H.

RICHMOND, GLOBAL APARTHEID: REFUGEES, RACISM AND THE NEW

WORLD ORDER 206-17 (1994).
322. Hans & Suhrke, supra note 120, at 159.
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likely to be a greater sense of shared risk, commonality, and mutual
responsibility. Because governments have traditionally been more prepared to make binding commitments at the sub-global level where
their influence is greatest and their interests are more directly implicated, a sub-global focus is positioned to give substance to the rhetoric
of interstate cooperation. While not ruling out the potential for the
interlinking of sub-global systems to evolve into a more universal
refugee protection regime, their conclusion is that there is presently
an insufficient sense of "connectedness" among states at the universal
level to generate a formal, binding commitment to collectivize the
3 23
costs of refugee protection.
In this Article, we adopt the term "interest-convergence group" to
identify the sub-global associations of states that ought reasonably to
feel drawn together to create a mechanism of shared responsibility for
refugee protection. The primary motivation for states to cooperate in
responding to the arrival of refugees will be the perceived cost of not
responding. Cost, real or perceived, is therefore central to the model.
It is perhaps helpful to consider the analogy of states choosing to
participate in an insurance program to find ways to minimize the risk
of incurring potentially unmanageable costs. International cooperation
generally develops from a perception of a shared risk that can be
324
attenuated by a collective response.
It should be possible to develop the capacity to generate a collectivized response to refugee protection within existing organizational
structures, such as the several formal regional organizations. 325 In addition,
most states belong to a variety of sub-global associations based on such
factors as economic and trading relationships, shared religion, common
language, shared political and legal traditions, or mutual security
concerns. These organizations could be encouraged to expand their
traditional mandate where there are important linkages between effective refugee protection and the realization of their broader objectives.
It is quite likely that particular refugee flows will be of interest to
more than one potential interest-convergence group. For example, the
plight of Muslim refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina was most
obviously of concern to states of the European Union and Council of
Europe, for a combination of historical, cultural, and geographical
reasons. However, the countries that cooperate in the Islamic Conference would also have an interest in ensuring that protection is available
323. Id.
324. Amitav Acharya & David Dewitt, Fiscal Burden Sharing, in RECONCEIVING INTERiATIONAL REFUGEE LAW, supra note 120.
325. Peter Nyongo & Justus Nyang'aya, Comprehensive Solutions to Refugee Problems in Africa:
Bilateral,Regional and MultilateralApproaches, 7 IN'L J. REFUGEE L. SPEc A . ISSUE 164, 168

(1995).
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to fellow Muslims fleeing human rights abuse, and NATO states would
want to ensure that the refugee flow was managed in a way that
advanced regional security interests. Because we propose that UNHCR
participate in the refugee protection discussions of all such interestconvergence groups, it should be possible to encourage inter-group
cooperation where interests overlap.
While it is logical to build refugee protection competence within
existing organizational structures wherever possible, few existing subglobal organizations have the perfect range of membership to implement a dependable regime of common but differentiated responsibility
toward refugees. Most commonly, an existing organization or some
subset of its members will be coterminous with what we define below
as the "inner core" of an interest-convergence group. Other countries
that have a shared interest with the "inner core" states in relation to
refugee protection issues, whether or not affiliated with the existing
organization in regard to other matters, would be encouraged to collaborate as "outer core" and "situation specific" members. This organizational concept is comparable to the notion of "flexible integration"
advocated by the Centre for Economic Policy Research as a means to
accommodate differences among European Union member states in
326
regard to the scale and pace of integration.
Rather than advocating a rigid structural form, we propose a model
of cooperation based on contemporary understandings of collective
security, implemented by groups of states that feel that common
interests, albeit varying in degree and impact, merit a shared response.
Collectivized responsibility toward refugees can be implemented within
any sub-global association that is able to meet two basic requirements.
First, the states concerned must develop a general framework of criteria
that will guide their decisions about responsibility sharing and burden
sharing within the parameters of international law. Second, its members must commit themselves to meet expeditiously in order to apply
those general burden and responsibility sharing criteria to the facts of
any situation referred to the group by a participating state or the
UNHCR.
1. Interest-Convergence Groups
Not all states will be equally drawn to cooperate in the provision of
refugee protection, nor will they be willing to commit themselves to
other governments with equivalent intensity. Rather than arbitrarily
demanding an identical form of affiliation from all potential members,
326. Will Hutton, Why Europe Needs Flexible Friends, MANcHESTER GUARDIN WKLY., Dec.
17, 1995, at 14.
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we believe that both overall participation and net protection resources
will be maximized by allowing states to make varying kinds of commitments -to an interest-convergence group. Those governments that
wish to work extremely closely together should be encouraged to do
so. Their efforts, however, will be more likely to succeed where supported, even if only in limited ways, by states whose self-interests
dictate that they refrain from fully allying their refugee protection
programs with those of other governments. In simplified terms, we
describe the variants of affiliation as inner core, outer core, and situation-specific membership.
a. The Inner Core
The inner core members of an interest-convergence group are those
states with the strongest reasons to cooperate by reason of their shared
vulnerability to refugee flows. Ordinarily, but not always, these states
will be neighbors within a geographical region. While the inner core
states of some interest-convergence groups may be able to fund refugee
protection efforts, the primary role of the inner core will normally be
to share responsibility for the provision of temporary protection to
refugees. In most cases, the delivery of temporary protection within
the region of origin will be the only practical possibility. Moreover,
several responsibility sharing criteria proposed below 32 7 are also most
readily met within the region of origin, including the ability of refugees to engage in productive activities consistent with the local economy, cultural harmony between refugees and members of the host
community, and the maintenance of contact by refugees with stayee
communities. Perhaps most fundamentally, the potential for repatriation will be greatest if the physical and cultural distance between the
328
country of origin and place of asylum is minimized.
We believe that a number of security concerns will motivate inner
core states to obligate themselves to share the responsibility to provide
temporary protection. First, inner core states will likely be prepared to
commit themselves in advance to sharing the responsibilities of other
members of the interest-convergence group if they perceive a real risk
of someday facing a refugee influx with which they cannot contend
independently. The model guarantees them access to intra-group cooperation in return for a promise to provide similar assistance to other
327. See infra text accompanying notes 378-397.
328. SECRETARIAT OF THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL CONSULTATIONS ON ASyLUM, REFUGEE
AND MIGRATION POLICIES IN THE STATES OF EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA AND AUSTALIA,
RECEPTION IN THE REGION OF ORIGIN: DRAFr FOLLOW-UP TO THE 1994 WORKING PAPER

(1995) [hereinafter INTER-GOVERNMENTAL CONSULTATIONS, REGION OF ORIGIN FOLLOW-UP];
see also infra text accompanying note 379.
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states when required. Particularly where the arrival of specific groups
of refugees could threaten fragile internal security balances, states will
be drawn to agree to responsibility sharing with other governments as
a means to negotiate the re-direction of a politically contentious flow,
in favor of admitting other refugee populations that pose little or no
329
risk to domestic security.
Second, states may opt for inner core membership if they have an
expectation of more diffuse reciprocity from other inner core states.
The quid pro quo of a binding commitment to responsibility sharing
need not be identical to the assistance contributed to the interestconvergence group. Instead, a strong alliance with the inner core
may make sense as a means to secure cooperation from the group in
advancing some other important national interest, or to secure a guarantee of support to cope with some other kind of anticipated emer330
gency.
Third, states will feel motivated to commit themselves to share
responsibility for providing protection in order to avoid regional
instability that can arise from the concentration of a large refugee
population in a single location. Where one country is the principal
place of asylum for a particular group of refugees, it may be stigmatized by the refugees' country of origin as a sympathizer with rebel or
other minority causes and punished accordingly. 331 Dispersal of the
community by means of responsibility sharing can sometimes ease
332
these concerns.
b. The Outer Core
While the support of other inner core members will clearly improve
the ability of a particular state to honor its refugee protection responsibilities, the maldistribution of refugee populations around the world
argues the sufficiency of inner core cooperation. Most refugees today
originate in poor countries, and are protected by other poor countries.
Africa alone shelters nearly double the number of refugees protected
329. For example, Turkey would likely have valued the ability to negotiate a responsibility
sharing arrangement that would have diverted the Iraqi Kurds who were arriving at its borders
and were believed to represent a threat to its political security.
330. For instance, a number of countries in the Caribbean basin were willing to consider
requests from the United States to assist in providing temporary refuge for Haitians, in return
for diplomatic recognition, forgiving of national debt, and other bilateral benefits granted by the
United States. Cf U.S. CommI'rFE FOR REFUGEES, WoRLD REFUGEE SURVEY 188 (1996).
331. For example, the presence of Sudanese refugees in Uganda led to armed attacks against
Uganda, raising the risk of regional armed conflict. Id. at 68-70, 72-73.
332. For instance, a shared approach might have made it more difficult for Hutu extremists
to regroup and rearm in Zaire, where they found their power concentrated and relatively
unchecked. See, &g., James C. McKinley, Jr., Strife on Zaire Border Erupts Into Open War With
Rwanda, N.Y TIMEs, Nov. 2, 1996, at 1.
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in all of Europe, North America, and Oceania combined. 333 It is clearly
unreasonable to propose a system of collectivized responsibility toward

refugees that amounts to no more than a proposal for already overburdened countries to share each other's burdens.

It is also unrealistic, however, to argue that all countries around the
world should share the responsibility to receive every refugee population. Not only does this notion run counter to the logic of providing
temporary protection close to the refugee's home country,334 but it is
a proposal that could only succeed if supported by a much more
profound global consciousness than presently exists. It would be virtually impossible to convince governments that presently believe themselves to be relatively safeguarded from most refugee flows that it is
in their national interest to absorb a proportionate share of the world
refugee population. On the other hand, we believe that it will be
possible to attract such states as outer core members of interest-convergence groups.
Even states not likely to be affected by immediate or massive refugee
flows often have important reasons to make an advance commitment
to the inner core of an interest-convergence group. The involvement
of these "outer core" governments will be formal and consistent, although not at the same level of intensity as that of the inner core.
Because their motivation to join the group derives from a less intense
sense of vulnerability, it is likely that the contribution of outer core
members will be in the form of a combination of fiscal support and
more managed forms of responsibility sharing, like providing permanent resettlement options for special needs cases and for refugees who
are unable to return home at the end of a reasonable period of temporary protection.
'
The first motivation for outer core participation is the emerging
concern among some officials in the developed world that the current
335
array of deterrent policies may not prove viable in the long-term.
As a purely practical matter, Jonas Widgren notes that "[olne could
well ask how the system will cope in the long run, with the highly

333. The U.S. Committee for Refugees estimates a refugee population in Africa of 5.2 million,
as of December 31, 1995, compared with a total of 2.7 million refugees in Europe, North
America, Oceania, and Japan. The European figure includes an estimated one-half million refugees
in Russia. U.S. COMMI=E FOR REFUGEES, WoRL REFUGEE SURVEY 4-5 (1996). CMe dIvoire,
for example, has one-twentieth the population of the United States yet is home to nearly twice
as many refugees. Id at 4-7.
334. See stora text accompanying notes 328-329.
335. Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the
Council and the European Parliament on Immigration and Asylum Policies, Doc. COM(94)23
Final, Feb. 23, 1994 [hereinafter European Commission Communication], para. 107. Seealso
Anthony H. Richmond, Open and Closed Borders: Is the New World Order Creatinga Syterm of Global
Apartheid?, 13 REFUGE 6, 10 (1993).
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penetrable borders of southern Europe, and the expected absence of
European border controls (with, for instance, 3,000 persons running at
peak hours through the Channel tunnel between Britain and France)." 336
The difficulty of policing arrivals across the southern border of the
United States raises comparable concerns. 337 The governments of developed states may therefore be attracted to collectivized protection
because it will provide them with a less absolute, but more sustainable,
mechanism to promote their migration control objectives.
Even if not convinced that deterrence is unviable in a mechanical
sense, some countries will nonetheless be interested in joining an
interest-convergence group because it will afford them a socially and
politically acceptable alternative to present reliance on deterrent policies. Because crude mechanisms that block 'access to protection clash
with basic social and legal values, 338 some governments will be attracted to collectivized protection as a principled means to control
unmeritorious claims to refugee status. Their basic migration control
goals will be served, since persons tempted to treat the asylum system
as an alternative immigration path will be deterred by an awareness
that responsibility sharing allocations mean that their claims to refugee
status will often be addressed in a country other than that in which
they first arrive. Consequently, those who continue to travel to distant
countries will more likely be persons for whom there is genuinely no
other protection option closer to home.
A second motivation for outer core membership is the existence of
relevant interests or concerns connected to the inner core states. These
may include the perception that a region is of important strategic
interest due to its location along a vital trade route, or the fact that it
is an important source of resources, such as petroleum. Extraregional
states were willing to commit themselves to the Comprehensive Plan
of Action for Indochinese Refugees in large measure because their
geopolitical and economic concerns were tied to the states of first
asylum.
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336. Jonas Widgren, InternationalMigration and Regional Stability, 66 INT'L AFFAIRS 749, 764
(1990). See also Loescher, supra note 101, at 631.
337. Kitty Calavita, U.S. Immigrationand PolicyResponses: The Limits ofLegislation, in CONTROLLING

IM 1GRATION: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 149, at 55, 58-61.

338. "[Glovemments evidence clear reluctance to proceed too far in [the) direction [of expulsion]
because of the fear of the negative consequences, internally as well as externally." Coles, supra
note 118, at 387. The negative social policy ramifications for developed states of resort to
non-entre policies are discussed in Sam Blay & Andreas Zimmermann, Recent Changes in German
Refugee Law: A CriticalAssessment, 88 AN. J. INT'L L. 361 (1994).
339. The CPA has in fact been called a "watershed" in international refugee protection. Nor
only were the "political interests of major powers ... directly involved," but "[for the first time
during this period a major group of refugees had appeared for whom the Western countries,
especially the United States, felt a serious responsibility for ultimately ensuring a solution." Coles,
supra note 118, at 379.
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States seeking to develop trade or other economic links with countries in an interest-convergence group might also be willing to consider
outer core membership. With the end of the Cold War, there are
tremendous new possibilities for international cooperation, as states are
not limited by their previous alliances. Worldwide, we now witness a
headlong rush toward the creation of new economic associations and
alliances. States that are anxious to demonstrate their good faith and
solidarity with potential economic partners are likely to consider support for an interest-convergence group to be politically astute as well
as a sensible investment in regional stability.
Third and similarly, states may be willing to be part of the outer
core of an interest-convergence group on the basis of a more general
affiliation with one or more inner core countries. While they may have
few, if any, immediate strategic or economic interests at stake, looser
bonds such as cultural or religious similarities may nonetheless moti34°
vate cooperation.
Finally, in addition to states motivated by immediate or diffuse
self-interest, it should be recognized that some governments will opt
for outer core membership simply because they have a good-faith,
principled commitment to the advancement of refugee protection and
development issues. Many states recognize a moral obligation not only
to those refugees who arrive at their own borders, but also to refugees
who seek protection abroad. Well-organized and effective mechanisms
for sharing the responsibility and burden of refugee protection will
offer states a forum in which this genuine concern can be most productively and meaningfully realized.3 1
c. Situation-Specific Involvement
Beyond states likely to become inner or outer core members of an
interest-convergence group, other governments should be prepared to
support protection efforts in specific cases. While not willing to commit themselves formally to an ongoing relationship to the group, some
states will nonetheless be willing to support assistance either to particular refugee populations or in specific circumstances. The contribu340. The shared legal and political culture of member states of the Commonwealth of Nations
prompted solidarity with the United Kingdom in giving asylum to ethnic East Indians forced
to flee Uganda, a fellow Commonwealth state. Nicholas Van Hear, Editorial Introduction to the
Ugandan Asian Theme Papers, 6 J. REFUGEE SUD. 226-29 (1993). This continuing bond among
Commonwealth governments has now prompted the Commonwealth to establish an Intergovernmental Group on Refugees and Displaced Persona, a fundamental goal of which is to find ways
to alleviate the burdens of its poorer members faced with large-scale refugee flows. Draft Summary
of Discussions of the First Meeting of the Commonwealth Intergovernmental Group on Refugees
and Displaced Persons (Oct. 2-3, 1996) (on file with authors).
341. See AGUILAR ZINSER, supra note 123, at 32-38.
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tions made will range from fiscal support to significant involvement in
responsibility sharing.
The first and most compelling reason to support an interest-convergence group on a situation-specific basis is a strong sense of connectedness to the refugee population. Israel, for example, has a proven
record of responding when Jewish refugees in any part of the world
are forced to flee. 342 In the late 1970s, China assimilated en masse
300,000 ethnic Chinese refugees from Vietnam. 343 When hundreds of
thousands of refugees fled Togo to neighboring countries in 1993, those
who went to Benin were warmly welcomed by their ethnic kinfolk, to
the point that thousands were taken into the homes of private citizens. 344
Second, a state might ally itself with an interest-convergence group
that is responding to a particular refugee flow that it induced, directly
or indirectly. In what amounts to a form of restitution, a government
might opt for situation-specific involvement where it believes that it
would be unfair for regional states to be forced to cope on their own.
For example, the willingness of the United States and its allies to
become involved in providing financial aid and resettlement offers to
Indochinese refugees is at least partly explained by feelings of respon345
sibility for the refugee exodus.
Third, governments may respond to an interest-convergence group
on a situation-specific basis when it is clear that public opinion demands a response. Some have termed this phenomenon the "CNN
effect," but its impact should not be underestimated. 346 The suffering,
deprivation, and loss that mark large scale refugee movements are often
graphically and immediately covered by media and transmitted around
342. For instance, from the spring of 1991 to the end of 1992, about 50,000 Ethiopian Jews
immigrated to Israel. U.S. COMrrrEE FOR REFUGEES, WoRLD REFUGEE SURVEY 101 (1993).
343. MUNTARBHORN, supra note 102, at 16-17.
344. Abbott, supra note 103.
345. Coles, supra note 118, at 379-80. Similar considerations may account for the response
crafted by the Americans and their allies to the Kurdish and Shi'i refugee crises that followed
the Gulf War (albeit a response open to justifiable criticism for its restrictiveness and slowness).
U.S. forces had encouraged those communities to rise up against the Iraqi government and
recognized some responsibility to assist when those uprisings were met with brutal force. S
generally Howard Adelman, HumanitarianIntervention: The Case of the Kurd, 4 INT'L J. REFUGEE
L. 4, 5-7 (1992).
346.
[The (U.S.] Administration felt able to hold up a minor contribution to a UN force
intended to stop mass murder [in Rwanda], but was compelled to spend far greater
sums on emergency aid for refugees, moved by pictures of suffering children ....
What pushed the United States to act was pictures of refugees in Goma shown on

CNN.
AFRIcAN RIGHTS, supra note 78, at 712, 715. See also THE MEDIA, HUMANITARIAN CsuSES, AND
POLIcY-MAKING: A REPORT OF AN INTERNATIONAL MEETING I (World Peace Foundation
Reports No. 7, 1995).
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the world. These images of pain and tragedy do have an impact on the
general public and can lead to domestic political pressure for an
appropriate, effective response. Conversely, half-hearted and inadequate
responses generate criticism and provide fodder to opposition politicians.
When pressure builds to a point that politicians have no choice
but
to act, the provision of aid through functioning and internationally
supervised interest-convergence groups is a reliable and convenient
route to follow. The influx of one million Rwandan refugees into Zaire
in July 1994 created a humanitarian emergency that shocked the world
and initially overwhelmed relief efforts. By the time a response was
mobilized to the horrifying images and stories of violent and diseaseridden Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire, conditions had deteriorated
to such an extent that the costs of properly responding had risen and
security problems had become intractable. 347 Had credible interestconvergence group plans to protect refugees been in place before the
crisis emerged, extraregional states would undoubtedly have directed
their contributions to support group initiatives, resulting in better
protection at a lower cost.
d. Non-State Participation
Intergovernmental organizations have proved critical to the coordination of successful attempts at collectivized refugee protection. The
participation and involvement of UNHCR and other intergovernmental agencies, including the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), have been critical to the success of undertakings such as the
ICARA II process in Africa and CIREFCA in Central America. They
played a. facilitative role, initiating and promoting dialogue and negotiations. 348 Intergovernmenta agencies are also able to draw on significant practical experience to propose and implement solutions to
logistical and other operational concerns.
UNHCR is, of course, the primary intergovernmental organization
charged with the responsibility for refugee protection, and should be
granted a formal relationship to each interest-convergence group. While
UNHCR's independence is compromised by both its governance structure and lack of a meaningful core budget, 349 it is still somewhat
347. AFRICAN RIGHTS, supra note 78, at 712, 715; U.S. ConrtzarE FOR REFUGEES, NVORLD
REFUGEE SURVEY 73-76 (1996).
348. PEREZ DEL CASTILLO & FAHLEN, supra note 123; Gorman, Refugee Aid and Di'elopmnent
in Africa, supra note 122.
349.
The actual operating budget of the organization is almost completely derived from the
voluntary contributions of a fairly small number of developed states, while funding
Because
from the United Nations covers only routine administrative expenses ....
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removed from the immediate political factors that may lead states to
respond in ways that are insensitive or even hostile to refugee needs.
This relative credibility and impartiality that UNHCR brings to refugee protection was an important element in the ICARA process, where
the UNHCR played a leading role in identifying and quantifying the
350
burden that needed to be shared.
The Refugee Convention already mandates a working relationship
between states and UNI-CR. Under Article 35, state parties are to
undertake to cooperate with UNHCR, and to facilitate its duty to
supervise the application of the Convention. States also agree to report
to UNHCR regarding the condition of refugees, the implementation
of the Convention, and national laws relating to refugees. 351- This
obligation could sensibly be implemented by inviting UNHCR to
serve as a secretariat to interest-convergence groups on refugee protection issues. UNHCR should be privy to, and participate in, the interest-convergence groups' discussions of refugee protection at all times:
when general principles for apportioning responsibilities and burdens
are being developed, when those principles are applied in response to
the arrival of refugees in a member state, and when respect for refugee
rights during temporary protection and eventual repatriation or resettlement is monitored.
Nongovernmental organizations should also be formally incorporated in the interest-convergence group model. NGOs are often able
to deliver services to refugees more cost effectively than governmental
and intergovernmental bureaucracies. 352 They may also be more attuned to the needs of the refugee population, taking care to incorporate
35 3
refugee voices into decision-making about aid and protection needs.
Experience of government corruption and inefficiency, and even instances of governments withholding aid money repressively, have dissuaded many states from funding government-to-government aid projects, including those directed to refugees. For this reason, most
governments involved in the CIREFCA process insisted on grassroots
delivery of development assistance, coordinated by NGOs. Donor gov-

this body is traditionally dominated by the developed states that make a significant
financial contribution to UNHCR, it provides a bulwark against any move to re-orient
the organization's work away from the containment of Third World refugee problems.
James C. Hathaway, A Reconsiderationof the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law, 31 HARv. INT'L L.J.
129, 161 (1990).
350. Robert F. Gorman, Beyond ICARA II: Implementing Refugee-Related Development Assistance,

20

INT'L MIGRATION

REv. 283, 286 (1986).

351. Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 35. See supra text accompanying notes 136-138.
352. ELIZABETH G. FERRIS, BEYOND BORDERS: REFUGEES, MIGRANT, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THE POsT-COLD WAR ERA 45 (1993).

353. GIL LOESCHER, BEYOND CHARITY: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND THE GLOBAL
REFUGEE CRISIS 177 (1993).

HarvardHuman RightsJournal / Vol. 10
ernments recognized that NGOs often provide the most reliable means
of reaching refugee populations and delivering aid to those who need
it most. 54 The effort was particularly successful in El Salvador, where
several indigenous NGOs were established to represent the needs of
affected communities, and to administer and deliver development assistance.3 55 The ongoing involvement of the NGO sector in the planning and delivery of protection is also a pragmatic means to secure the
involvement of a dependable group of outer core states.
While it would be unwieldy to allow all relevant NGOs to become
full members of interest-convergence groups, states should invite the
lead NGOs working with refugees in their area to participate formally
in the work of the interest-convergence group. The NGOs might be
granted the kind of consultative status afforded NGOs within the UN
356
system, depending on their size and mandate.
Not all NGOs would want this kind of cooperative relationship with
the government members of the interest-convergence group. Organizations primarily involved in the delivery of aid to refugee populations
will likely see this as an opportunity for better access to those in need
of assistance, as they would be allowed to help in planning and
delivering aid programs from the outset. As long as the sharing regime
stays true to basic principles and is approached in good faith by all,
aid agencies would probably find it easier to realize their protection
objectives under a collectivized approach than within the present fragmented system. 357 NGOs concerned with monitoring protection should
also consider participation as a means of bringing enhanced transparency to the protection regime. Together with UNHCR, NGOs are well
positioned to help ensure that decisions about sharing are being made
realistically and fairly, in a manner that truly meets the needs of
refugees.
2. The Process of Sharing
The operationalization of a responsibility sharing and burden sharing regime is of course what will ultimately determine its success. A
reliable process that responds quickly and fairly to refugee flows needs
to be established in advance, so that the members of each interest-con354. GALLAGHER & MILLER, supra note 123, at 26; Patricia Weiss Fagen, Peace in Ccntral
America: Transitionfor the Uprooted, in U.S. COMMIrTEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY
30-39 (1993).
355. AGUI.AR ZINSER, supra note 123, at 42-43.
356.

See HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMN RIGHTS IN CON-

TEXT: LAW, POLITIcS, MORALS 489-99 (1996), for a description and overview of the NGO
consultative status process within the United Nations system.
357. NGOs already derive a significant portion of their budgets from the administration of

aid projects on behalf of governments. FERRIS, supra note 352, at 41.

1997 / InternationalRefugee Law
vergence group clearly understand their obligations before a request for
assistance is actually made. The process needs to be strongly proactive
in order to avoid the temptation of states to deter the arrival of refugees
for fear of being required to assume individuated responsibilities.
A good-faith pledge should be a condition precedent to membership
in an interest-convergence group. An active commitment to good faith
among states might be encouraged by establishing an incentive fund
to be administered by UNHCR's Division of International Protection.
Of course, some interest-convergence groups, particularly those involving mainly wealthier countries, may prefer to forego the incentive
funds rather than abandon aberrant practices. In those instances, it may
simply be an unavoidable reality of the international system-including present protection mechanisms no less than those we proposethat the only serious check on the behavior of those states will be the
power they wield over each other.358 This kind of state self-regulation
is, in turn, largely a function of the negative attention that intergovernmental organizations and NGOs can bring to bear on activities that
359
endanger refugees.
In operational terms, the central element of the interest-convergence
group process we propose is the ability of any member of an interestconvergence group or the UNHCR to convene a meeting of the group
when faced with a refugee influx with which it feels unable to cope
independently. The purpose of the meeting would be to concretize and
operationalize pre-determined criteria for sharing responsibilities and
burdens in a specific context. 360 Members of the group would bind
themselves in advance to attend any such meeting and to negotiate in
good faith the nature of the shared response to the arrival of refugees.
An early precedent for this sort of flexible sub-global cooperation
was set by the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS),
which allows any member state to request that a Meeting of the
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs be convened to consider
361
an urgent problem of common interest to the American states.

358. See SHAw, supra note 2.

359.
At the international level, and particularly in the United Nations context, the frequent
reluctance of government actors to criticize their counterparts from other countries and
the limited supply of independent information have contributed to making NGOs the
linchpins of the system as a whole. In situations in which NGO information is not
available or where the NGOs are either unable or unwilling to generate political
pressure upon the governments concerned, the chances of a weak response by the
international community, or none at all, are radically increased.
STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 356, at 456.
360. The criteria for responsibility sharing and burden sharing are outlined at infra text
accompanying notes 396-397 and 409-413 respectively.
361. Charter of the Organization of American States, 1948, arts. 60, 61, 33 LLM. 981 (1994).

200

HarvardHuman RightsJournal / Vol. 10

While the OAS procedure has not proved particularly successful as a
means to generate fast and innovative responses, it has allowed states
to address areas of common concern through a well-defined process of
dialogue.
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE)
process for c6hflict resolution provides a useful model for structured
collaboration with a relatively informal association of states. The OSCE
mechanism for "consultation and cooperation with regard to emergency
situations" was adopted at the Valletta Meeting on Peaceful Settlement
of Disputes, and endorsed by the Berlin Meeting of the then-CSCE
Council in June 1991. Under this procedure, if any member state
concludes that an emergency situation is developing, it may request
"clarification" from another member state or states involved. An emergency includes anything that might constitute a violation of one of the
ten principles established in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, including
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The recipient
state has an immediate obligation to respond. If after forty-eight hours
the initiating state considers the situation to be unresolved, it can ask
the Chair of the Senior Council to convene a two-day emergehcy
meeting. If, within a further forty-eight hours, twelve OSCE states
second the request for a meeting, a meeting will be held no earlier
than forty-eight hours and not later than seventy-two hours from that
362
time.
The strength of the OSCE mechanism is its ability to get a disparate
group of states to come quickly to' the negotiating table. It shows that
states can agree to formalize a duty to consult with each other within
tightly defined time limits in response to a perceived crisis. In the
refugee context, however, the quorum requirement for convening a
meeting of OSCE Senior Officials, like the majority vote requirement
in the OAS Permanent Council, is unduly onerous. A government
faced with a refugee influx that it believes threatens key interests

might be tempted to resort to refoulement or other violations of refugee
rights if it cannot immediately secure a high level of agreement to

meet in order to share-out responsibilities and burdens. As well, the
OSCE requirement that all decisions be arrived at by consensus may
prove an obstacle to the ability of the process to generate clear and
workable decisions, particularly if the refugees' country of origin is a

member of the interest-convergence group. 363

Of greatest direct relevance, the European Union has recently adopted
an Emergency Procedurefor Burden Sharing with Regard to the Admission
362. Regarding the OSCE mechanism see VoJTEcH MAsTNY, THE HELSINxI PROCESS AND
THE REINTEGRATION OF EUROPE, 1986-1991 311-12 (1992).
363. Id.
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and Residence of DisplacedPersons on a Temporary Basis.36 The procedure
allows a member state of the EU, the EU Presidency, or the EU
Commission to convene an urgent meeting of a Coordinating Committee for the purpose of deciding whether a "situation exists which
requires concerted action by the European Union for the admission and
residence of displaced persons on a temporary basis." 365 If that meeting
concludes that an urgent situation exists, a proposal shall be prepared
and submitted to the EU Council for approval, taking account of the
recommendations of UNHCR. While the need for a two-step process
may be questioned, the EU procedure is the clearest example of an
interstate agreement to meet expeditiously in order to formulate a
collective response to a refugee flow. Of particular importance are the
decisions to base the consultative process on a previously agreed upon
set of principles, and to ensure input from UNHCR into any proposed
response.
The OAS, OSCE, and EU procedures all focus on ensuring that "the
meeting" will take place. Guaranteeing that a reliable forum for dialogue will be available is a realistic effort to move away from unilateralism, yet is still faithful to the realpolitik of contemporary state
collaboration. Even beyond meetings in response to particular requests
for assistance, the members of an interest-convergence group, including
state and non-state representatives, should have the opportunity for a
regular review of their collective undertaking. This might take place
on an annual basis, and could occur in the context of a meeting
convened to deal with the group's broader agenda. It is, however,
important that the interest-convergence group regularly turns its attention to refugee protection, and not just when a crisis arises.

E. Common but Differentiated Responsibility
The process of mandatory consultation described above will apply
pre-existing principles about the allocation of responsibilities and burdens to particular refugee situations. If governments are to have confidence
that the process will yield equitable results in minimum time, it is
essential that the "rules of the game" be agreed upon in advance of a
particular request for cooperation. The approach we advocate to the
definition of allocational principles for interest-convergence groups is
'3
based on a theory of "common but differentiated responsibility." 6
364. Burden Sharing with Regard to the Admission and Residence of Displaced Persons on a
Temporary Basis-Resolution, Final Text (95/C 262/01) (1995) [hereinafter E.U. Burden Sharing
Resolution].
365. Id.
366. See supra text accompanying note 124-146.
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The most difficult task in designing a system of common but
differentiated responsibility is, of course, to define the measure of what
is a fair and appropriate contribution for a state to make, both in terms
of physical protection and financial assistance. A generally applicable
form of measurement is necessary so that states have a sense of security
and predictability about how the scheme will operate. While it is
impossible to propose a completely formulaic approach, we develop
below a list of relevant indicators. Interest-convergence groups should
adapt and refine these principles to their own circumstances. Additional fine-tuning would occur as part of the mandatory consultation
process discussed above, 367 in which group members will meet to make
concrete decisions about sharing and financing protection for particular
groups of refugees.
1. Sharing the Responsibility to Protect
The Council of the European Union's Resolution on Burden Sharing
with Regard to the Admission and Residence of Displaced Persons on a
Temporary Basis368 links the duty to receive refugees directly to efforts

being made by states to resolve a particular refugee exodus. The
responsibility of a particular state to receive refugees arriving in Europe
will be reduced to take account of contributions it is making to prevent
or resolve the root cause of the refugee flow, especially by the supply
of military resources and humanitarian assistance. 369 While the growing commitment of states to address the origins of refugee flight and
to assist victims who remain within their own countries is important,
such efforts should not be invoked to reduce or eliminate refugee protection responsibilities.
Root-causes intervention and the provision of palliative protection
through refugee law are parallel, not alternative, responsibilities. Nor
is there any practical benefit to trading off a duty toward refugees in
order to stimulate action to eradicate the harms that induce flight:
meaningful and effective root causes intervention, in and of itself, will
reduce refugee flows, thereby providing governments with a sufficient
incentive to action. For example, Germany proved willing to end a
fifty year policy of not sending its troops abroad when it realized that
failure to intervene in Bosnia raised the prospect of contending with
more refugees. 370 Fundamentally, the European Union approach plays
367. See supra text accompanying note 360.
368. E.U. Burden Sharing Resolution, supra note 364, para. 4.

369. Id.
370.
[German Foreign Minister] Kinkel appealed to enlightened self-interest, saying: 'We
are more affected by the results of this conflict than others. Some 1.2 million people
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into the myth of "the right to remain," discussed earlier.37' It impliedly
suggests that refugee protection as traditionally conceived can be exchanged for a commitment to take action within the boundaries of
countries of origin. As we have shown, in-country protection remains,
at best, an unreliable proposition. The failure of international efforts
to establish true "safe-havens" in Iraq, Bosnia, and Rwanda clearly
attests that it is seriously premature to consider attenuation of the
as a means of securing
commitment to (external) refugee protection
372
support for the promise of solutions.
In addition to making contributions toward resolving the causes of
the refugee migration, the European Union Resolution provides that
decisions about sharing should also take into account "all economic,
social and political factors which may affect the capacity of a state to
admit an increased number of displaced persons under satisfactory
conditions." 373 The Resolution does not, however, give any guidance
on how those very broad factors should be measured or assessed. Peter
Schuck urges a market-based process for the allocation of the duty to
receive refugees.374 More commonly, it is suggested that each state's
responsibility to receive refugees be set as a function of its assimilative
375
capacity. This might be defined relative to a particular refugee flow,
or on the basis of a general formula of the kinds proposed by Atle
Grahl-Madsen and B.S. Chimni.
Writing in 1982, Atle Grahl-Madsen proposed a simple approach
for the apportionment of resettlement quotas among Northern states,
which may be a starting point for the kind of analysis advocated by
the second branch of the European Union's Resolution. Grahl-Madsen
suggested that refugee protection quotas be based on GNP and population, but with more emphasis on a state's GNP than on the size of
its population. He proposed a ratio of GNP"5/population. 376 Alterna-

from former Yugoslavia live here. We would be the first to have to cope with a new
influx of refugees if the peacekeepers pull out.
Rick Atkinson, Kohl Orders Troops to Bosnia, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WKLY., July 9, 1995, at
18.
371. See supra text accompanying notes 81-99.
372. See generally J. Hathaway, Root Caues as Refugee Protection: A Chimerical Promise?, in
IMMIGRATION AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: BUILDING ON A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH 117-

121 (S. Perrakis ed., 1995).
373. E.U. Burden Sharing Resolution, supra note 364, para. 4.
374. See Peter Schuck, Expanding Refugee Burden-Sharing and Protectiom A Modest Proposal,22
YALE J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 1997).
375. "lAin ideal method would determine the relative costs for each country associated with
admitting a given alien and direct that alien to the country where the costs are least." Steven H.
Atherton, International Moral Obligations: An Integrated Approach, 3 GEo. IMm. LJ. 19, 34-45

(1989).
376. Atle Grahl-Madsen, Refugees and Refugee Law in a World of Transition, 1982 MICH. YB.
INT'L LEGAL STUD. 65, 74.
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tively, considering the possibility of a global scheme of common but
differentiated responsibility, B.S. Chimni has proposed that all states
of sufficient size, which he defines as greater than 20,000 square
kilometers, agree to take roughly the same number of refugees. The
numbers would be adjusted by total land mass and population density,
377
and there might be a numerical ceiling.
In our view, however, this focus on absorptive capacity to define
basic responsibility sharing allocations is misplaced. The kinds of
measurement proposed by the European Union, Grahl-Madsen, and
Chimni should at most serve only an auxiliary function in defining the
basis for responsibility sharing.
A strict focus on the relative resources and circumstances of partner
states may result in refugees being admitted to countries unable to
deliver the kind of solution-oriented temporary protection that we
believe is essential to keeping a commitment to refugee protection
alive. Because the concept of differentiated responsibility allows us to
counter prima facie inequities, in responsibility sharing allocations
through binding commitments to provide residual solutions and fiscal
support, it makes most sense to protect refugees where they are safest,
most self-sufficient, least likely to experience social conflict, and ultimately in the best position to repatriate if and when safety is restored
in their country of origin. Only where a number of member states are
similarly positioned to meet refugee needs should population, geographical size, and other demographic measurements be factored in to
adjust responsibilities.
First and foremost, responsibility sharing allocations should be predicated on a careful assessment of implications for physical security.378
Second, functional compatibility between refugees and their potential
host communities is of vital importance. 379 Third, attention should be
paid to cultural harmony. The existence of ethnic, religious, or other
bonds between refugees and the population of a particular host state
is often indicative of a situation in which refugees are most likely to
be most readily accepted. Fourth, geographical proximity between the
state of asylum and the country of origin is desirable to allow for
ongoing contact between refugee and stayee communities, and ulti380
mately to facilitate repatriation.

377. B.S. Chimni, The Operational Mechanism: International Burden Sharing, in Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human Rights Protection: Background Paper for the Meeting of the Legal
Working Group 86, 104-07 (April 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
378. The legal obligatio, to provide for the physical security of refugees is discussed supra in
text accompanying notes 185-205.
379. The importance of refugee productivity to a solution-oriented understanding of temporary protection is discussed stpra in text accompanying notes 225-231.
380. The importance of ongoing contact between refugees and the stayee and internally
displaced communities is discussed supra at text accompanying notes 287-288.

1997 / InternationalRefugee Law
In making specific decisions about the locus of protection, interestconvergence groups would be advised to give weight to the express
wishes of the refugee population. The UNHCR Executive Committee
has agreed that "the intentions of the asylum seeker as regards the
country in which he wishes to request asylum should as far as possible
be taken into account." 381 Itis both humane and pragmatic to heed
this advice. In practical terms, refugees often make choices about
where to flee based on the very factors that we believe should guide
the interest-convergence groups' decisions about apportioning the responsibility to afford temporary protection: 'security, functional compatibility, cultural harmony, and geographical proximity. It is therefore
logical that the wishes of the refugee population be a source of data
for interest-convergence groups called upon to apply the four governing criteria for responsibility sharing.
There may be concerns that this four-part approach to the definition
of responsibility sharing risks ghettoizing refugees, as the criteria
identified here are likely to mean that most refugees will be physically
protected within their region of origin. 382 States farther away, in contrast, would more often contribute by a combination of fiscal transfers
and residual resettlement opportunities. As refugee populations originate disproportionately in the South, most refugees will remain in the
South under a workable responsibility sharing plan, and Northern
states might be viewed as "buying their way out" of an obligation to
provide refuge.
The simple answer to this critique is that Northern states do not
need this proposal in order to insulate themselves from most refugee
flows, as that goal has already largely been achieved by means of
non-entre tactics and refugee containment under the banner of the
"right to remain." The North has thus far acted unilaterally, to the
detriment of both refugees and the Southern countries that shoulder
the resultant responsibilities and burdens of protection. While it is
true that our model does not challenge the trend to protect most
refugees within their region of origin (though for such groups as
Bosnians or Haitians, the region of origin clearly includes parts of the
North), the suggestion that the shift proposed here would somehow
"1allow" powerful governments to "buy their way out" of providing
refuge takes no account of the fact that there is very little left to buy.
The developed world has already off-loaded most obligations onto the
381. ExCom Conclusion No. 15, supra note 112.
382. The Secretariat of the Inter-governmental Consultations has recently acknowledged criticism of its proposal to establish an exclusively "in-region" approach to refugee protection. It
candidly recognized that such a project faces "significant moral (political and humanitarian) ...
obstacles." INTER-GOVERNMENTAL CONSULTATIONS, REGION OF ORIGIN FOLLOW-UP,supra note
328, at 7. See also Rosemary Byrne & Andrew Schacknove, The Safe Country Notion in European
Asylum Law, 9 Htav. Hums. RTS. J. 185 (1996).
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South, but without paying anything for the privilege. The difference
between the status quo and what we propose is therefore not so much
where refugees will be protected, but the equity of the conditions
under which that protection will be provided.
Because developed states value manageability, and because they are
increasingly aware that their economic and security interests are implicated in the South, we believe that the kinds of obligation we posit
here will ultimately be understood to be reconcilable to Northern
countries' self-interest.38 3 Both refugees and Southern states will benefit
significantly as a result. There is, however, no quidpro quo that could
induce the North to dismantle all barriers to access and to grant
temporary protection, much less routine permanent admission, to all
refugees who arrive at its borders. Ready access to durable asylum in
the North is simply not on the table, and an approach to refugee law
reform that assumes otherwise is bound to fail.
More fundamentally, there is no inherent wrong in most refugees being
protected in their region of origin if the decision to afford protection
there follows logically from a good-faith application of the four responsibility sharing criteria proposed above. 384 Because fiscal burden sharing will be guaranteed to offset inequitably assigned costs, only geopolitical chauvinism could lead to the conclusion that the responsibility
sharing mechanism is flawed simply because it frequently results in a
decision to protect refugees in other than the developed world.
In any event, our proposal does, in fact, require extraregional states
to assume responsibility for important parts of the duty to receive
refugees. 38 5 We specifically define the ability to ensure physical security
as the primordial concern in making decisions about responsibility
sharing. 38 6 To the extent that secure asylum is not possible in a region,
for example by reason of pervasive armed conflict, extraregional interest-convergence group members and other states will of necessity be
called upon to receive refugees. Furthermore, as stressed earlier,387 there
383. See supra text accompanying notes 125-126, 128-133, and 335-341.
384. See, eg., Report of the Sub-Committee of the Whole on International Protection, U.N. GAOR,
Executive Committee on the High Commissioner's Programme, 43d Ses., at para. 20, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.96/802 (1992):
A strong emphasis was placed by a number of delegations on regional cooperation to

resolve refugee problems. One delegation commented, in particular, on the value of
refugees staying, where possible, close to their home countries, so as to assist their

return when conditions allowed and to facilitate their reintegration. Another delegation
felt that asylum outside the region of origin should be considered relevant mainly for
especially vulnerable groups, such as medical cases, which cannot be cared for inside
the region.
385. See supra text accompanying notes 132-134.
386. See supra text accompanying note 377.
387. See supra text accompanying notes 274-276, 292, and 305.
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will be a clear need both to exempt some refugees with special needs
from the temporary protection system altogether, and to find permanent homes for those refugees who cannot return home in safety at the
expiration of the period of temporary protection. In many and perhaps
most cases, extraregional states should shoulder these responsibilities. 38s While the number of persons admitted extraregionally by virtue
of these responsibilities will be significantly smaller than the refugee
population that remains in the region of origin, this imbalance is offset
by the fact that the extraregional commitment is permanent, rather
than temporary.
Finally, our model does not allow states to abdicate their responsibilities under the Refugee Convention, including the duty of non-refoulement.38 9 Northern governments will therefore not be able to write
a check as a means of legitimating the deterrence of refugee claimants.
The approach advocated here simply accepts the reality that the vast
majority of the world's refugees do remain in the South, and that their
needs are often poorly met, while grossly disproportionate sums of
money are spent on non-entrke practices and assessing the protection
needs of the small minority who reach the North.390 Better protection
in the regions of origin, which we believe will flow from a principled
sharing regime, will benefit the overwhelming majority of refugees. It
will also make the difficult decision of staying closer to home or
claiming refugee status abroad a more balanced one for refugees, who
will not feel the need to take long and costly journeys because of a
lack of security in countries of first asylum. 391 Under the logic of
differentiated responsibility, fiscal transfers from wealthier countries
become a matter of obligation rather than largesse. The obligation of
extraregional governments toward refugees who receive asylum in their
region of origin is no less real and concrete simply because it will often
entail fiscal, rather than physical, support.
2. Apportioning Fiscal Burdens
An interest-convergence group will also need to establish principles
to guide the allocation of the costs of providing protection. In keeping
with the principle of differentiated responsibility, interest-convergence
groups should recognize that those states that take on a substantial
388. The logic of assigning much of this responsibility to the outer core of an interest-convergence group is noted supra in text accompanying notes 276 and 306.
389. See supra text accompanying notes 128-129 and 185-189.
390. See supra text accompanying notes 154-160.
391. "Nf]ost displaced persons would choose to remain in their region of origin, if adequate
protection and conditions were provided." INTER-GOVERNMENTAL CONSULTATIONS, REGION OF
ORIGIN FoLLOW-up, supra note 328, at 2.

HarvardHuman RightsJournal / Vol. 10
share of the responsibility of providing protection ought not also to be
expected to shoulder a major part of the fiscal burden of protection. It
will normally fall to outer core members to guarantee reliable funding,
assisted by funds from situation-specific contributors. Disproportionately overburdened, and often impoverished, inner core states need to
know that extraregional support and involvement are reliably forthcoming. Simply put, states will participate in the insurance program
if they are confident that it is adequately funded, and that the cost of
assuming responsibility toward refugees is thereby minimized.
The system of predetermined burden sharing is intended to avoid
the frequently encountered danger of a gap between rhetoric and
reality. Pledges of funding may encourage states to sign-on to a collectivized enterprise, but if the money does not materialize after the
photo opportunities of international conferences, implementation will
be delayed and possibly abandoned. This was a critical problem in the
ICARA process for addressing the needs of African refugees. As many
donor states failed to follow through with funds to back up their
392
pledges, protection suffered accordingly.
Collectivized responsibility also provides a means for outer core
states, and states motivated to participate on a situation-specific basis,
to know that they can rely on the local players to be effective and
efficient in applying resources to protection needs. ICARA and CIREFCA demonstrated that while the careful preparation of project proposals can be time-consuming, it is integral to garnering the confidence
of potential donors. 393 If an interest-convergence group's proposed plan
of responsibility sharing is realistic, efficient, and effective, even states
not formally committed to the group are likely to see that it is in their
interest to ensure that the necessary fiscal support is made available.
Beyond respect for the principle of differentiated responsibility noted
at the outset of this section, there are a variety of ways in which
determinations of the quantum of support logically assigned to particular members of the interest-convergence group should be made. In
considering the possibility of a global scheme of burden sharing, B.S.
394
Chimni has proposed a system of graduated taxation based on GNP.
Alternatively, some cooperative environmental regimes have adopted a
system of contributions based on the scale of funding obligations to

392. Gorman, supra note 122, at 230-31.
393. "[W]ith assistance from UN technical teams, African host countries elaborated project
submissions that were more successful than the ICARA I submissions at attracting greater donor
interest and support." Id. at 228 (citation omitted). Although the desired funding did not
materialize, "ICARA H was a milestone in linking refugee aid and development." Id at 228. Sce
also PEREZ DEL CAS'LLO & FAHLEN, siora note 123, for a general discussion of the importance
of project proposal development to the attraction of financial assistance under CIREFCA.
394. Chimni, supra note 377, at 116-17.
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the United Nations. 395 There are also some useful parallels in how
members of the U.N. and some regional bodies have apportioned the
cost of various peacekeeping missions, balancing between those states
that provide troops and weaponry and those states that primarily
provide financial assistance.
The experience of international environmental protection regimes,
as well as the seemingly intractable budget crisis faced by the U.N.,
clearly demonstrate that promises of financial assistance are meaningless if there is no follow-through. The whole collectivized regime may
simply disintegrate if the inner core states do not receive the backing
they require. A simple means of ensuring a reasonable degree of financial stability and reliability might therefore be for interest-convergence
groups to establish a fund during non-crisis times. Outer core states
would make ongoing contributions so as to keep the fund as close as
possible to a desired level of preparedness. For example, a European
Refugee Fund has been proposed from which funds would be made
available to a state willing to assume a disproportionate share of the
collective responsibility to protect refugees arriving at the common
396
territory of the European Union.
CONCLUSIONS
Much of the refugee regime's present dysfunction can be traced to
two fundamental concerns: the failure of refugee law to minimize
conflict with migration control objectives through the promotion of
viable repatriation, and an atomistic understanding of legal responsibilities undertaken toward refugees. States increasingly want to avoid
the particularized obligations that arise when refugees arrive at their
territory. They are also unconvinced that refugees will ever return
home. As a result, governments have adopted policies that envisage the
deterrence of refugees by non-entre and other containment practices, or
drive refugees away by offering only an inhumane variety of "protection." This Article derives from a conviction that it is possible to meet
395. The U.N.'s scale of assessments is based, in theory, on the real capacity of member states
to pay. There are, however, some striking disparities in the assessment levels that do not seem
to be indicative of national wealth (for example, Saudi Arabia's assessment level is set at .96%,
whereas the Ukraine's is 1.18%). The levels are set by an 18-member Committee on Contributions. No one state can contribute more than 25% of the entire budget, and all states must make
a minimum contribution of .01%. INDEPENDENT ADVISORY GROUP ON U.N. FINANCING,
FINANCING AN EFFECTIVE UNITED NATIONS (1993); DAVID R. PROTHEROE, THE UNITED
NATIONS AND ITS FINANCES: A TEST FOR MIDDLE POWERS (1988).
396. European Commission Communication at paras. 100-01, referring to European Parliament Resolution A3-0280/92, at para. 7, Nov. 18, 1992. The proposal has received general
support from the European Council on Refugees and Exiles. ECRE, Position of the European
Council on Refugees and Exiles on Sharing the Responsibility: Protecting Refugees and Displaced
Persons in the Context of Large Scale Arrivals, at 2.
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these concerns of governments head-on, thereby mediating the restrictionist tendencies of asylum states. The Refugee Convention establishes
a refugee rights framework that can easily lay the groundwork for
solutions, and calls for international cooperation in protecting refugees.
It is time to put those principles into practice on a dependable and
pragmatic basis.
Temporary protection, leading in most cases to repatriation, makes
clear that refugee law is a form of human rights protection, and not a
"back door" to permanent immigration. It is concerned to safeguard
human dignity only until and unless the home state is able to effectively resume its primary duty of protection. If temporary protection
is conceived in a rights-regarding and solution-oriented manner, most
refugees will be able to return home. This requires respect for the
existing refugee rights regime, including admission to secure asylum
in which human dignity is respected and self-sufficiency promoted.
More fundamentally, the viability of repatriation calls for affirmative
efforts to preserve the family and communal structures of refugees,
develop skills that will be of value in the home country, promote
cooperative planning between refugees and those who did not leave,
and institute confidence-building measures that include both solid
information-gathering and opportunities to "test the waters" in the
country of origin. It will normally need to be sustained by a credible
program of repatriation aid and development assistance, oriented to
grounding a process of meaningful economic and social reintegration.
Steps can also be taken to convince governments that an openness
to the arrival of refugees does not expose them to the risk of unilateral
and undifferentiated legal responsibility. While a regime of shared
global responsibility may still be beyond reach, sub-global associations
of states bound by shared security interests, common heritage, or
important economic or political relationships afford a ready base for
collectivized implementation of duties owed to refugees. We have
described how governments, in concert with the UNHCR and NGOs,
should formalize processes and principles that delineate as clearly as
possible, but with flexibility, the obligation to assist each other in
responding to the arrival of refugees. There is a need for cooperating
governments to benefit from solid and credible mutual undertakings,
so that the states involved know that they can rely on each other. This
includes an obligation on all states involved to respond expeditiously
to refugee arrivals with which a cooperating state feels unable to cope
independently, and to contribute on the basis of agreed criteria for the
allocation of burdens and responsibilities.
Different states have differing capabilities to contribute to a collectivized process of refugee protection. Some states will be best suited
to provide physical protection during the period of temporary protec-
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tion. Other states will be motivated to assist by providing dependable
guarantees of financial resources and residual resettlement opportunities. Still other governments will collaborate by funding protection or
receiving refugees in particular contexts, on a case-by-case basis. Under
a system of common but differentiated responsibility, the net resources
available for refugee protection would be maximized by calling on
states to contribute in ways that correspond to their relative capacities
and strengths.
The approach to refugee protection outlined in this Article is intended to encourage a transition away from traditional ways of thinking about refugee flows and solutions. Consideration should be given
to implementing refugee law on the basis of a duty to equitably share
the responsibilities and burdens of refugee protection. Collectivized
and solution-oriented temporary protection presents the best option to
replenish at least a substantial part of the world's asylum capacity.
While some refugees, perhaps even a substantial minority, will still
require residual or special needs resettlement, temporary protection
will help to keep the number of such cases manageable, thereby more
effectively reconciling the protection needs of refugees to the migration
control objectives of governments.
No approach to refugee protection, standing on its own, can eradicate the need for persons to flee the risk of serious harm. Our model
of protecting refugees neither aspires to be, nor in any sense contradicts, a program of timely, meaningful, and apolitical action to bring
an end to the causes of refugee flight. Our goal, and the goal of refugee
protection as conceived in international law, is instead to ensure the
availability of solid and rights-regarding protection to refugees until
and unless it is safe for them to return. Protection, if carefully designed
and delivered, is the critical complement to root causes intervention.
Even as states give increasing attention to efforts intended to end the
need to flee, we must not fail to renovate the means by which we
protect those who cannot wait for our efforts to succeed. Solution-oriented temporary protection, conceived within a framework of common
but differentiated responsibility toward refugees, offers the best hope
of keeping the institution of asylum alive.

